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ARTICLES
INHERITANCE EQUITY: REFORMING THE
INHERITANCE PENALTIES FACING
CHILDREN IN NONTRADITIONAL
FAMILIES
Danaya C. Wright*
This Article examines how more than 50% of children living today
may be disadvantaged by 1950s era inheritance laws that privilege and
protect only those children living in nuclear families with their biological
parents.  Because so many children today are living in blended fami-
lies—single-parent families, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or
queer/questioning (LGBTQ) families, or are living with relatives—their
right to inherit from the persons who function as their parents is severely
limited by most state probate codes, even though they would likely be
entitled to child support under the parent-child definitions of most of
those states’ family law codes.  In the unusual case of second-parent
adoptions by the partner of a biological parent, many children will be
cut off from being able to inherit from their biological parent, which is a
truly unanticipated consequence of the “fresh start” provision of most
probate codes that delineate the rights of adopted children.  This Article
explores the vast scope of the inheritance penalty, including the history
of equitable adoption doctrines and attitudes about parenting.  It in-
cludes model statutory language to resolve some of the myriad disabili-
ties in these probate codes and a chart detailing how the adoption and
inheritance laws of all fifty states interact to create the inheritance
penalty.
* Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.  I
would like to thank Lee-ford Tritt for bringing this issue to my attention and to Shelbi Day,
formerly of Lambda Legal, for encouraging further research in this area.  I also would like to
acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the University of Florida, Levin College of Law for its
financial support of this work, to Carla Spivak and the Oklahoma City University College of
Law and the Section on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues of the AALS for al-
lowing me to present this work, and to my students for their interest and input in all manner of
trusts and estates issues.  And I had the invaluable assistance of three law students, Amy
Levenberg, Richard Burke, and Reilly-Owen Clemens.  Finally, I have to thank my partner,
Kendal Broad-Wright and our two children, without whom I would not be among the majority
of people living in a nontraditional family.
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INTRODUCTION
In Charles Dickens’s classic novel, Great Expectations, the or-
phaned Pip becomes a gentleman after learning that he will inherit great
wealth from an anonymous benefactor.1  Raised by his ill-tempered older
sister and her benevolent husband, Pip had few opportunities to better his
lot in life, and his fortunes rise and fall with those of his acquaintances
and friends.  Pip inherits nothing from his parents, who die when he is an
infant, and his older sister agrees to raise him because he has no other
family to take him in.  Pip’s unexpected good fortune comes at the hands
of an escaped convict, Abel Magwitch, who decides to make a gentleman
of the young child who saved his life when he escaped from the prison
hulks and made his way to Australia to earn his fortune.
1 CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS (1861).
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Although written 150 years ago, Dickens’s novel depicts a life that
is both remarkably common and rather uncommon today.  Like Pip,
nearly 70% of children in the U.S. today are being raised in nontradi-
tional homes.2  These relationships more often involve divorce, same-sex
cohabitation, or both, rather than the death of both parents, but it is stag-
gering that fewer than half of all children are raised in homes with both
the child’s married biological mother and father.3  Like Pip, children to-
day are also very unlikely to inherit significant wealth, relying instead on
happenstance, good fortune, and the benevolence of others to find their
“great expectations.”  Today, fewer than 50% of decedents’ estates will
be probated, and the vast majority of small inheritances will pass to
spouses and children with little or no planning.4  For those of us in the
bottom 99% of the population, an inheritance is not something we expect
nor is it likely to establish our future class standing, as it did fortuitously
for Pip.5
2 I use the term “nontraditional” in this Article to refer to all types of family and house-
hold relations except the nuclear family of a married heterosexual couple with the couple’s
biological children.  Nontraditional families would include divorced families, remarried fami-
lies with children by different parents (blended families), same-sex families, unmarried cohab-
iting families, children raised by relatives, stepparent families, and the like. See A Generation
at Risk, GRIEF SPEAKS (May 19, 2014), http://www.griefspeaks.com/id113.html.
3 Id.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-14, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010, at 5
(2010), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf; see also Jeannie Kever,
Census Data Shows Non-Traditional Families Are Growing, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Aug. 11,
2011), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Census-data-shows-non-traditional-families-are-
1849358.php (explaining that in Texas, 39% of children live with a single parent, same-sex
parents, grandparents, or other relatives, while 61% live in heterosexual families, and 61%
include blended families with stepparents).
4 Only 35% of Americans have a will, down from 45% in 2007. See Lawyers.com
Survey Reveals Drop in Estate Planning, LAWYERS.COM (MAY 19, 2014), http://press-
room.lawyers.com/2010-will-survey-press-release.html.  At the same time, 20% believe they
do not need such documents because their spouse and children will receive their property
anyway. Id.  This Article questions that assumption even for the relatively small 20%.  A 1978
study showed that more than half of all people questioned had not made wills. See Mary
Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 337 (1978).  Two earlier
works indicated the same thing. See Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of
Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 248 (1963); Joel R. Glucksman, Intes-
tate Succession in New Jersey: Does it Conform to Popular Expectations?, 12 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 253, 285 (1976).  Identifying how many people have wills is difficult; it is not a
question asked on the census and there is no easy way to correlate local deaths with local
probate proceedings of wills.  So most of the data is from small samples and has been recited
over and over until it takes on mythical stature.  Nevertheless, most people do not make wills,
but the rates of will-making increase with age and with wealth.  Neither of these conclusions is
surprising.
5 Scholars continue to marvel at unrealistic assumptions most people continue to pos-
sess.  In a famous study into whether or not the estate tax should be repealed, the vast majority
of people voted to repeal the tax, even though repeal would have benefitted only a small 1% or
2% of the population at the time.  Today, that number is about 0.2% of the population.  None-
theless, people had such unrealistic expectations that they might someday inherit great wealth
that they would opt not to impose an estate tax even though the odds of being affected by it are
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But unlike orphans in England during the 1860s, people today are
far more likely to encounter formal legal barriers to organizing their in-
formal family relationships; they structure their lives with a greater atten-
tion to their legal rights and obligations.  We generally have come to
accept that law will play a greater role in our lives, including laws that
determine family relationships and property distribution upon death.  We
know that property cannot be retitled without a probate judge’s signature,
and that child support or custody is enforceable only when backed by a
court order.  The supervisory role of law has pushed deeper into our pri-
vate families and we have come to accept greater regulation of our par-
ent-child relationships.  A larger percentage of marginalized families will
encounter the law than those of Pip’s era, for no social workers visited
Pip’s sister’s house, no school demanded a guardianship determination,
and his sister did not have to prove his biological relationship in order to
qualify for financial assistance.  When his sister and brother-in-law died,
Pip was unlikely to be notified by a court of his standing to intervene in
the probate of their estates.
Modern family law has adjusted to the sexual revolution of the
twentieth century, the mobility of our twenty-first century population,
and the social acceptance of nontraditional families.  It has tried to ac-
commodate the needs of all children by enforcing child support orders6
and making custody and visitation determinations based on the child’s
best interests.7  Additionally, social welfare agencies have tried to pro-
vide stability in all homes, resulting in the greater influence of law in
people’s lives today.8  The law of inheritance, however, remains largely
mired in nineteenth century values and expectations, based on the lives
and needs of the landed classes, where inheritance and bloodline deter-
mined personal success and ensured social and political stability.  Like
virtually zero. See Mayling Birney et al., Public Opinion and the Push to Repeal the Estate
Tax, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 439, 439–40 (2006).
6 E.g., Erica Bertini, Married but Separated: Custodial Parents Can Seek Retroactive
Child Support Under the Parentage Act, 24 DUPAGE CNTY. B. ASS’N BRIEF 36, 36 (2012);
Michael L. Hopkins, “What is Sauce for the Gander is Sauce for the Goose”: Enforcing Child
Support on Former Same-Sex Partners Who Create a Child Through Artificial Insemination,
25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 219, 220 (2006).
7 E.g., Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custo-
dial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 302 (1996) (pointing out that
high courts of many states have recognized, over time, the custodial parent’s right to relocate
with the child); James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 923,
928–44 (2001); Suzanne B. Goldberg et al., Family Law Scholarship Goes to Court: Func-
tional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 348,
370–73 (2011).
8 Although these laws are not perfect by any means, family law recognizes that people’s
lives do not always fit into neat patterns. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law,
57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 854–59 (2004); Shani M. King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?)
Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 592 (2011).
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the probate codes of Dickens’s Victorian England, contemporary probate
codes continue to privilege the biological connection and are out of touch
with the fluid and informal relationships of today’s modern families.  Al-
though the inheritance laws have changed little over the last century and
a half, the number and makeup of families whose affairs will be affected
by inheritance laws have changed dramatically, and there are many more
Pips in this country than lawmakers, judges, and the Uniform Law Com-
mission9 (ULC) like to acknowledge.
The tremendous gap between the desires of decedents to benefit the
people in their lives with testamentary gifts, and the strictness of many
laws of inheritance, propel us toward reexamining inheritance law re-
gardless of whether their relationships are formally perfected.  And ironi-
cally, more than just informal family relationships need protecting.  The
law also disadvantages a certain class of children who are legally
adopted and whose parents have undertaken the costly and burdensome
task of formalizing their parent-child relationship.  In the case of second-
parent adoptions by same-sex partners or unmarried partners of biologi-
cal parents, a formal adoption may cut off the inheritance rights of
adopted children to inherit from their biological parent even when that
person continues to act as a parent.  Most state probate codes will cut off
a child’s right to inherit from her biological parent upon an adoption by
an unmarried co-parent, thus denying inheritance rights even when par-
ents intend for the adoption to secure such rights.  Without a legally rec-
ognized parent-child relationship, however, a child cannot inherit from a
person who is, for all intents and purposes, his or her parent, and the
death of that parent can lead to dire financial circumstances for minor
children.10  Thus, while nonadopted children cannot inherit from func-
tional parents, some adopted children cannot inherit from biological par-
ents either, raising serious concerns about the underinclusiveness of
inheritance law and the inequitable effects of linking inheritance rights to
biology and adoption.
This Article looks at two situations in which the interplay of adop-
tion and inheritance law disadvantages millions of American children:
(1) the lack of inheritance rights by children who are not adopted by their
9 The ULC is a group of law professors and expert practitioners whose mandate is to
help create uniform statutes like the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Trust Code, and the
Uniform Parentage Act.  In the most recent amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in 2008,
however, the ULC did not address any of the profoundly complicated issues facing the chil-
dren of LGBTQ parents, despite purporting to deal fully with surrogacy.  The Code still privi-
leges the heterosexual married couple with their biological children in many aspects of
adoption and inheritance. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120 (amended 2010).
10 See, e.g., Carissa R. Trast, Note, You Can’t Choose Your Parents: Why Children
Raised by Same-Sex Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance Rights from Both Their Parents, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 857, 861 (2006).
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functional parents; and (2) the inexplicable disinheritance of many chil-
dren who are adopted by a co-parent.11  In the former situation, children
who are raised by parents, one or both of whom are not biological par-
ents, are unlikely to inherit unless a formal adoption is finalized or ex-
pensive estate planning is undertaken.  In many of those cases, however,
formal adoption is not a legal option, either because a biological parent
refuses to consent to an adoption, or the functional parents are prohibited
by law from adopting.  Barriers to adoption can occur when the parents
are unmarried, in same-sex relationships, or facing economic penalties
for marrying.12  In the latter situation, where functional parents are able
to legally adopt nonbiological children, their doing so cuts off the
adopted child’s inheritance rights from her biological parent, even if the
biological parent consented to the adoption and continues to parent the
child (such as through second-parent adoptions by unmarried or same-
sex couples).  Because the probate and adoption codes of most states are
so mired in an ideology of traditional family relations and remain depen-
dent on marital and biological status, they harshly penalize millions of
children and are woefully out of touch with our postmodern family life.13
A number of scholars have pointed out the inequalities in inheri-
tance rights between adopted children and children in nonformalized
11 A co-parent is defined as a person cohabiting with the unmarried biological parent of
the child—either an unmarried opposite sex partner or co-parent in a same-sex relationship
with the child’s biological or adoptive parent.  It is estimated that ten million children in the
United States are currently being raised by lesbian, gay, or bisexual parents.  Kelly M.
O’Bryan, Mommy or Daddy and Me: A Contract Solution to a Child’s Loss of the Lesbian or
Transgender Nonbiological Parent, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2011) (relying on an
estimate made by the American Bar Association).  Using 2010 census data and other studies,
the Williams Institute’s Gary Gates reports that as many as 19% of gay men and 49% of
lesbians have children.  Gary Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex
Couples, NAT’L COUNCIL ON FAMILY RELATIONS, http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/Gates-Badgett-NCFR-LGBT-Families-December-2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,
2015).  Comparing 2000 and 2010 census data, Gates found that the number of same-sex
couple households increased 80% to over 646,000. GARY GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE,
SAME-SEX COUPLES IN CENSUS 2010: RACE AND ETHNICITY (2012), http://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-CouplesRaceEthnicity-April-2012.pdf.  In many states
LGBT parents are prohibited from adopting, or barriers exist to adoption, while many others
may choose to adopt but cannot afford to and are uncertain that the judgments will be effec-
tive.  These parents are successful in creating and sustaining meaningful family relationships.
See Charlotte J. Patterson, Family Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1052, 1052 (2000).  In fact, approximately twenty-five percent of all same-sex couples
are raising children.  Richard E. Redding, It’s Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay
Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127, 128 (2008).
12 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-103 (2014) (assigning preference to married couples
for adoption); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-726(a) (2013) (allowing the sexual orientation of an
adoptive parent to be considered); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2014) (explicitly prohibit-
ing adoption by two people of the same gender); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-301 (2013) (preclud-
ing two unmarried individuals from jointly adopting); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (2014).
13 Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 5
(2000).
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functional parent-child relationships.14  Other scholars have pointed out
the truly bizarre disinheritance of the biological child whose inheritance
rights are cut off when a co-parent successfully adopts the child, a seem-
ingly irrational outcome that has a relatively simple solution.15  Many of
these scholars have made cogent constitutional and policy arguments as
to why these outcomes are undesirable.  They have often offered a model
statute or a constitutional argument for changing these laws.  But because
inheritance and adoption are defined and regulated by state law, no single
change is likely to be effective everywhere, even if the Supreme Court
were to hold, in a perfect case raising all the relevant issues, that state
laws penalizing certain adopted and functional children were unconstitu-
tional.16  The remedies would likely be quite diverse and no federal law
would be able to take into account all of the different statutory regimes
of the states.
To promote further reform in this area, this Article’s Appendix
presents an analysis of the law and history of these inheritance penalties
and includes an analysis of all fifty states’ adoption and inheritance laws.
For legislators, advocates, and judges, this Article provides a basic over-
view of the patchwork of state and federal laws, but legal reform at the
state level will require a more thorough understanding of each state’s
unique legal situation.  It provides guidance as to how the different laws
regarding marriage, adoption, and inheritance interact and how best to
tackle the daunting project of bringing inheritance rights to the millions
of children who currently face the inheritance penalty.  It also provides
both policy and statutory suggestions for changes that can bring inheri-
tance equity to the millions of children currently raised in nontraditional
families.
In Part I, I explain how the adoption, marriage, and inheritance laws
interact to create an inheritance penalty against children with nontradi-
14 E.g., E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of
Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1999); Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Es-
tates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession,
62 SMU L. REV. 367, 369 (2009).  Spitko explains that the typical intestacy statutes do not
distinguish on their face between the inheritance rights of heterosexual people and LGBT
people and thus ignore an important distinction.  By ignoring such a distinction, he argues that
such statutes discriminate against LGBT people by denying them donative freedom and deval-
uing their relationships.
15 E.g., Jason C. Beekman, Same-Sex Parent Adoption and Intestacy Law: Applying the
Sharon S. Model of “Simultaneous” Adoption to Parent-Child Provisions of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 141 (2010); Laura M. Padilla, Flesh of My Flesh but Not
My Heir: Unintended Disinheritance, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 219, 228 (1997); Trast, supra
note 10, at 861. R
16 Even if there were a perfect case for challenging state laws creating the inheritance
penalty, and the Supreme Court ruled that such differential treatment was an equal protection
violation, the states would still have difficulty passing the panoply of laws necessary to fully
rectify the situation.
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tional parents.  In Part II, I explain the full scope of the inheritance pen-
alty, its effects on testate as well as intestate estate plans, and the sources
of its inequitable treatment of children.  In Part III, I explain how differ-
ent statutory or common law changes would affect the penalty, from
marriage equality to the broadening of equitable adoption principles and
language for statutory reform.  In Part IV, I explore the history of adop-
tion law and testamentary freedom, arguing that a more textured under-
standing of the myriad motives behind adoption and donative freedom
call for a more textured solution.  In Part V, I present model statutory
language, portions of which could be adopted to tackle discrete inheri-
tance issues.  Finally, I provide a chart in the Appendix listing the rele-
vant laws in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that involve the
interplay of adoption and inheritance.
As a coda, I certainly realize that an article of this length could be
written for each and every state.  That is not my goal; my hope is that
others will take up that challenge.  Rather, I hope to provide a compre-
hensive overview of the legal terrain so that lawmakers, advocates, and
judges can begin the process of making change in a rational and humane
way.  Bright-line rules are administratively efficient and often politically
appealing, but are usually not equitable.  And, in this case, they do not
reflect the needs of the millions of children today growing up in non-
traditional families.  When laws stop protecting the very people they are
designed to protect, and instead disadvantage not just a few marginal
outliers, but large percentages of the very population they seek to benefit,
it is past the time for change.
I. THE PROBLEM: INHERITANCE PENALTIES AGAINST CHILDREN OF
NONTRADITIONAL PARENTS
There are two prongs to the inheritance penalty problem—the first
applies to children who are not legally adopted and ought, based on equi-
table principles and the intention of the decedent parent, to be able to
inherit.  I call this the functional parent-child relationship.17  Children
17 I did not invent this term.  Functional parent-child relationships have been discussed
for years and most state family law codes provide mechanisms for functional children to re-
ceive support from functional parents. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1997); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregat-
ing Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 309 (2007); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclu-
sivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83 (2004); Yehezkel Margalit,
Intentional Parenthood: A Solution to the Plight of Same-Sex Partners Striving for Legal Rec-
ognition as Parents, 12 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 39 (2013); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles
& Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of
Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419 (2013).  The Uniform Law Commission
has also begun to recognize functional children in the context of inheritance in the 2008
Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-116 (amended 2010).
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not legally adopted by their functional parents are penalized when they
are unable to inherit from, and through, those parents.  These children
might be stepchildren, foster children, children being raised by relatives,
or children of same-sex parents when state laws prohibit adoption by the
second parent.  They might also be children in the process of adoption
when an adoptive parent dies before the adoption goes through, or chil-
dren conceived through assisted reproductive technologies when state
laws are not sensitive to their unique circumstances.  They might be ge-
netically related to two gamete providers who have relinquished their
legal claims to the offspring.  But the intentional parents who are paying
for the service and intend to raise the child might die before an adoption
takes place, or state laws may prohibit their adoption of this child.  A
gestational surrogate would have no legal claim if she were not geneti-
cally related to the child.  The vast legal complications raised by these
new technological reforms have been documented and discussed by nu-
merous scholars, but very little attention has been given to the inheri-
tance penalties these children face, especially when parents using these
new technologies do not formalize their intentions and relationships
through available contract and statutory means.18
The second situation applies to children who are legally adopted,
but because of the interplay between state adoption, marriage, and inheri-
tance laws, are prohibited from inheriting from their biological parent
who continues to act as a parent.  I refer to this as the “cut-off penalty”
because the law cuts off the child’s inheritance rights from a biological
parent in circumstances where that parent would not want the rights to be
extinguished, particularly in the case of second-parent adoptions by a
biological parent’s unmarried partner or co-parent.19  It might seem
strange to think that a biological parent will have her parental inheritance
relationship with her children severed when she permits her unmarried
same-sex or opposite-sex partner to adopt her children.  But that is pre-
cisely what the law dictates in the majority of states that have adopted
the standard provision, articulated in the Uniform Probate Code—that a
child’s relation and inheritance rights to her biological parents are sev-
ered upon formal legal adoption.20
To understand how these problems arise, we need to understand
how the various laws work together and why the inheritance penalty is so
much larger than simply the exclusion from the default rules of intestate
succession.  We need to explore why making a will does not solve this
18 See Spitko, supra note 14, at 1064; Tritt, supra note 14, at 369. R
19 See Beekman, supra note 15, at 141; Padilla, supra note 15, at 228. R
20 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-114(b) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-
124(2) (2014); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-50(c)(2), (3) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109(1)
(2013); see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-119.
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problem and how even the most diligent of parents cannot plan or con-
tract around all of these legal pitfalls.  Only when we understand the full
scope of the penalty can we begin to draft solutions.
The probate codes of all fifty states provide a relatively straightfor-
ward inheritance scheme.21  If a person dies without having made a will,
any property titled in that person’s name at death will pass according to
the default rules of intestate succession.  These default rules privilege
survivors in the following order: surviving spouses first, children and
grandchildren next, and then parents, collateral relatives like siblings,
aunts and uncles, or nieces and nephews.22  If there are no biological
relatives of the required degree of relationship23 (i.e., persons defined as
legal heirs), then the decedent’s property escheats to the state.  A number
of states try to avoid escheat by permitting the property to pass to the
heirs of the decedent’s last surviving spouse (e.g., the decedent’s
stepchildren or collateral relatives of a former spouse), but there are
fewer than one-third of states that will pass property beyond the blood-
line.24  For the majority of decedents, a surviving spouse and blood rela-
tives are the only permissible heirs.
Most probate codes define “child” for purposes of intestate succes-
sion to be a biological child or an adopted child only.25  Stepchildren,
foster children, or other minors raised by a decedent, even those in a
functional parent-child relationship, do not qualify as “children” under
most probate codes.26  This means that a minor who is raised by an adult,
treated as a child, given that adult’s name, listed as a dependent on the
21 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-101 to -114 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:2-
101 to -114 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, §§ 2-101 to -114 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 700.2101–.2114 (2014).
22 Arkansas and Kentucky are unusual in providing for children before a surviving
spouse. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-9-204 to -205 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010
(2012).
23 Some states allow for only a relatively narrow slice of relatives to count as legal heirs.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103.  Others allow for a broad array, like fifth cousins four
times removed or any relative within six, seven, or eight degrees of relationship. See, e.g., KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010.
24 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-215(2)(1); CAL. PROB. CODE § 240 (West 2015); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45a-439(a)(4) (2013); IOWA CODE § 633.219(6) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-514
(2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(6); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-104(e) (Lex-
isNexis 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 474.010(3); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:5-4(f); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-04-03(6) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (West 2014); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-103(6); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-103(1)(f) (2014); see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
103(b).
25 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(5) (defining “child”), which conflicts with UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-116 (allowing for functional children).
26 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(5) (expressly excluding stepchildren, foster chil-
dren, and grandchildren from its definition of “child”); see also FLA. STAT. § 731.201 (2014)
(excluding from the definition of child a “stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or a more
remote descendant”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2209(3) (2014); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 22.004
(West 2013).
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adult’s tax returns, and treated in all ways as the biological child of the
adult, will not be able to inherit from that person if the child is not for-
mally adopted.  Instead, distant collateral heirs may take the estate to the
exclusion of the person who had the closest relationship with the dece-
dent and who the decedent most likely would have wanted to have inher-
itance rights.27
Most state family law codes also define “child” for purposes of pa-
rental rights to make decisions for the child, to control the child’s prop-
erty, or to pay child support.28  When the family and probate code
definitions do not align, there is an obvious gap that will result in some
children being unable to inherit from a parent, even when that parent has
a legally recognized parental relationship with that child.29  This conflict
can be quite common given the fact that most family law codes recognize
functional children as children for child support, visitation, and parental
decisionmaking purposes, whereas most probate codes do not.30  Further-
more, all states provide certain benefits and presumptions to “spouses”
27 See In re Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004); Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d
321, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also In re Estate of Thompson, 760 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2008); In re Estate of Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016, 1019–20 (Utah 2013).
28 E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-101 to -905 (2014); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7500–7962 (West
2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.001–.763 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.26.011–.914 (2014).
29 The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) provides that parentage will be established by bio-
logical birth, adoption, or adjudication of parentage in the context of a gestational surrogacy
agreement or assisted reproductive technology. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 101–511, 701–809
(amended 2002).  The state probate codes, except those that have adopted the 2008 UPC
amendments, do not allow for the third option—it is biology or adoption only.  See UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-109.  This gap is relatively small but can be widened in states that have more
expansive parent-child definitions in their family law codes.  The UPA has been adopted in 9
states.
30 Although the Uniform Parentage Act has only been adopted in nine states, many
others have adopted portions of it.  The Parentage Act Summary defines the mother and father
as follows:
[A] legal mother is one who carries a child to birth (rather than the one whose egg
has been fertilized), but may also be one who is adjudicated as the legal mother, who
adopts the child (thus expressly recognizing adoption), or who is the legal mother
under a gestational agreement. In the last three instances, the woman who carries the
child to birth is not the legal mother.
In Article 2, the legal father may be one of the following: an unrebutted pre-
sumed father (a man married to the birth mother at the time of conception, or a man
who resided in the same household as the child during its first two years of life, and
openly held the child out as his own), a man who has acknowledged paternity under
Article 3, an adjudicated father as the result of a judgment in a paternity action, an
adoptive father, a man who consents to an assisted reproduction under Article 7, or
an adjudicated father in a proceeding confirming a gestational agreement under Arti-
cle 8. The genetic father or the presumed genetic father is the legal father in the first
three of these categories, but is not necessarily the legal father in the latter three
categories.
Parentage Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (July 12, 2009), http://
www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage+Act.
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(i.e., parents who are in legal marriages).  For instance, the children of a
married heterosexual couple are presumed to be the children of both, and
both have equal parental rights and the children have equal rights to in-
herit from and through both parents.31  But nonmarital children (i.e., chil-
dren born to parents who are not married) do not benefit from the
presumption of parental status, particularly in questions involving pater-
nity.32  Nonmarital children, children born from assisted reproductive
technologies, children born to heterosexual parents but who reside with
one parent and that parent’s same-sex partner, children living with step-
parents, and children born within same-sex relationships all are denied
the benefits and presumptions of a child born in a traditional marriage.
Thus, where a state denies marriage rights to parents and where pro-
bate codes do not protect the functional parent-child relationship, inheri-
tance penalties can create gross disparities between otherwise similarly
situated children.  Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unani-
mously, on May 21, 2012, that state law definitions of “child” would
apply to federal determinations of eligibility to receive social security
benefits.33  This decision further entrenches state diversity and reflects
the federal courts’ unwillingness to adopt nationwide definitions for fed-
eral laws affecting family relationships.34  Because these relationships
are typically left to the purview of the states, the inheritance penalty cre-
ated by state law has a very long reach.
To begin the task of correcting the inheritance penalty, we need to
understand how it works, what state interests prompted the rigid rules
that are in place, and what state interests should be protected in fashion-
ing a remedy.  In doing so, I am assuming that the state’s interests in
protecting or benefitting traditional family relationships, based solely on
historical inertia and stereotypes, are not legitimate grounds for denying
functional or cut-off children inheritance rights when there is parental
intent that they be entitled to benefit.
31 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120–22 (1989).
32 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201, which creates a father-child relationship when pa-
ternity is established either by acknowledgement, adjudication, or adoption.  Where certain
presumptions apply, the child is presumed to be the child of the father if the mother and the
putative father are married and the child is born during the marriage. See UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 204.
33 Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032–33 (2012).
34 Although much of the state-wide diversity in definitions of marriage concerning same-
sex couples has been resolved with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015), state diversity remains in areas of common law marriages, qualifications
for marriage, and the treatment of foreign marriages.
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A. The Functional Parent-Child Relationship and the Unadopted
Child or Stepchild
The first situation involving the inheritance penalty is that of a child
in a functional parent-child relationship where the parent fails to adopt
the child and the child is excluded from inheriting because the child does
not qualify as a child under the state’s probate code.  However, the child
would likely count as a child under the state’s family law code or com-
mon law recognition of a functional familial relationship.  In the absence
of a somewhat flexible probate code,35 a child is simply excluded from
all the inheritance rights of being recognized as a child.  Although one
can understand the importance of the bright-line test for inheritance,
there are many situations where distant heirs who have had no contact
with the decedent for decades might inherit to the exclusion of a child
who came into the decedent’s home as a minor, was cared for and treated
like a child, and who, upon reaching adulthood, cared for the parent as an
adult child is likely to do.36  In such a case, there is no good reason for
denying inheritance rights to a child who functions as one, in many or all
respects.
But many legislators and judges feel it is appropriate to require the
adult to legally adopt a child before that child is entitled to inherit.  Legal
adoption creates a bright line that avoids the administrative costs of
lengthy trials poring over evidence about a decedent’s intent, or poten-
tially rewarding fortune-hunting claimants who try to claim someone
else’s lawful inheritance.  As discussed more fully below in Part IV, for-
mal legal adoption is a costly and intrusive legal process that is not abso-
lutely necessary in order to gain the benefits of a parent-child
relationship during life, including the legal benefits of parental rights
under most states’ family law codes.  The decision not to adopt is more
often the result of cost, fear of the loss of privacy, or insecure adult rela-
tionships than it is a desire to restrict inheritances.37  On the flip side, the
35 California allows a child to inherit even if he or she was not adopted, so long as there
was a legal impediment to the parent’s adopting. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 2015)
(using the terms “foster parent or stepparent”).
36 See In re Estate of Chambers, No. B223492, 2011 WL 711854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011);
Morgan v. Howard, 678 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ga. 2009); In re Estate of Thompson, 760 N.W.2d
208 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008); In re Estate of Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016, 1019–20 (Utah 2013).
37 Social science data about adoption abounds, often debunking traditional myths about
adoption as creating second best families.  Virtually no reliable studies have been done on
whether adoption was specifically undertaken in order to influence inheritances, although the
idea that adoption is a proxy for inheritance is a myth from the nineteenth century that cer-
tainly continues to prevail in legal circles. See, e.g., L. DiAnne Borders et al., Are Adopted
Children and Their Parents at Greater Risk for Negative Outcomes?, 47 FAMILY RELATIONS
237, 237 (1998); see also Kathy Brodsky, Ten Myths About Adoption, PATH 2 PARENTHOOD
(Mar. 28, 2015), http://www.theafa.org/article/ten-myths-about-adoption; Debunking the
Myths: The Facts About Adoption from Foster Care, 12 OUTLOOK WEEKLY 21 (2007) [herein-
after Debunking the Myths]; Jack Demick, Challenging the Common Myths About Adoption,
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decision to adopt is more likely to be based on a desire to protect legal
parenting rights during life (like the right to travel abroad, to make edu-
cational and medical decisions for children, and custody over the child in
the case of divorce or death), than on a desire to ensure inheritance
rights.38  Yet states continue to protect the functional parent-child rela-
tionship more during life than they do at death, when the only rights that
would be affected are economic rights regarding property.
The administrative costs and difficulty of adjudication are not ade-
quate reasons to deny inheritance rights for functional children precisely
because courts routinely perform the exact same analysis under most
family law codes.  Moreover, at the time when adoption was not a legal
possibility, courts routinely had to determine parentage and legitimacy
through lengthy trials done with conflicting evidence, and without DNA
or modern forensic evidence.  It is not an impossible task.39  In limited
circumstances, courts currently do allow functional children to inherit
under the doctrine of equitable adoption or estoppel where statutes would
otherwise deny recovery.40  Thus, litigation can provide one mechanism,
albeit an inefficient one, for determining inheritance rights of functional
children.  Simply aligning probate code definitions of children with fam-
ily law codes or common law rules regarding functional parenthood
would go a long way in mitigating the harms of the inheritance penalty
on some functional children.
Family law courts and scholars have embraced the functional par-
ent-child relationship in numerous ways.  For instance, the American
Law Institute promulgated the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion: Analysis and Recommendations in 2002 that promoted recognizing
and protecting functional parent-child relationships.  The early drafts and
the final principles have been influential in numerous child visitation and
23 BROWN UNIV. CHILD & ADOL. BEHAVIOR LETTER 8 (2007); Christine Narad & Patrick W.
Mason, International Adoptions: Myths and Realities, 30 PEDIATRIC NURSING 483 (2004); Ka-
tarina Wegar, Adoption, Family Ideology, and Social Stigma: Bias in Community Attitudes,
Adoption Research, and Practice, 49 FAMILY RELATIONS 363 (2000).
38 Although it is hard to study why people choose to adopt rather than foster children or
simply care for children, the literature suggests that most people choose adoption when they
want to create a family and cannot do so naturally.  But with the improved availability of
assisted reproductive technologies, researchers suggest that adoption has become a second best
alternative to having biologically-related children. See, e.g., Gulcin Gumus & Jungmin Lee,
Alternative Paths to Parenthood: IVF or Child Adoption?, 50 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 802 (2012);
Nicholas K. Park  & Patricia Wonch Hill, Is Adoption an Option? The Role of Importance of
Motherhood and Fertility Help-Seeking in Considering Adoption, 35 J. FAM. ISSUES 601, 605
(2014); Lynn D. Wardle & Travis Robertson, Adoption: Upside Down and Sideways? Some
Causes of and Remedies for Declining Domestic and International Adoptions, 26 REGENT U.
L. REV. 209, 213 (2014).
39 E.g., United States v. Collins, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 592, 592 (1809); Walker v. State, 6
Blackf. 1, 1 (Ind. 1841); Sword v. Nestor, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 453, 453 (1835); Pigeau v.
Duvernay, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 265, 265 (La. 1816).
40 See infra Part III.D.
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child custody disputes.41  Scholars too have pointed out the importance
of using common law doctrines and equitable principles to protect chil-
dren who have formed functional parent-child relationships with adults,
even when the adults have not completed an adoption or legally formal-
ized their relationships.42  The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Holtzman v.
Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H–K.)43 was one of the first states to adopt
equity principles to protect a functional parent-child relationship.  Many
courts have subsequently followed that case.44  Other courts have simply
recognized that harm to a child could occur if a functional parent-child
relationship is not protected.45
Unlike the relative willingness of states to find functional parent-
child relationships in the family law context, probate courts remain noto-
riously strict and hesitant to use equity jurisdiction to find a functional
parent-child relationship in the inheritance law context through a very
limited application of equitable estoppel.  The court explained in Bean v.
Ford (In re Estate of Ford)46 that equitable adoption is only to be applied
in unusual circumstances, circumstances where something exists that is
more than a mere functional parent-child relationship.  Most equitable
adoption rules require the presence of a contract between the biological
parent and the adoptive parent, a contract by which one biological parent
agrees to surrender parental rights over the child and the other agrees to
41 See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 170 (Wash. 2005); see also
DiFonzo, supra note 7. R
42 See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex
Couples: Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 684 (2005); see also Developments in
the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2052 (2003); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation: Unrecognized Parents and the Story
of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307, 333 (2006); Kathy T. Graham,
Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children’s Rights as Children, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1006 (2008); Gilbert A Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitu-
tional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L.
REV. 358, 387 (1994); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking
Parentage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 43, 47 (2008); Martha Minow, Redefining Fami-
lies: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 276 (1991); Richard F. Storrow,
Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parent-
age, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 666 (2002).
43 533 N.W.2d 419, 434–36 (Wis. 1995).
44 Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 609–10 (Mont. 2009); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d
539, 547–53, 555 (N.J. 2000); DiCenzo, 759 A.2d at 966–72; Middleton v. Johnson, 633
S.E.2d 162, 167–72 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161.
45 Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 481 (Alaska 1993), overruled by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979
P.2d 514, 515–20 (Alaska 1999); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App.
1991); Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 188–92 (N.Y. 2010); Shondel J. v. Mark D.,
853 N.E.2d 610, 615–16 (N.Y. 2006); Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 241 (App. Div.
2001); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 509 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d
721, 724 (Pa. 1999).
46 82 P.3d 747, 753–54 (Cal. 2004).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 16 23-DEC-15 16:42
16 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:1
assume the rights and duties of a parent by formally adopting the child.47
As the dissent in O’Neal v. Wilkes cogently explains, however, there are
many situations where the elements of a contract are unlikely to exist, as
when the biological and adoptive parents have never met, and where the
custody of the child is transferred through the hands of numerous in-
termediaries before finally reaching the custodial parent.48  In other
cases, equitable adoption will apply only when there is a legal impedi-
ment to an adoption, as was required in the case of In re Estate of Ford.
In that case, the California court refused to protect Terrold Bean’s rights
to inherit from his foster father because there had been no actual or legal
impediment to the adoption, even though his foster parents thought in-
correctly that there was a legal impediment and would have adopted but
for their mistaken belief in the impediment.49  To the extent donative
intent is the holy grail of inheritance law, it makes no sense to limit
inheritance rights of functional children when the evidence shows that a
mistaken understanding of the law guided the decedent’s decision to not
adopt or to not make a will.  We elevate form over substance when intent
is gleaned from incorrect assumptions rather than actual facts.
Many courts apply a presumption against equitable adoption in the
context of stepparents, on the theory that the law should not discourage
stepparenting by imposing inheritance rights in the absence of a formal
adoption.50  The presumption assumes that people would not enter into
relationships with single parents if there is a risk that they will be
deemed to have equitably adopted the children simply by providing a
home for them or by marrying their biological parent.51  To further the
presumption, the law of equitable adoption requires an unequivocal act
other than the act of marrying the child’s parent in order to impose inher-
itance obligations on a stepparent.  And since marriage is a social good,
it is often deemed to be better to deny inheritance benefits to children in
the future when children are not parties to these agreements, than to im-
pose any further impediments to marriage, which is a social good in the
present.
47 Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973) (determining Florida law);
Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 575–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Morgan v. Howard,
678 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ga. 2009); O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490, 491 (Ga. 1994); Lankford
v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606–07 (N.C. 1997); see 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 62 (2014).
48 O’Neal, 439 S.E.2d at 493.
49 In re Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747, 752–55 (Cal. 2004).
50 See, e.g., Green v. Boyd, 794 So. 2d 668, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Franklin v.
Gilchrist, 491 S.E.2d 361, 362 (Ga. 1997); Davis v. Bennett, 438 S.E.2d 73, 74–75 (Ga. 1994);
In re Estate of Thompson, No. 08-0120, 2008 WL 4877762, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13,
2008); Bellinger v. Boatmen’s Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 779 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989); In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d 1236, 1246 (Wyo. 2003).
51 See Seader, 76 P.3d at 1246; see also infra Part III.D.
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But the stepchild situation is one of the most common nontraditional
family structures that often results in particular inheritance inequities.  In
the classic situation of a second marriage by two adults with children by
different partners, under most intestacy laws the surviving parent will
take all or most of the deceased parent’s property when the first parent
dies.  Then, when the surviving parent dies, her biological children will
take all of her property under intestacy, including the property she inher-
ited from her deceased husband, to the exclusion of the husband’s bio-
logical children.  Even under laws that grant half of the first parent’s
property to his children, the other half is likely to pass with all of the
second parent’s property to the second parent’s children for a one-quar-
ter/three-quarters division of the couple’s assets unless they hire lawyers
to conduct estate planning.52  For the majority of us in the 99%, that is
not likely to happen.
When something as simple as treating stepchildren similarly, or
preventing the family heirlooms from passing completely away from the
children, cannot be accomplished except through complex prenuptial
agreements or estate planning, then something is amiss.  And the result is
not much better under testacy because most states’ elective share statutes
virtually guarantee a grossly unequal division of property unless the sur-
viving spouse devises a share of the decedent spouse’s property back to
his or her children.53  But even that will not protect descendants of prede-
ceased stepchildren because most states’ antilapse statutes will not save
gifts to nonbiological relatives.54  Thus, if a surviving wife takes her
52 The one-quarter/three-quarter split would occur if both spouses in a common law state
held roughly equal amounts of property and each died intestate.  The property of the first to die
would pass half to the surviving spouse and half to that decedent’s children by a different
marriage.  Now the surviving spouse would have three-fourths of the couple’s property and
upon her death intestate, it would entirely pass to her children by a different marriage.  This
division is probably the best that would occur.  In many states the surviving spouse would take
100% of the decedent spouse’s intestate estate, and could then pass all of it to her children,
completely disinheriting the first spouse’s children.  Or, under the Uniform Probate Code, § 2-
102, the surviving spouse would take the first $150,000, homestead, exempt property, and
family allowance, in addition to half the decedent spouse’s intestate estate. UNIF. PROB. CODE
§§ 2-102, 2-402 (amended 2010).  If the survivor then passes this property to her children
exclusively, the children of the first spouse to die receive very little.
53 Under most states’ elective share statutes, the surviving spouse is entitled to anywhere
from 30%–50% of a decedent spouse’s estate (either the net probate estate or the augmented
estate, which includes property passing by will substitutes).  Once homestead, family al-
lowances, and exempt property are taken out, and the surviving spouse claims his or her elec-
tive share (on 30%–50% of the remainder), that leaves usually less than half an estate to pass
by will to children. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
6001–87 tbls.6.01, 6.02 & 6.03 (2014).
54 See Seader, 76 P.3d at 1246.  Many states’ antilapse statutes apply only to save gifts
from lapsing if the gift is given to biological relatives. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603;
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104(2) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 732.603 (2015); see also CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2111 (2014) (applying antilapse to kindred of the decedent and the kindred of a sur-
viving, deceased, or former spouse).
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elective share from her deceased husband’s estate, she will likely receive
at least half of his property.  Then, upon her death, if she “generously”55
devises that property back to his children, those gifts may lapse if any of
those children predeceased her, leaving lineal descendants.  The lineal
descendants (i.e., her step-grandchildren) will not take their parent’s
share.  Like the law of intestacy, the law of antilapse also relies heavily
on biological relationships and will not save a gift to a nonrelative.  Of
course, the exact opposite outcome would occur if the wife predeceased
the husband, resulting in the husband’s children taking the lion’s share of
the wife’s property to the exclusion of her own children.  And this can be
even more galling to the children when a parent’s new spouse inherits
family property from both biological parents, as in the situation when the
mother dies, the father inherits all of her property, then the father remar-
ries, and the stepmother survives him and inherits all of his property,
including what he inherited from the mother.
The stepchild inheritance problem is the direct result of many states’
decision to embrace the partnership theory of marriage in their state elec-
tive share and intestacy laws.56  By making the spouse the primary legal
heir, thereby giving the surviving spouse between 50% and 100% of a
decedent spouse’s estate, the law recognizes the equitable claims of a
spouse in a couple’s accumulation of wealth.  And it is assumed that
upon the surviving spouse’s death, the property not needed for her sup-
port will pass to, or be devised to, their children.57  No longer does the
surviving widow have to move out of the manor house, down the hill to
the small dower estate on the fringes of the property, and depend on the
eldest son for her pittance of an allowance.58  Now, children have to wait
55 She is under no compulsion to return any of that property to his children, and may, if
she chooses, allow it all to pass entirely to her children by intestacy or via a will. See Law-
rence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised
Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 229–35 (1991).
56 The partnership theory of marriage suggests that surviving spouses should take a sig-
nificant portion of a decedent spouse’s estate because the survivor likely contributed to the
creation of that property and has an equitable claim to it.  However, with the rise of shorter
second and third marriages, the partnership theory doesn’t always result in the most equitable
outcomes. See Waggoner, supra note 55 (explaining the divided loyalties of surviving spouses R
who may have children by other relationships than with the decedent and recent statutory
efforts to equitably protect both spouses and children).
57 Commentary to the UPC’s spousal share provision (UPC § 2-102) explains that the
decedent’s children are not the natural objects of the surviving spouse’s bounty if they are not
the children of the surviving spouse. See also Waggoner, supra note 55. R
58 Under the law of dower, the surviving widow had to be content with her life estate in
one-third of the real property that the husband owned at death, while the eldest son, under
primogeniture, inherited the remaining two-thirds of the real property, plus a remainder in the
widow’s one-third.  Because the son took possession of the majority of the property, the
widow had to relinquish possession and reduce her standard of living to accommodate the new
family of the eldest son.  Jane Austen’s novel, Sense and Sensibility, depicts the surviving
widow and three daughters being ejected from the manor house by the older half-brother who
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until the death of both spouses before they are able to take their
inheritance.
But with the ubiquity of second marriages and blended families, the
assumption that the survivor will leave all of the couple’s estate to their
joint children no longer holds true.  Many widows and widowers remarry
without prenuptial agreements providing for the inheritance rights of
prior children, and if those children begin to badger their mother or fa-
ther about making a will, they often risk being disinherited altogether.  If
the father dies without a will, the stepmother inherits most of his prop-
erty, and even if the children have a good relationship with their step-
mother, they will get nothing from their father’s estate if she dies
intestate.  This is because her property will pass to her lineal descendants
or even collateral descendants.  And, even if she feels duty bound to
make a will giving her deceased husband’s property back to his children,
her own children will have every incentive to challenge her will or argue
undue influence in order to take all of the property themselves.
What prevents courts from broadly applying equitable adoption doc-
trines, and legislatures from expanding the definition of “child” to in-
clude the functional child, seems to be an underlying belief that if the
parent did not bother to actually adopt the child, especially when doing
so is relatively simple and inexpensive, then the parent did not want the
child to inherit, and so courts and legislators should not bend over back-
wards to do what the parent clearly did not want to do.  The problem
with this reasoning, however, is that there are many reasons why a parent
might not go through with a legal adoption, very few of which are related
to not wanting the child to inherit.  The most common reasons for doing
so are: 1) expense, or a belief that the expense is too great; 2) legal
impediments, or belief that there are legal impediments; 3) the parent
may have intended to adopt, but ran out of time, died unexpectedly, or
was a procrastinator; 4) the parent did not feel the need to adopt because
he or she had made a will; 5) the child reached adulthood and the parent
did not think an adoption was necessary at that point; 6) the parent as-
sumed incorrectly that the law of intestacy would protect functional chil-
dren or stepchildren; 7) the parent eschewed the legal intrusion into
family privacy that is necessitated by adoption procedures; or 8) the par-
ent did not think about inheritance rights at all.59  In all of these cases,
took possession of all of the father’s property upon his death. JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND
SENSIBILITY (2003).
59 There are no good studies regarding the reasons why people choose not to adopt the
children in their lives.  However, there are studies that the home-assessment process can be
intrusive and not reflective of the parents’ situation. See Gerald P. Mallon, The Home Study
Assessment Process for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Prospective Foster and
Adoptive Families, 7 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 9 (2011); see also Debunking the Myths, supra note
37 (relating to the common but incorrect belief that an adoption is high in cost).  One can also R
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the parent treats the child as a child, wants the child to inherit, and is
either mistaken about the facts or legal requirements of adoption or is
unable to adopt because of state laws or circumstances beyond the par-
ent’s control.  There is no good policy reason why, in these instances at
the very least, the child should be precluded from inheriting.  Yet the law
on equitable adoption is unlikely to provide relief in even a small per-
centage of these cases.
All of the reasons listed above are cogent reasons why a parent
might not feel comfortable going through the formal legal channels to
adopt a child she is parenting.  Considering that inheritance rights pro-
vide financial support to children when their parent is no longer able to
support them, there are no good counterarguments which suggest that the
child should not be able to inherit when that parent dies.  It is ironic that
most adults form functional parent-child relationships with dependent
children because they care about the child’s welfare and go to great ex-
pense to help rear the child, yet counterfactual presumptions and legal
barriers are imposed to prevent them from continuing that care and sup-
port after their death.  It makes no sense to limit a parent’s ability to care
for a child to the parent’s lifetime when the two mechanisms for ensuring
post-mortem provisions (adoption and will-making) are expensive legal
activities.  Most parents want to be able to provide the economic re-
sources for their children after they are gone, even if they failed to take
the simple steps necessary to make it happen.60  It is simply irrational
that the law imposes such barriers to the child’s welfare when the func-
tional parent is deceased and therefore unable to provide for the child;
and there is no corresponding benefit to the parent himself from not pro-
tecting the child’s claim to the parent’s post-mortem financial support.
I argue that we should switch the current presumption about adop-
tion.  Only when a functional parent consciously considers adoption, has
the means and opportunity to do so, and expressly chooses not to adopt,
should the law presume that the parent does not want the child to inherit.
Yet without the bright-line test of a formal legal adoption, courts fear
they will be unable to keep a lid on equitable adoption cases and spurious
claims by “undeserving” foster children, stepchildren, or even random
neighborhood street urchins who claim that a deceased adult acted like a
parent and wanted them to share in an inheritance.  Scholarship and case
glean from the cases some of the reasons suggested by the petitioners for the failure of a
formal adoption to have been undertaken, as in Ford, which argued that the parents believed
incorrectly that there was an impediment, or Seader, in which the functional parent decided not
to adopt because his lawyers advised him that making a will would be sufficient protection of
his stepdaughter.
60 See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt out of Intes-
tacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 930–31 (2012) (arguing that we should make wills accessible to all
by channeling testamentary designations into tax records).
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law show, however, that “the problem is like a comet in our law: though
its existence in theory has been frequently recognized, its observed
passages are few.”61
To the extent succession law aims to protect the intentions of a de-
ceased parent rather than the needs of a dependent child, it is understand-
able that the law prefers bright-line rules to distinguish between adults
who simply help care for a child, and those who step into a parent-like
relationship with the child.  Adults provide care to children for many
reasons, and perhaps it makes sense to draw a line somewhere to separate
the claims of some children from the claims of others.  But few of the
functional parent-child relationships I have been talking about form
spontaneously on one side of the bright line or the other.  An adult can
gradually become involved with another adult who has children, and they
can progressively become more and more a part of their children’s lives.
The marriage of a biological parent to a stepparent may not be the bright
line that indicates the stepparent is ready to take on full parenting respon-
sibilities.  Over time, the biological parent may become disabled and the
stepparent becomes the hands-on parent.  Or, as the children develop,
they may find it easier to talk to a nonparent than a parent.  They may
also spend time with childless relatives or neighbors, helping them out as
they age.  As the children grow up and become more responsible, they
may begin to care for aging adults, and only then might the bond be-
tween them become cemented.
There is no limit to the different ways in which parents can be par-
ents and children can be children.  And because many of the nontradi-
tional parenting relationships form gradually, it may be that the child
reaches adulthood before the relationship is developed enough that either
party would have expectations about inheritance rights.  And by then, the
parent may not think of adoption as a necessity, or the law may prohibit
it.62  But as the child develops through life, even if she is not a minor
dependent when the parent dies, there may still be important reasons why
that child should be able to inherit, even if the parent did not think adop-
61 Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334–35 (Cal. 1976).  Even a cursory review of the
last decade’s worth of equitable adoption cases shows that the claims of the children were
quite strong; they were not the claims of fortune-hunting orphans seeking to make a quick
buck off the death of the old man down the street. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747,
755 (Cal. 2004); Morgan v. Howard, 678 S.E.2d 882, 883–84 (Ga. 2009); In re Estate of
Thompson, 760 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008); In re Estate of Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016,
1019–20 (Utah 2013).
62 See Doby v. Carroll, 147 So. 2d 803, 804–05 (Ala. 1962); Hays v. Hays, 946 So. 2d
867, 868 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006); In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-
25646, 637 P.2d 1092, 1093–94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); see also K. M. Potraker, Annotation,
Adoption of Adult, 21 A.L.R.3d 1012 § 2 (1968).  Ironically, many courts deny adult adoptions
that are sought with the intention of affecting inheritance rights. See Ralph C. Brashier, Chil-
dren and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 163–64.
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tion was necessary.  This is because very few of us actually think about
death or the descent and distribution of our property until it is upon us.63
Furthermore, if everyone put her financial house in order before dying,
we wouldn’t need the bright-line rules of intestacy laws at all.  But until
we can foresee our own deaths and can easily provide for the welfare of
the important people in our lives, the law should presume inheritance
rights for functional children precisely because the existence of the par-
ent-child relationship during life strongly evidences the parent’s devotion
to the child’s welfare.
B. The Cut-Off Child of Second-Parent Adoptions
Where a legal impediment or a mistaken belief in a legal impedi-
ment to an adoption exists, the presumption should shift to allow inheri-
tance by a functional child because that would conform to both the
parent’s and child’s most likely expectations and intentions.  This would
take care of unmarried and same-sex couples, in which one parent is a
biological parent and the other is the functional equivalent of a steppar-
ent, whether they choose not to marry or are legally barred from mar-
riage.64  To encourage adoption and the formalization of the parent-child
relationship for unmarried couples parenting children, a number of states
have begun to allow what are called “second-parent adoptions” to re-
move the legal impediment of many state adoption codes that prohibited
two unmarried adults from adopting a child.
The second-parent adoption allows a nonspouse to adopt a child
without terminating the parental rights of the biological co-parent.  This
process is one commonly used by same-sex couples when one partner is
the biological parent and is co-parenting with an adoptive parent.  This
may arise when an LGBTQ couple decides to use assisted reproductive
technology (ART) to enable one of them to either carry a child or sire a
child through the use of sperm donation or a gestational surrogate.  The
63 As noted earlier, studies show that well over a majority of the population do not have
wills and that although will-making increases with age and wealth, a significant number of
people will die intestate.  Whatever the reasons for the lack of basic estate planning, the facts
cannot be avoided.  If most people cite procrastination for why they do not make wills, it is
reasonable to assume that a similar reason explains their inactivity in adopting the children in
their lives. See Weisbord, supra note 60, at 889.  As Weisbord argues, the lack of estate R
planning is not a result of agreement with the default rules.  The same can be argued for
equitable adoption.  It is unlikely that people choose not to adopt because they agree with the
default rule that unadopted children may not inherit.
64 Until 2015, same-sex marriage was not recognized in a majority of states, leaving
same-sex couples unable to benefit from the stepparent rules and exceptions for adoption and
inheritance.  Although same-sex marriage is becoming legally possible for a majority of
LGBTQ couples, the availability of the right does not do away with the cut-off problem en-
tirely, as many heterosexual and homosexual couples will choose not to marry because of
numerous social, legal, and economic barriers that have nothing to do with their relationships
with the children in their lives.
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biological parent will have an automatic legal parent-child relationship
with the child, which includes the child’s right to inherit from that parent
or directly from or through that parent’s relatives.  The nonbiological
parent is then able to adopt the child as a second parent, taking the place
of the other biological parent who, in the case of a sperm or egg donor,
provided the other genetic material, but relinquished all parental rights in
doing so.  The second-parent adoption is legally equivalent to a steppar-
ent adoption; the only difference is that the second-parent adoption does
not require the marriage of the two parents, whereas a stepparent adop-
tion, by definition, involves an adoption by the spouse of a biological or
prior adoptive parent.
Second-parent adoptions are not permitted, however, in a majority
of states.65  Some state adoption laws allow only married couples or sin-
gle individuals to adopt, thus precluding adoption by any unmarried part-
ner of a biological or adoptive parent.66  Most state adoption codes
expressly permit a single person or a married couple together to adopt a
child, but they say nothing about an unmarried couple or a co-parent who
is not married to a biological parent.  In the absence of express statutory
authorization, adoption decrees in second-parent adoption cases may be
overturned and voided on public policy grounds if the second parent is a
same-sex partner or if the parents are living in an adulterous situation.
All states allow an unmarried individual to adopt a child, but doing
so usually cuts off all parental ties, including inheritance rights, with all
biological parents.  An adoption by a married couple also cuts off all
inheritance rights with biological parents.  Things get more complicated
when one biological parent retains parental rights, but allows another co-
parent to adopt a child.  In that case, if the biological parent and the co-
parent are married, the co-parent is a stepparent and will benefit from
streamlined adoption procedures, and the adoption will not cut off the
inheritance rights of the child with the biological co-parent.  But if the
biological and co-parent are not married, the adoption generally falls into
a kind of legal limbo unless the state either expressly permits or disal-
lows adoptions.67  Even where such adoptions are permitted, there may
65 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington allow it, along with the District of Columbia. See
infra Appendix.
66 Utah prohibits anyone cohabiting with an unmarried partner from adopting; Arizona
and Utah give preferences for married couples, and Mississippi prohibits adoption by a same-
sex couple. See infra Appendix.
67 According to the Family Equality Council, second-parent adoptions are expressly per-
mitted in 15 states plus the District of Columbia, uncertain in an additional 28 states, and
expressly prohibited in 7 states. See Second-Parent Adoption Laws, FAMILY EQUAL. COUNCIL,
http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/equality_maps/second-parent_adoption_laws/
(last visited May 17, 2015).  It is not clear whether the twenty-eight states for which second-
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be legal or social obstacles for unmarried couples.  For instance, many
states that may allow second-parent adoptions have strong preferences
for married couples, and at least five states have ruled that second-parent
adoptions violate the state’s adoption laws.68
Although the trend is toward allowing second-parent adoptions,
states that require marriage (for either same-sex or opposite-sex couples)
in order to adopt a child (either a child who is a stranger to both or a
child who is the biological child of one of the partners) dramatically limit
the ability of nontraditional parents to protect the legal interests of their
children.  Moreover, many judges in liberal counties in states that have
not come out either way on second-parent adoptions typically grant
them.  Where they are granted, the judgment usually provides that the
biological parent consents to sharing parental rights with the second par-
ent without the termination of the biological parent’s rights.  These judg-
ments also provide that the adoption should be treated like a step-parent
adoption even though the parents are unmarried, either because they are
unable or unwilling to marry.
The problem with these second-parent adoptions in states that have
not expressly allowed them is that although the adoption judgment may
give the second parent parental rights to make care and custody decisions
on behalf of the child, the judgment cannot override inheritance laws that
terminate an adopted child’s inheritance rights through and from her bio-
logical parent.69  These state inheritance laws, similar to Uniform Pro-
bate Code § 2-114, provide that all inheritance rights terminate between
a child and her natural parents upon adoption except when the spouse of
the natural parent adopts the child.70  Because the inheritance laws create
only one exception, the step-parent exception, adopted children will be
cut off from inheritances by and through their natural parents, even when
they continue to reside with them and the natural parent continues to
parent adoptions are uncertain would limit the uncertainty to same-sex couples, or whether
they would treat opposite-sex unmarried couples the same way.  Similarly, it is not clear if
unmarried opposite-sex couples are also prohibited from engaging in second-parent adoptions
in the seven states that prohibit them, although it seems likely.
68 Kentucky, North Carolina, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix.
69 See Padilla, supra note 15, at 237. R
70 Ironically, the post-2008 UPC § 2-119 creates three other situations in which the
child’s rights to inherit from the biological parent are not cut off, but none deal with second-
parent adoptions.  The first new provision deals with adoption by a relative of a genetic parent,
the second deals with adoption after the death of both genetic parents (which is relatively rare),
and the third deals with adoption by those using assisted reproductive technology (ART).  No-
tably, none of these new situations adequately address the inheritance needs of the child cut off
in the co-parenting second-parent adoption or the functional child. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §2-
119 (amended 2010).
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have parental rights over the child in accordance with the second-parent
adoption decree.71
Adoption and probate statutes, which effectuate the inheritance pen-
alty, reflect a “fresh start” policy.  The most current iteration of the Uni-
form Probate Code creates a parent-child relationship between an
adoptee and her adoptive parents,72 while a parent-child relationship is
not deemed to exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s genetic par-
ents.73  The comment to this section explains that “[t]his rule recognizes
that an adoption severs the parent-child relationship between the adopted
child and the child’s genetic parents.  The adoption gives the adopted
child a replacement family, sometimes referred to in the case law as ‘a
fresh start.’”74  State laws mirroring the Uniform Probate Code were in-
tended to effectuate a policy that protects adoptive parents from claims
of the child’s biological parents.75  While these are laudable goals, the
fresh start provision does not contemplate alternative family structures.
In addition, some courts have interpreted the fresh start language strictly,
to avoid adaptation of it for same-sex couples.76  The fresh start pre-
sumption simply does not work at all in adoptions where the child con-
tinues to be parented by one biological and one adoptive parent, unless
the adoption is analogized to a stepparent adoption.  With statistics show-
ing that over 50% of children are now being born out of wedlock,77 pro-
bate codes that tie inheritance rights to the marital status of parents are
clearly falling behind the curve of social practice.
Even stepparent adoptions can be problematic because they require
the termination of the noncustodial parent’s rights.  If a noncustodial par-
ent refuses to give up parental rights to a child, the stepparent simply
cannot adopt.  If the noncustodial parent is abusive, neglectful, or other-
wise subject to a judicial termination of parental rights, an expensive
judicial process will be necessary to terminate the noncustodial parent’s
rights before the stepparent can adopt.  If the child’s parentage or non-
custodial parent’s location is unknown, a hearing along with publication
71 Ralph C. Brashier incorrectly assumed that a second-parent adoption, which allows
the continuation of parental rights for both the biological and adoptive parent, will allow the
child to be the heir expectant of both parents. See Brashier, supra note 62, at 161–62. R
72 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-118(a).
73 Id. § 2-119(a).
74 Id. § 2-119 cmt.
75 Beekman, supra note 15, at 150. R
76 E.g., In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071,1071–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(denying the petition of a woman to adopt her partner’s biological child, stating that the adop-
tion by an adult who was not the child’s stepparent would terminate the parental rights of the
biological parent by operation of law because the unambiguous language and meaning of the
statute required strict construction).
77 See A Generation at Risk, supra note 2; see also Kever, supra note 3; U.S. CENSUS R
BUREAU, supra note 3. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 26 23-DEC-15 16:42
26 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:1
of the termination petition may be required.  And if the other biological
parent is deceased, the surviving parent may feel a strong sense of duty
toward the memory of the deceased parent, and might not permit a step-
parent adoption.  These emotional and legal impediments all work
against a child who is not formally adopted, by denying inheritance
rights from and through the functional family (whether this is a steppar-
ent or an unmarried co-parent who does not adopt), and against a child
who is adopted by anyone but a stepparent, by denying inheritance rights
from and through the biological co-parent.
The latter situation, the cutting off of the inheritance rights of the
adopted child, is, in many ways, even worse than prohibiting inheritances
by nonadopted, but functional children.  The point of adoption, for most
parents, is to legally cement the parent-child relationship and to ensure
that their children can inherit from them.  But when the adoption by the
nonbiological co-parent ends up terminating the inheritance rights of a
child from the biological co-parent, the law has created a serious double
bind for parents.  In the case of the typical lesbian couple, Mary and
Sally, where Mary is the biological parent of the couple’s two children,
the children will be able to inherit only from Mary if Sally does not adopt
them, and they can inherit only from Sally if Sally does adopt them.  The
same is true if the parents are Mark and Sally, where Mark is the biologi-
cal parent and Sally adopts Mark’s children after the death of his first
wife, but Mark and Sally decide not to marry because doing so will have
economic repercussions such as the loss of Sally’s Medicaid or Social
Security benefits.78
Thus, even in progressive states that have recognized the impor-
tance of second-parent adoptions for same-sex and cohabiting opposite-
sex parents, these parents face a serious catch-22.  Although the second-
parent adoption gives both parents parental rights during life, the probate
codes of the vast majority of these same states will not allow these chil-
dren the same inheritance rights as children adopted by the married
78 The so-called marriage penalty is a very real barrier to many same-sex and opposite-
sex couples deciding whether to marry.  Married couples with dual-income pay more in in-
come taxes, Medicare taxes, and social security and receive proportionately fewer benefits
than similarly situated unmarried couples.  There are also situations in which divorced individ-
uals might lose insurance benefits, child support, or alimony benefits from their former spouse
if they remarry.  Some individuals balk at the prospect of potentially becoming responsible for
a spouse’s debts and may forego marriage as the easiest way to deal with many of these
economic disparities.  Many individuals on Medicaid risk losing coverage if they marry and
their spouse’s income raises their household income levels above the ceiling for Medicaid.
And where one spouse is a non-resident, the income tax penalties can be quite significant for
the resident spouse who has a choice of filing as married filing separately (which is usually the
worst tax category) or married filing jointly (which makes the non-resident spouse’s non-US
income taxable). See, e.g., Jim Wang, How Much the Marriage Tax Penalty Will Cost You,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2014/03/11/
how-much-the-marriage-tax-penalty-will-cost-you.
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spouse of a biological parent.  And even if marriage becomes a legal
possibility in all states for same-sex couples, that option would not re-
solve the cut-off problem for both straight and gay co-parents who
choose not to marry, even if they have the wherewithal to adopt.
II. BUT MOMMY WROTE A WILL: AVOIDING THE INHERITANCE
PENALTY
When we talk about the law “cutting off” inheritance rights, most
people think about the laws of intestate succession, the default rules for
how property will pass when the decedent fails to write a will.  If a bio-
logical parent of a child subject to the cut-off provision, or a functional
parent who never adopted a child, writes a will naming the child as a
beneficiary, then there is no penalty, right?  Wrong.  The cut-off provi-
sion may be located in the intestacy section of most state probate codes,
but it has a much longer reach than merely to descents of intestate es-
tates.  And besides, intestate estates still constitute more than half of all
estates.  Many people, after living a lengthy life with several expressions
of an intent to write a will or to adopt the child in their life, never get
around to it.  Should we punish the children for the omissions of their
parents?79
The inheritance penalty may arise in a number of factual scenarios
involving both descent and devises.  Testamentary freedom, the bedrock
of American inheritance law, grants individuals the freedom to control
the disposition of their property after death.  To this end, people can cre-
ate wills to effectuate the desired distribution of their property and can
name anyone as a beneficiary, including functional or biological children
that would be subject to the cut-off provision.  However, any part of a
person’s estate that is not effectively disposed of by a testamentary in-
strument will be distributed according to the state’s intestacy scheme.
The same is true of much devised property that lapses, any gift to a class
like heirs, children, or issue, and any of these bequests that pass through
the parent from grandparents, siblings, or other collateral relatives.  Le-
gal heirship is far more complex than who inherits if Mommy does not
write a will—it pervades all aspects of the probate code, from questions
of standing to homestead rights, to preferences as executor, to social se-
79 Justice Sears-Collins, dissenting in O’Neal v. Wilkes, explained that many of these
inheritance penalties and barriers serve only to harm the very children they are supposed to
protect.  She explained that “where there is no person with the legal authority to consent to the
adoption, such as in the present case, the only reason to insist that a person be appointed the
child’s legal guardian before agreeing to the contract to adopt would be for the protection of
the child. Yet, by insisting upon this requirement after the adopting parents’ deaths, this Court
is harming the very person that the requirement would protect.”  O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d
490, 494 (Ga. 1994).
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curity benefits, and to the tax rates and withdrawal rules of a decedent’s
IRA and 401(k) plan accounts.
The current intestacy scheme, as it exists in most states, is rigid and
formalistic80 and does not consider whether the decedent had an ongoing
relationship with the designated heirs, who are the priority takers under
intestacy.81  In fact, it does not even matter if the decedent knew the heir
personally.82  Intestacy statutes rarely conform to the decedent’s actual
intent, although it provides a pretty good approximation for those dece-
dents who leave a surviving spouse and biological children.83  No intes-
tacy system currently in place attempts to determine whether a parent
and child functioned as a family.84  Thus, a functional child may be cut
off and property will pass in favor of a distant cousin who has never met
the decedent.
The goal behind intestacy statutes, therefore, is not necessarily to
approximate what persons the decedent would have wanted to benefit,
but to give the decedent’s property to the decedent’s family, with the
term “family” narrowly defined to mean family by biology or adoption.85
In this way, the inheritance system “maintain[s] and perpetuate[s] the
social unit that Americans have traditionally deemed essential for a sta-
ble and productive society—the family.”86  This falls short of addressing
the needs of nontraditional families,87 given the increase in LGBTQ and
blended families within the past few decades.88  Furthermore, intestacy
law completely ignores a decedent’s nonmarital partner, whether same or
opposite sex.89  The bright-line rules of intestacy “aid in the ease of ad-
80 Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199,
208 (2001) (describing intestacy schemes as assigning shares “mechanically”); Tritt, supra
note 14, at 379 (describing succession statutes as “rigid” and “mechanical”). R
81 Gary, supra note 13, at 3. R
82 Foster, supra note 80, at 207; Gary, supra note 13, at 3. R
83 Tritt, supra note 14, at 382; see also Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship R
Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 651 (2002) [hereinafter Parent-Child
Relationship].
84 Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 665. R
85 Gary, supra note 13, at 3 (citing Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About R
Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 324); see also Foster, supra note 80, at 206 (“[T]he U.S. inheritance R
system actually disserves support.  Its principal function is not support, but rather preservation
of the family.”); Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 653. R
86 Foster, supra note 80, at 204; see also Spitko, supra note 14, at 1100 (“[I]ntestacy law R
not only reflects society’s familial norms but also helps to shape and maintain them.”).
87 Gary, supra note 13, at 3; Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 646. R
88 See O’Bryan, supra note 11, at 1119. R
89 Spitko, supra note 14, at 1065.  The acclaimed novelist of The Girl with the Dragon R
Tattoo, Stieg Larsson, died unexpectedly after delivering the manuscripts of his novels to his
publisher.  His partner of thirty years was entirely excluded from any financial benefits of his
estate because he died intestate and Swedish inheritance law did not provide for unmarried
partners.  His father and brother ultimately worked out a settlement, but the law by no means
required such largesse.  Boyd Tonkin, The Publisher Who Played with Fire: The Battle for
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ministration, but do so at financial and emotional cost to many
families.”90
Of course, individuals can avoid intestate succession by executing a
will, although most people fail to do so. 91  There are myriad reasons
why people do not execute wills, including procrastination, lack of re-
sources, or even just avoidance of difficult issues around death and dy-
ing.92  And for those who do, some or all of their property still may be
distributed according to intestate schemes because wills can be invali-
dated for any number of reasons, including incapacity, undue influence,
revocation, fraud, or mistake.  If a will, or parts of a will, are invalidated,
the decedent’s property will pass through intestacy.
The collateral effects of the narrow intestacy rules privileging biol-
ogy and adoption extend to another important doctrine of succession law,
that of “representation.”  Representation is the substitution of more re-
mote relatives to take the property of a parent or other ancestor who
predeceased the decedent but would have been a descendant had he or
she survived.93  If a functional child is not entitled to inherit from a func-
tional parent by intestacy, she cannot represent her functional parent if
that parent is an heir to another, but predeceased that ancestor.  Adopted
children are often precluded from inheriting from their natural parent’s
relatives by representation due to the cut-off provision and fresh start
policy.  For instance, in In re Estates of Donnelly, the Washington Su-
preme Court relied upon the fresh start policy to deny an adopted child
the right to represent her natural parent and take from her natural grand-
parent.94  This can happen even though her natural parent continued to
raise her and she maintained an ongoing relationship with her grandpar-
ents or other relatives.
The “stranger to the adoption rule,” which often prevents an
adopted child from inheriting property through the adoptive parent from
the adoptive parent’s relatives, is based on the presumption that the
grandparents or other relatives were strangers to the adoption and may
not necessarily consider the adoptive child a full-fledged member of the
Control of Larsson’s £30m Legacy, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 20, 2013), http://
www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/the-publisher-who-played-with-fire-the-battle-for-
control-of-larssons-30m-legacy-9018974.html#.
90 Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 654. R
91 Gary, supra note 13, at 3; Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 649–51. R
92 Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 650–51. R
93 Representation allows a member of a younger generation to stand in the shoes of a
member of an older generation who would have been an heir under intestacy but for that
person’s death. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 2.2, at 51 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that
representation allows a member of a younger generation to stand in the shoes of a member of
an older generation who would have been an heir under intestacy but for that person’s death).
94 In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wash. 1972).
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family.  The opposite problem still arises for the cut-off child.  This is a
biological child with continuing ties to the biological parent and her rela-
tives, and the odds are very slim indeed that the relatives would have the
expertise and forethought to realize that the second-parent adoption of
their grandchild would cut off the child’s inheritance rights from them.
These individuals need to be informed that their biological grandchild,
with whom they still have a relationship, has been declared a stranger to
them by law because of an adoption by a co-parent.  The court explained
that the legislative policy of providing a clean slate was preeminent in
adoption law and that the new family of the adopted child was to be
treated as her natural family.95  Thus, this outmoded fresh start policy
that underlay the stranger to the adoption policy will result in an adopted
child of a same-sex or unmarried couple being unable to inherit by, from,
or through any biological parent who is not legally recognized as her
parent.
Besides intestate succession of a decedent’s estate, however, the
state’s intestacy statute has an even wider reach.  By defining who counts
as a legal heir, the statute determines who has standing to challenge a
decedent’s will or to intervene in the probate of an estate.96  Only legal
heirs have a potential interest in an estate and thus have standing to chal-
lenge a particular distribution.  Probate codes also establish the order of
priority for who will be appointed executor or personal administrator of
an estate, giving priority to spouses and children.97  A functional child or
cut-off child will be deemed a stranger to the decedent under most state
codes.
The intestacy statute also determines legal heirs for purposes of
homestead protections, retirement benefits, social security, and insur-
ance.98  Persons who are not legal heirs often cannot recover for the
wrongful death of a parent or spouse.99  Any testamentary document that
bases distribution on terms like “heir,” “child,” “descendant,” or “issue”
will rely on the state’s intestacy laws to determine the validity of the
legal relationship.  Even such diverse matters as mental capacity and un-
95 Id. at 1167.
96 See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 93, § 12.1, at 497. R
97 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.06 (West 2014) (prioritizing spouse, then next
of kin as administrators of an estate); FLA. STAT. § 733.301 (2014) (prioritizing the surviving
spouse over the heir nearest in degree); CAL. PROB. CODE § 8461 (West 2015) (prioritizing
spouse, then children, then grandchildren).
98 See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033–34 (2012) (holding that federal social
security benefits were based on definitions of family relationships under state law).
99 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2015) (allowing spouses, domestic
partners, children, and issue of deceased children to bring a wrongful death action); see also
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 2014).  New York allows only a per-
sonal representative to bring a wrongful death action, so if a putative child cannot be a per-
sonal representative, he or she cannot bring a wrongful death action.
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due influence will ultimately rest on the definition of the legal heir for
determining the “natural objects of a person’s bounty,”100 or whether a
particular person is in a “confidential relationship.”101  And although
many courts might recognize the functional parent-child relationship of a
biological parent to her child in cases beyond the strict intestacy context,
the broad reach of the category of legal heir cannot be understated.
Making a will may be effective in benefitting a same-sex partner
and their cut-off children if it is not challenged and if it disposes of all of
the biological parent’s property.  But it will not help in the many in-
stances in which a child would inherit through her biological parent.
Thus, if grandparents, siblings, or collateral relatives die without writing
a will and naming the child, she will not be able to take by representation
her parent’s share if her parent predeceased the testator.  So it is not
enough for the parent to execute a will—all relatives who would seek to
benefit the parent or the child must execute a will or other testamentary
instrument so that these estates do not pass by intestacy.  And all the
issues of standing, mental capacity, executorship priorities, and the like,
apply to grandparents, siblings, and collateral relatives of the parent as
well.  The same impediments apply to functional children whose inheri-
tance rights are denied as to the cut-off child.
One big problem arises when a functional or biological parent of a
cut-off child predeceases any relative who devises property to that par-
ent.  Under intestacy laws, a beneficiary who predeceases the decedent
cannot inherit a share, but their descendants take by representation.102
Under a will, however, the law treats that gift as having lapsed.103  Every
state has adopted an antilapse statute, however, which provides that a
substitute gift is created in the issue of the will’s beneficiary, who will
take the lapsed gift in place of the predeceased beneficiary.  Though
these statutes differ in classes of applicable beneficiaries,104 they all ap-
ply to children and grandchildren.  Thus, if a grandparent devises a gift
to a parent, and the parent predeceases the grandparent, the cut-off or
functional child will not take her parent’s share under antilapse statutes
because the child is not deemed a child of that parent.  So even making a
will does not solve this problem if lapsed gifts come into play.
100 See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 93, § 7.1, at 295. R
101 See id. § 7.3, at 306.
102 See id. § 2.2, at 51.
103 See id. § 8.3, at 328–29.
104 For instance, in Maryland, antilapse applies to any testamentary beneficiary who pre-
deceases the testator. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-401 (LexisNexis 2014).  In the
District of Columbia, antilapse applies to beneficiaries who are issue of the decedent. See
D.C. CODE § 18-308 (2015).  Under the UPC, the antilapse provisions apply only to benefi-
ciaries who are related through the grandparents of the decedent. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
603 (amended 2010).
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Countless provisions in the average probate code benefit children or
issue or descendants of a decedent, from antilapse rules to homestead
protections to forced shares for minor children in Louisiana.105  The cut-
off provision applies to them all to deny a child the legal right to be
deemed the parent’s child for all inheritance purposes.  And it does not
stop with the parent.  If the child is not the parent’s child, she is not a
grandchild, niece, aunt, sister, or cousin for any of the family members of
the parent.  This mushrooming effect of legal heirship means that every
single relative would need to execute ironclad instruments naming a
child to ensure that the inheritance penalty will not apply.
Yet, even if all relatives execute appropriate wills, trusts, or other
testamentary instruments, legal heirship problems can still arise in class
gifts.  A class gift is property given to a group of people who share com-
mon characteristics and who are intended to get equal shares of prop-
erty.106  The inheritance penalty may arise in the class gift context in at
least two ways.  Adopted children, by virtue of the fresh start policy, are
typically considered strangers to their birth relatives.  As a result,
adopted children can be excluded from class gifts to heirs, children, de-
scendants, and issue of the biological parent or relatives.  Children of
unmarried and same-sex couples can be penalized in another way.  If a
functional parent never adopted his partner’s child, but had two biologi-
cal children of his own and executed a will leaving his property to “his
children,” the functional child might be excluded from that class even if
the testator intended for her to be included.  Functional and cut-off chil-
dren both will be excluded from class gifts under traditional
interpretations.
Thus, even if all functional parents write wills and name their chil-
dren as beneficiaries, only a fraction of the problems are avoided.  In the
case of the biological child being cut off from her parent’s inheritances,
she is cut off from inheriting through her parent as well.  Thus, grandpar-
ents, aunts and uncles, and brothers and sisters all have to write wills to
avoid the cut-off provision.  And, the estate planning must be quite de-
tailed, for no will or trust or beneficiary designation should rely on the
terms “heir,” “child,” “issue,” or “descendant” if the cut-off child is to
take her share.  In the case of the child who is not adopted by her func-
tional parent, that parent also must take extra steps in estate planning to
provide for her functional child, as must her entire family.  For instance,
the child might not have the standing to challenge a claim to a grandpar-
105 For a typical antilapse statute, see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603. A good example of a
homestead protection that privileges recognized descendants exists under Florida law. See
FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (2014); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2014).
106 See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 93, § 1.1, at 3 (defining a class gift as “a gift to R
a group, like ‘children,’ as distinguished from a gift to individuals, like ‘John and Mary’”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 33 23-DEC-15 16:42
2015] INHERITANCE EQUITY 33
ent’s estate.  Or, she will not be entitled to Social Security or insurance
benefits if the adoption is not made legal.  But, in the case of unmarried
and same-sex couples, they are over a barrel with either decision they
make, to adopt or not to adopt.  Adoption may allow the child to inherit
from and through the adoptive parent, but the adoption cuts off the rights
of the child to inherit from and through her biological co-parent.  Unlike
the traditional child who is entitled to inherit from both parents, the cut-
off child is legally denied the possibility of inheriting from two parents.
And the penalty can spiral downward as well.  A functional or cut-
off child who predeceases a testator, even if the child is named, may find
that her children are not entitled to the benefits of antilapse statutes be-
cause she is not of the statutorily required degree of relationship.  In the
case of In re Estate of Seader, for instance, a couple had two genetic
children and the wife had a daughter from a prior marriage.107  Despite
numerous aborted plans to adopt the daughter, the father failed to get
around to it.108  Instead, he simply wrote a will leaving his estate in three
equal shares, to his two sons and his wife’s daughter, who he character-
ized as his child.  But the daughter predeceased the father by a few
months, and the daughter’s two sons were not allowed to argue equitable
adoption because the court held that doctrine applied only in the case of
intestacy.109  Since the daughter was provided for under the will, equita-
ble adoption was not applicable.110  But the daughter’s children could not
benefit from the state’s antilapse statute without a finding that the daugh-
ter was a child.111  Thus, the father’s estate was divided into two shares
for the biological sons, and the stepdaughter’s children were cut out.112
There are countless ways in which the denial of a parent-child rela-
tionship for intestacy purposes disadvantages the functional child and the
cut-off child, ways that cannot be adequately planned around.  Many
benefits depend on the status of being a child, but for those who are
distanced from the legal system, it is especially difficult to properly draft
instruments to effectively avoid the inheritance penalty.  And how many
people actually think about the myriad effects of the penalty until it is too
late?  Even if the solution were to make adoption easier and simpler so
that more functional parents took formal legal steps to protect their chil-
107 76 P.3d 1236, 1237 (2003).
108 Id. (stating that the father consulted with a lawyer but decided it was too expensive).
109 Id. at 1248.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Ironically, had one of the sons predeceased his father leaving issue, the issue would
have taken their father’s share under the state’s antilapse statute, but the stepdaughter’s issue
would not be allowed to take their mother’s gifts, even though she was a named beneficiary.
The court held that because she was named specifically, the court could not infer that the
stepfather included her as a daughter, rather than simply as a named beneficiary. See id. at
1247.
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dren’s inheritances, making adoption easier does not address the problem
of the cut-off child.  In fact, making adoption easier may cause parents to
exacerbate the inheritance penalty for their children.  Although probate
courts still have some flexibility in using equitable principles to protect
donative intent, if explicit statutory changes are not made, the solution is
likely to be piecemeal in most states, addressing each category of child
differently.  There are two policy changes that would help.
The first change would be to reexamine the traditional history of
adoption in an effort to unlink the age-old connection between adoption
and inheritance, recognizing that the linkage is based on outdated expec-
tations regarding adoption.113  If we understood adoption decisions to be
primarily about relationships and powers during life, then perhaps the
fear of the nonadopted child inheriting undeserved property might lessen,
and the courts could liberalize the equitable adoption rules.  The second
change is to focus our attention, and the equity court’s attention, on the
living—the child who has performed her side of the bargain, and should
not be barred from inheriting—and not on the dead.  Despite the mantra
of testamentary freedom, which excuses courts from not providing inher-
itance rights to functional and cut-off children, we should focus on the
fact that, in many cases, limits on dead hand control to protect spouses
come at the expense of the very children that adults care most about.
Legislatures intent on resolving the inequities of the inheritance
penalty have many piecemeal fixes they can enact, as well as comprehen-
sive inheritance law reforms they could undertake.  In any reform, how-
ever, courts and legislatures need to consider two important points.  First,
just as family law codes have unhitched the parent-child relationship
from the marital status of the parents, so too should the probate codes.
Second, the reliance on adoption as a bright line indicating donative in-
tent is contrary to most people’s likely intent given the complex role of
law in the modern family.  People choose to adopt, or not adopt, for
many reasons, only one of which is likely to be the cementing of inheri-
tance rights.  To properly address these complex inequities, we next need
to examine how a variety of reform elements might work.  Then we need
to consider the policy changes that can be made to facilitate bringing
inheritance equity to our modern families.
113 Even if the history of adoption showed that parents primarily adopted children in order
to allow them to inherit, the practice today is far too diverse for such a simple correlation.
Parents adopt (or fail to adopt) for many reasons, and as I have argued, allowing or foreclosing
an inheritance seems to be one of the least common reasons.
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III. THE DETAILS: MARRIAGE EQUALITY, SECOND-PARENT
ADOPTIONS, FUNCTIONAL PARENT/CHILD STATUTES,
EQUITABLE ADOPTION, INTESTACY REFORM, AND
DECEDENT-CONTROLLED REFORMS
There are a number of possible solutions to the diverse problems of
the inheritance penalty and, given the state-by-state diversity of adoption,
marriage, and probate laws, it is likely that individual solutions will con-
sist of a variety of legal changes, some statutory and some judicial.
Many of these proposals apply to intestacy and inheritance laws gener-
ally, suggesting formal and informal changes to probate codes.  Others
include suggested changes to adoption codes and the definition of family,
as well as general legal changes to allow parents whose children are fac-
ing the inheritance penalty to draft around the penalty as best as they can.
At the core of these proposals is a critique of the strict adherence to
notions of biology and formalism in the definition of family in inheri-
tance law.114  In many ways, inheritance laws continue to reflect the nu-
clear family norm of the 1950s, as well as the elite landed family’s
priorities of the 1850s.115  However, the nuclear family norm does not
reflect the lives of most American families.116  Yet, legislatures have not
responded by expanding the definition of family for purposes of inheri-
tance rights, even though they have expanded the definition of family in
their family law codes.117  As a result, many scholars have proposed dif-
ferent approaches for amending inheritance laws to mirror actual family
structures.118  In bringing these together to analyze their strengths and
weaknesses for remedying the myriad inheritance penalty problems, I
recognize that no single solution or legal change will solve the problem
for all children.  Comprehensive law reform will require many of these
changes at different levels, and a failure to achieve change in one way
may require change through a different channel.  Even if these changes
are not made, however, policy changes that reflect the structure and pro-
tect the needs of twenty-first century families will help decrease the im-
pact of the inheritance penalty on some, if not all, children.
114 See, e.g., Gary, supra note 13, at 4–5. See generally Foster, supra note 80, at 204. R
115 Gary, supra note 13, at 5. R
116 Beekman, supra note 15, at 144 (“The 2000 Census reported that 34.3% of lesbian R
couples and 22.3% of gay male couples were raising children.”); Gary, supra note 13, at 31 R
(“[T]he limited data available for stepfamilies and for gay and lesbian families support the
general perception that the structure of American families has changed from the nuclear norm
and will continue to change in the future.”); Margaret Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of
Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 917 (1989) (“Many modern fami-
lies do not take the form of the traditional nuclear family.”).
117 Gary, supra note 13, at 4. R
118 See Beekman, supra note 15, at 141–42; Foster, supra note 80, at 205; Gary, supra R
note 13, at 3; Trast, supra note 10, at 864. R
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A. Marriage Equality
One part of the solution that should rectify the problem for many
children subject to the cut-off provision is the recent availability of same-
sex marriage, with all of the rights and duties of marriage.  Thus, since
the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,119 married same-
sex couples now fit within the stepparent exception to the probate codes
which then allow the children of married LGBTQ parents to inherit from
both their biological and adoptive parents.
However, even though same-sex marriage is now available nation-
wide, important state-by-state changes still need to be undertaken to en-
sure that second-parent adoptions that were done by unmarried partners
before they married will be treated as stepparent adoptions after the par-
ents are deemed legally married.  Many same-sex parents received mar-
riage licenses in states that granted same-sex marriages, but lived in
states that did not recognize them.  If they have adopted children in a
state that did not recognize the marriage, it is unclear what will happen
now that the state has to recognize their marriage.  It would seem obvi-
ous that second-parent adoptions that occurred before the marriage was
deemed legal should be treated as step-parent adoptions once the mar-
riage is legalized, but such common sense outcomes are by no means
guaranteed, especially in those states that stringently opposed same-sex
marriage or have imposed barriers to adoptions by LGBTQ parents.120
And, same-sex marriage will not solve the problem for children of
parents who are unable or unwilling to marry.  This can include persons
already married to another who may be unable or unwilling to obtain a
divorce, or persons who might not want to marry because of tax, debt,
welfare, or insurance disadvantages.  Marriage has a tremendous number
of financial benefits, but it also carries with it certain disadvantages that
people reasonably might wish to avoid.  Telling someone that she must
marry in order to be a parent connects parental status to marital status in
a way that raises serious constitutional and ethical problems.121  Thus,
although marriage equality will provide relief to many children of same-
119 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).
120 See Ann Zimmerman & Ana Campoy, Texas National Guard to Let Same-Sex
Couples Register for Benefits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304017204579224473216479040 (discussing Texas and Mississippi’s re-
fusal to use state resources to register same-sex couples for federal military benefits).
121 See Danaya C. Wright, “Well-Behaved Women Don’t Make History”: Rethinking En-
glish Family, Law, and History, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 211 (2004) (exploring the multitude of
ways in which nineteenth century women reformers sought to disconnect the parental and
marital rights and responsibilities of women).  The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a
child’s inheritance rights are dependent on the marital status of their parents.  Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
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sex married parents, it does not solve the problem for adopted children
of unmarried parents, whether same-sex or opposite-sex.
To the extent that the Constitution and federal and state laws pro-
hibit disadvantaging nonmarital or illegitimate children, we already have
a public policy and laws in place that have unhitched parental rights from
the marital relationship.122  The problem remains, however, that while
legitimacy has been displaced as the primary issue for inheritance, biol-
ogy has taken its place.  The laws prohibiting discrimination against
nonmarital children have turned to biology for its bright lines, and bio-
logical relationships are most definitely not an adequate substitute in our
brave new world of assisted reproductive technologies and manufactured
families.
Even though same-sex marriage will provide relief for many chil-
dren, it is likely to further cement the divide between marital and func-
tional children for the other children caught in the inheritance penalty
web.  Many same-sex and opposite-sex couples have sound reasons for
eschewing marriage and it makes little sense to force them to marry in
order to avoid the inheritance penalty.  As one aspect of a comprehensive
solution, marriage equality makes sense, but it is by no means the blanket
salvo that some critics have claimed.123
B. Second-Parent Adoptions
Another important part of any solution would be the legislating of
second-parent adoptions with explicit recognition that the second parent,
like a stepparent, does not cut off the child’s inheritance rights from the
biological co-parent.  According to the Comments to the Uniform Adop-
tion Act, the stepparent exception to the fresh start provision is “justified
because in the typical stepparent adoption, the minor has been living with
the stepparent and the stepparent’s spouse.”124  The adoption then for-
malizes a de facto parental relationship and creates the bright line that
122 In Trimble, Justice Powell explained that no purpose is served when a state punishes a
child for the sins of its parents, and that laws which do so do not pass constitutional muster.
Justice Powell quoted Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., where the Court explained:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of
irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.  But visiting this condemnation
on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.  Moreover, imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obvi-
ously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
123 See, e.g., SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP: HOW GOD, GENES,
AND GOOD INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY EQUALITY 3 (2013) (arguing that the focus on
tolerance and integration of gay life, especially through marriage, undermines the more impor-
tant ways in which LGBTQ persons are discriminated against in daily life).
124 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT art. 4 cmt. (1994).
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judges and lawmakers prefer. The same reasoning holds true for an adop-
tion by any adult involved in any intimate relationship with a biological
parent, regardless of their marital status.
Second-parent adoption allows the partner of a biological parent or
previously adoptive parent to adopt the partner’s child.125  Such an adop-
tion does not terminate the parental rights of the biological parent or the
inheritance rights of the child to inherit from her biological parent under
the fresh start provision.126  Colorado and Connecticut allow second-par-
ent adoptions by statute.127  Other states’ courts have recognized them by
analogy to stepparent adoptions.128  But, courts in Kentucky, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin have foreclosed such adoptions.129
Even when granted, second-parent adoptions do not always eliminate the
inheritance penalty because of statutory preferences for married couples
and laws that disallow adoptions by same-sex couples.  Moreover, most
states that have not expressly allowed or prohibited second-parent adop-
tions prevent unmarried couples from jointly adopting, allowing only sin-
gle individuals or married couples to adopt.130
Adoption laws vary from state to state, but some merit brief discus-
sion.  In Arizona, any adult may adopt, but preference is given to married
couples,131 foreclosing same-sex couples from adopting together and
limiting the adoption rights of unmarried couples.  Even in Connecticut,
a state that allows same-sex marriage, the sexual orientation of a poten-
tial adoptive parent may be considered.132  North Carolina and Utah have
125 See Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 659. R
126 Id.
127 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(3) (2013).
128 See, e.g., In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1187 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001).
129 S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 828 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (noting in dicta that an
unmarried couple cannot use the stepparent adoption procedures in Kentucky to establish legal
parentage for both partners); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Neb. 2002) (hold-
ing that a lesbian could not adopt partner’s biological child because biological parent had not
relinquished parental rights); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010) (holding
that a lesbian partner’s second-parent adoption was void because the issuing court did not
terminate the parental rights of the biological mother, her partner, as required by statute); In re
Adoption of Jane Doe, 17 N.E.2d 1071, 1072–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (denying the petition
of a woman to adopt her partner’s biological child, stating that the adoption by an adult who
was not the child’s stepparent would terminate the parental rights of the biological parent by
operation of law because the unambiguous language and meaning of the statue required strict
construction); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994) (denying a woman’s
single petition to adopt her partner’s adopted child and holding that the child was not eligible
to be adopted since one parent still retained full parental rights).
130 See infra Appendix.
131 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-103 (2014).
132 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-726(a) (2013) (prohibiting the Commissioner of Children
and Families or a child-placing agency from determining an adoption placement based solely
on a prospective adoptive parent’s race, color, or national origin).
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statutes that preclude two unmarried individuals from jointly adopting.133
Until 2010, Florida had a law that explicitly denied adoptions to homo-
sexual petitioners.134  The Florida Third District Court of Appeal held
this law unconstitutional,135 but it remains unclear whether same-sex
couples, as opposed to single individuals, will be granted full adoption
rights in Florida.136  Mississippi explicitly prohibits adoption by couples
of the same gender,137 but it is unclear what would happen if a single co-
parent adopted the biological children of her same-sex partner.  Even
facially neutral statutes with disparate results impliedly express judgment
of LGBTQ families in the context of inheritance law, which only pun-
ishes the innocent child and does not affect their parents’ behavior.138
Despite allowing second-parent adoptions, only a few states have
made explicit provisions that the second-parent adoption functions like a
stepparent adoption for inheritance purposes.139  Thus, a two-pronged so-
lution is needed with regard to second-parent adoptions.  The first prong
is to make second-parent adoptions available and applied equally in all
the states and territories, in order to do away with the marriage prefer-
ence.140  This expands adoption options for parents that want to formal-
ize relationships with the children in their lives.  The second prong
requires explicitly tying second-parent adoption rights to stepparent
adoption rights within the state probate codes, so that second-parent
adoption counts as an exception to the fresh start policy of stranger adop-
tions for inheritance purposes.  This is necessary because although many
states allow second-parent adoptions, the probate codes continue to pro-
vide an exception only for stepparent adoptions.
At least one scholar advocates the simultaneous adoption solution,
which makes the cut-off provision discretionary, not mandatory.141  This
133 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-301(c) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-117(3)–(4)
(2014).
134 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2010).
135 See In re Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
136 The Florida adoption code allows only married couples or single individuals to adopt,
making it unclear whether an adoption by a second parent in an intimate relationship with a
biological parent will cause the cut-off penalty to apply. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (2012).
137 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2014).
138 Spitko, supra note 14, at 1064.  Spitko explains that the typical intestacy statute does R
not distinguish on its face between the inheritance rights of heterosexual and LGBT persons
and thus ignores an important distinction. Id.  He argues that by ignoring such a distinction,
such statutes discriminate against LGBT people by denying them donative freedom and deval-
uing their relationships. Id.
139 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203 (2014).
140 The lack of legal equity also has implications for the structure of family relationships.
See Jonniann Butterfield & Irene Padavic, The Impact of Legal Inequality on Relational Power
in Planned Lesbian Families, 28 GENDER & SOC’Y 752, 752, 762–66, 768 (2014) (illustrating
the numerous ways a lesbian parent without legal parental rights engages in fear-induced strat-
egies to avoid being deprived of access to children by the legal co-parent).
141 See Beekman, supra note 15, at 165. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 40 23-DEC-15 16:42
40 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:1
would allow a child to still inherit from a biological parent despite a
second-parent adoption if the biological parent relinquishes her parental
rights in the moment before the adoption, and then jointly adopts with
her co-parent.142  Though there is a fear that terminating one’s parental
rights, even for just a moment, may be asking for trouble, the benefit of
the simultaneous adoption is that both parents become co-equal adoptive
parents.  But the simultaneous adoption solution works only in states that
allow two unmarried individuals to jointly adopt a child.  It is a way to
get around the cut-off provision, but is permitted in only a few states.143
And a parent must ensure that the states that allow it do not distinguish
between adoptive and biological children for any inheritance purpose,
especially inheriting through the adoptive parent.144  If there are situa-
tions in which the parental rights of a biological and an adoptive child
are different,145 a biological parent may hesitate to change status from
one to the other.
As more states allow second-parent adoptions, more parent-child re-
lationships are likely to be granted full effect under inheritance schemes,
regardless of marriage, so long as the state laws do not require that the
adoption trigger the cut-off provision.146  Thus, second-parent adoption
laws need to be refined and brought into harmony with state inheritance
laws.  However, legalizing second-parent adoption will not be a solution
for the inheritance penalty of children of all unmarried co-parents, be-
cause many co-parents may not realize the importance of adoption for
securing inheritance rights and thereby forego adoption, fearing its cost
or the public scrutiny of an adoption.  Also, the probate codes and pro-
bate courts might not analogize the second-parent adoptions to stepparent
adoptions.147  Thus, laws allowing for inheritance when functional par-
ent-child relations exist need to be implemented as well.
Another quick fix to the inheritance penalty would be to amend the
probate codes to provide that a biological parent who does not relinquish
parental rights with respect to a child will continue to be treated as a
142 Id.
143 Massachusetts is one of these states. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321
(Mass. 1993).  California is another. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 562–64
(Cal. 2003).
144 This refers to the “stranger to the adoption” rules that are mostly abolished but may
have lingering traces in many state codes.  The stranger to the adoption rule was a presumption
that a testator would not intend for an adopted relative to inherit if the testator was not the
adoptive parent. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Adopted Child as Within Class Named in
Testamentary Gift, 36 A.L.R. 5th 395 § 21 (1996).
145 Differential treatment can occur in many instances, including application of antilapse
provisions, class gift interpretations, or identification of who counts as children for representa-
tion purposes. See id. § 21.
146 Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 680. R
147 See Trast, supra note 10, at 870–71. R
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parent, and the child as the parent’s child, for purposes of intestacy.148
Such a change would apply to second-parent adoptions where the probate
code has not included the second-parent adoption within the stepparent
exception of the intestacy provision.  Such a simple statutory amendment
would involve broadening the stepparent exception to apply to commit-
ted but nonmarital partners for all legal rights, even if the expansive defi-
nition exists only in the adoption code and not the probate code.149  Thus,
the cut-off provision would not apply whenever a parent-child relation-
ship continues to exist with both the biological and adoptive parents.
Another statutory amendment would be to simply create an exception to
the cut-off provision for children adopted by their parent’s partners, re-
gardless of that partner’s gender.  Vermont has exactly this type of gen-
der-neutral statute.150
Marriage is not a prerequisite to a parent-child relationship under
family law codes and modern principles of family privacy.151  Unmarried
same-sex and opposite-sex partners may wish to adopt their partners’
children, and a valid second-parent adoption would prevent these chil-
dren from having their inheritance rights from, through, and by their bio-
logical parent severed.  Second-parent adoptions also do not depend on
biological status at all.  Thus, a child who was adopted by a single indi-
vidual should be allowed to have a second parent adopt her as well with-
out terminating the first parent’s rights.
Second-parent adoptions simply make good sense.  If a biological or
adoptive parent consents to share parental rights with another adult, there
is absolutely no reason the inheritance rights cannot be shared as well.
This is especially true when the second-parent adoption does not entail
terminating another parent’s parental rights.  We need to jettison the
fresh start policy for all adoptions where one parent continues as a par-
148 Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 662. R
149 This can be done through language stating that if a biological parent consents to a
partner’s adoption of her child, no legal parental or inheritance rights will be affected.  Putting
this language into a statute is necessary because, although the language is usually in the sec-
ond-parent adoption judgment, the judgment cannot override the probate code’s fresh start
provision.
150 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2014).
151 The preface to the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act states:
The most important uniform act addressing the status of the nonmarital child was the
Uniform Parentage Act approved in 1973 [hereinafter referred to as UPA (1973)].
As of December, 2000, UPA (1973) was in effect in 19 states stretching from Dela-
ware to California; in addition, many other states have enacted significant portions
of it.  Among the many notable features of this landmark Act was the declaration
that all children should be treated equally without regard to marital status of the
parents.  In addition, the Act established a set of rules for presumptions of parentage,
shunned the term “illegitimate,” and chose instead to employ the term “child with no
presumed father.”
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002).
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ent, regardless of his or her marital status, and second-parent adoptions
should be allowed in all states.  It is always better for a child to have two
loving and dedicated parents than one, and better for the child to inherit
from two rather than one parent.  While social policies in some states
may prefer that married parents adopt children, it is better for children to
have two parents rather than one, even if they are unmarried.  The refusal
to offer second-parent adoptions only punishes children for the behavior
of their parents while doing nothing to discourage that behavior.  Moreo-
ver, in many instances the decisions of parents to not marry are entirely
rational.152  We should not punish parents for choosing not to marry until
we create a legal regime in which the costs of marriage are reduced.
C. Functional Parent/Child Relationship Statutes
In an ideal world, same-sex marriage would prevent the disinheri-
tance of the child from a biological parent who is adopted by a co-parent.
More refined probate codes would allow second-parent adoptions to be
treated like stepparent adoptions for non-married parents, and adoption
could continue to provide the bright line that lawmakers and judges seek.
But the solution for parents who simply do not go through the adoption
process would still require complex judge-made rules giving functional
parents the right to pass on their property to functional children.  And
revisions to probate codes, like that of UPC § 2-116, which create a par-
ent-child relationship where parental intent exists, even if an adoption is
not completed, would also be required.  But focusing on the functional
relationship, rather than on bright lines and default rules, is time consum-
ing and difficult to codify and administer.  Resting the change in the
hands of equity judges is both comforting and dangerous.  If judges have
adequate policy grounds to expand the rights of functional children, they
risk accusations of judicial activism and calls for reactionary legislation
by short-sighted political interests.  If they do not find an equitable adop-
tion in compelling cases, they are shirking their equity duties and give
the law its well-founded reputation as being unjust and inequitable.
The functional approach has been advocated by many scholars and
includes defining “family” by what a family does, what functions family
members perform, and the relationships between family members.153
152 See Wang, supra note 78 (discussing the marriage penalty). R
153 Gary, supra note 13, at 5 (citing Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and R
Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270 (1991)) (stating that a group of people functions as
a family when the people “share affection and resources, think of one another as family mem-
bers, and present themselves as such to neighbors and others”); Mary Patricia Treuthart,
Adopting a More Realistic Definition of “Family,” 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 99 (1990) (defining
family as “a community, which: (1) provides financial and emotional support to the members,
(2) involves interdependence and commitment, and (3) allows transcendence of self-interest to
an unlimited degree” (footnote omitted)).
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This approach focuses on the quality of the relationship between a dece-
dent and a child heir,154 and “recognizes that the human family is a social
relationship, not an entity defined by nature.”155  If intestacy schemes
adopt a functional approach, then a court can remove the inheritance pen-
alty if it is satisfied that a parent-child relationship existed.  A functional
approach would encompass all different types of families and allow legal
recognition for more parent-child relationships, thus protecting inheri-
tance rights for the people decedents have chosen to benefit with their
care, love, and financial support during life.
Recognizing scholarly critiques, some courts have endorsed a func-
tional approach to familial relationships.156  The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, in the case that legalized same-sex marriage within the
state, stated that Massachusetts “affirmatively facilitates bringing chil-
dren into a family regardless of whether the intended parent is married or
unmarried, whether the child is adopted or born into a family, whether
assistive technology was used to conceive the child, and whether the par-
ent or her partner is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual.”157  The
court essentially opened its arms to any functional family.  But whether
that court’s open arms can undercut the strict definitions of intestacy law
is a different matter.158
While the functional approach has benefits, it is not without flaws.
One critique of the functional approach is that it injects judicial discre-
tion into the distribution of a decedent’s property.159  This is problematic
for families outside of the prevailing norms.160  Judges can decide not to
recognize a functional family when their religious or moral inclinations
sway them.  Another critique is that the functional child approach will
require judicial administration to determine who qualifies as a functional
child, and in most instances we can imagine that judicial proceedings
will be necessary, which can be hotly contested and perhaps quite costly.
Despite these shortcomings, Professor Susan Gary proposes a func-
tional approach in defining the parent-child relationship by adding a
functional definition to existing formal definitions.161  Her proposed stat-
ute provides a court with factors which indicate the existence of a parent-
child relationship, factors which may give rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion of a functional parent-child relationship and can only be overcome
154 Foster, supra note 80, at 232. R
155 Tritt, supra note 14, at 401. R
156 Id. at 403.
157 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
158 See Padilla, supra note 15, at 228, 237 (discussing the ability of an adoption judgment R
to override a legislative provision).
159 Gary, supra note 13, at 69. R
160 Id.
161 Id. at 72.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 44 23-DEC-15 16:42
44 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:1
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.162  She explains that
such an approach would necessitate a high standard of proof.163  Discrete
factors may eliminate judicial activism, but the statutory functional ap-
proach runs up against the same challenge as the formal approach in that
it requires legislative action.  And even if legislatures act, courts will
have to closely monitor the application of the rule.
The UPC’s functional parent-child relationship statute is a similar
version of Gary’s model statute but without the factors.  It provides that
“if a parent-child relationship exists or is established under this [subpart],
the parent is a parent of the child and the child is a child of the parent for
the purpose of intestate succession.”164  Legislatures that adopt this rule
should also ensure that it applies to all probate and inheritance rights
under state law because it is not clear that a functional child would re-
ceive wrongful death priorities or executorship rights simply by being
declared a child for intestate succession purposes.  “Functioned as a par-
ent of the child” is also defined in UPC § 2-115 to mean “behaving to-
ward a child in a manner consistent with being the child’s parent and
performing functions that are customarily performed by a parent, includ-
ing fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or
holding out the child as the individual’s child, materially participating in
the child’s upbringing, and residing with the child in the same household
as a regular member of that household.”165
Although I discuss this more fully below in Part V, it is important to
shift the presumption from nonparentage to parentage.  If a child shows
162 Id. at 81–82.
163 Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 83, at 670. R
164 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-116 (amended 2010).
165 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-115; see also § 2-115 cmt. (outlining many of the elements
a court should consider when deciding whether a person functioned as a parent.  The phrase
“functioned as a parent of the child” is derived from the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers.  The Reporter’s comment to § 14.5 of the Restatement lists the
following parental functions:
Custodial responsibility refers to physical custodianship and supervision of a child.
It usually includes, but does not necessarily require, residential or overnight
responsibility.
. . . Decisionmaking responsibility refers to authority for making significant life
decisions on behalf of the child, including decisions about the child’s education,
spiritual guidance, and health care.
. . . Caretaking functions are tasks that involve interaction with the child or that
direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by others. Caretaking
functions include but are not limited to all of the following:
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the child’s bedtime
and wake-up routines, caring for the child when sick or injured, being attentive
to the child’s personal hygiene needs including washing, grooming, and dress-
ing, playing with the child and arranging for recreation, protecting the child’s
physical safety, and providing transportation;
(b) directing the child’s various developmental needs, including the acquisition
of motor and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence, and maturation;
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that a functional parent-child relationship existed, then it is likely that the
child has performed many of the duties of a child, from caretaking to
service, and it is likely that the parent has received significant benefits of
parenthood, both emotional and economic.  This includes tax deductions,
dependent care credits, support payments, the child’s labor, state-sup-
ported economic benefits, and the emotional rewards of parenthood.
Creating a presumption of parenthood and inheritance rights from a par-
ent claiming a child deduction on his income taxes, for instance, would
protect the child’s inheritance rights without unduly burdening other eq-
uitable claims, like those of other biological children.
Three states—Colorado, New Mexico, and North Dakota—plus the
Virgin Islands, have adopted the 2008 amendment of UPC § 2-116, the
(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, assigning and supervis-
ing chores, and performing other tasks that attend to the child’s needs for be-
havioral control and self-restraint;
(d) arranging for the child’s education, including remedial or special services
appropriate to the child’s needs and interests, communicating with teachers and
counselors, and supervising homework;
(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal relation-
ships with peers, siblings, and other family members;
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up, and home health
care;
(g) providing moral and ethical guidance;
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter, or other child-
care provider or facility, including investigation of alternatives, communication
with providers, and supervision of care.
. . . Parenting functions are tasks that serve the needs of the child or the child’s
residential family. Parenting functions include caretaking functions, as defined
[above], and all of the following additional functions:
(a) providing economic support;
(b) participating in decisionmaking regarding the child’s welfare;
(c) maintaining or improving the family residence, including yard work, and
house cleaning;
(d) doing and arranging for financial planning and organization, car repair and
maintenance, food and clothing purchases, laundry and dry cleaning, and other
tasks supporting the consumption and savings needs of the household;
(e) performing any other functions that are customarily performed by a parent
or guardian and that are important to a child’s welfare and development.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.5 cmt. e
(2011).  Ideally, a parent would perform all of the above functions throughout the child’s
minority.  In cases falling short of the ideal, the trier of fact must balance both time and
conduct.  The question is, did the individual perform sufficient parenting functions over a
sufficient period of time to justify concluding that the individual functioned as a parent of the
child?  Clearly, insubstantial conduct, such as an occasional gift or social contact, would be
insufficient.  Moreover, merely obeying a child support order would not, by itself, satisfy the
requirement.  Involuntarily providing support is inconsistent with functioning as a parent of the
child.  The context in which the question arises is also relevant.  If the question is whether the
individual claiming to have functioned as a parent of the child inherits from the child, the court
might require more substantial conduct over a more substantial period of time than if the
question is whether a child inherits from an individual whom the child claims functioned as his
or her parent.
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“functioned as a parent” provision.166  Thus, the functional parent-child
relationship is now protected in these states, but the cut-off provision was
not amended to include the adoptive co-parent in any but Colorado.167
Consequently, a child in these states whose functional parent did not
adopt her may be able to inherit from that parent, but the child’s co-
parent in a same-sex relationship or an unmarried opposite sex relation-
ship with the child’s biological parent who does adopt, will terminate the
child’s inheritance rights with the biological parent.  Without both revi-
sions, only one subset of children in nontraditional family settings will be
protected.
D. Expanding Equitable Adoption Doctrines
Equitable adoption and other equitable remedies have provided only
limited relief for children raised by parents who might have intended to
adopt them, who treated those children as their own, but who failed to
follow through with the legal requirements of adoption.  It is notoriously
difficult to succeed in court on the theories of equitable adoption and
estoppel.168  Usually it is based on contract doctrines, allowing the child
to inherit as a third-party beneficiary to the contractual agreement be-
tween the child’s biological parent and the adoptive parent.  But in many
instances there is not adequate proof of a contract to adopt.  In that case,
some courts have used estoppel to allow the child to inherit, where the
parent has raised expectations in the child that he will adopt, but then did
not follow through.  If the child has fully performed, it would be inequi-
table to allow the parent to avoid an agreement on which others have
relied to their detriment.169  But estoppel and equitable adoption often
will not be used in cases involving testacy, antilapse, or class gift defini-
tions.  The doctrine provides limited remedies when a functional parent
166 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-115 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-115 (West 2014);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-14 (2013).
167 Colorado allows second-parent adoptions for unmarried parents, and adoption by a co-
parent does not terminate the biological parent’s relationship.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-119.
Since the UPC’s fresh start provision depends exclusively on marital status of the adopting
parent, it is not affected by the functional parent statute.
168 William G. Reeves, Inheritance by Equitable Adoption: An Overview of Theory and
Proof, 57 J. MO. B. 130, 131 (2001) (noting that the burden of proof on the child is “onerous,”
that it has been characterized as “highly rigorous,” and requiring evidence that is “clear, une-
quivocal and of a strong and compelling nature” (footnotes omitted)).
169 See generally R. Brent Drake, Status or Contract? A Comparative Analysis of Inheri-
tance Rights Under Equitable Adoption and Domestic Partnership Doctrines, 39 GA. L. REV.
675 (2005); Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cul-
tural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (2008); Irene
D. Johnson, A Suggested Solution to the Problem of Intestate Succession in Nontraditional
Family Arrangements: Taking the “Adoption” (and the Inequity) Out of the Doctrine of “Eq-
uitable Adoption,” 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 271 (2009).
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dies intestate, but virtually no remedy for the plethora of ancillary rights
dependent upon the legal status of being a parent or a child.
Equitable adoption is a rarely invoked legal doctrine, and is even
more rarely applied.  Of a study of the most recent thirty appellate level
cases involving equitable adoption since 1987, only six affirmed the in-
heritance rights by finding that the child should be treated as having been
equitably adopted.170  Of the many that did not find the elements of equi-
table adoption to have been met, the vast majority resulted in the dece-
dent’s property passing to distant collateral relatives.  For instance, in In
re Estate of Hannifin, a fourteen-year-old Navajo child was given up for
adoption by his mother to an Episcopal priest.171  The priest had no
spouse or descendants, but failed to formalize the adoption, most likely
because of the legal barriers to adoption of Native American children and
because the child’s parents were still alive.172  Nineteen of the priest’s
collateral relatives contested the child’s claim to the decedent’s estate.173
The trial court found plenty of evidence to support its finding of equita-
ble adoption when the priest held out the child as his son, held the child’s
children out as his grandchildren, supported the child and provided a
home for him throughout his adolescence and early adulthood, and even
named the child his beneficiary on a variety of payable-on-death designa-
tions (PODs), his life insurance policy, and his bank accounts.174  Over a
strong dissent, the Utah Supreme Court reversed, refusing to find an eq-
uitable adoption, citing the passage of Utah’s most recent probate code,
170 I undertook a search of the thirty most recent equitable adoption cases to determine
how many cases involved putative parents with biological lineal descendants who would be
displaced or partially displaced by the claims of an equitably adopted child.  These would be
the cases in which one would imagine the courts would be most protective of the inheritance
rights of the lineal descendants and least willing to find an equitable adoption.  The cases,
however, showed the opposite.  In 80% of those cases (twenty-four) the court refused to find
an equitable adoption.  The court found that the elements of equitable adoption were met in six
cases. See Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1998); Morgan v. Howard, 678 S.E.2d
882 (Ga. 2009); Goodman v. Hammonds, 480 S.E.2d 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Lankford v.
Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604 (N.C. 1997); Spiers v. Maples, 970 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App. 1998);
Welch v. Wilson, 516 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1999).  In only five of the thirty cases did the dece-
dent have lineal descendants.  Ironically, of the five cases where there were lineal descendants
whose interests might have deserved greater protection, the court found an equitable adoption
in two of them (40%), a much higher rate than in the twenty-four remaining cases where the
decedent did not have lineal descendants and an equitable adoption was found (3/24, or 13%).
Moreover, to find thirty cases, I had to search back to 1987, or nearly thirty years, which
shows that equitable adoption is not being frequently used.
171 311 P.3d 1016, 1017 (Utah 2013).
172 The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978), gave
tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over adoption and foster situations for Native American
children residing within a tribe’s lands, and concurrent jurisdiction over Native American chil-
dren residing off of tribal lands.  It is unknown if the ICWA would have made it more difficult
for the priest to adopt in this case, but it was likely to have been an issue.
173 Hannifin, 311 P.3d at 1018.
174 Id. at 1018.
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which defines a child for intestacy purposes as a biological or adopted
child.175  Because the code did not include the term “equitably adopted”
child, the Utah Supreme Court held that equitable adoption had been
preempted altogether in Utah by passage of the state’s probate code; the
priest’s property all passed to his collateral relatives despite clear and
convincing evidence that the priest wanted his foster son to inherit.176
Equitable adoption is notoriously difficult to prove in large part be-
cause courts require evidence that is so “clear, cogent and convincing as
to leave no room for reasonable doubt.”177  Concerned that a lesser stan-
dard would lead to a wave of “unfounded and trumped-up claims”
against stepparents and foster parents, courts generally require that the
evidence must be “inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.”178
And since equitable adoption cases are brought after the death of the
putative parent, it is particularly difficult to find the kind of evidence that
will show beyond all reasonable doubt either the existence of a contract
or an agreement that was relied upon by the natural parent.  Generally,
the child’s own expectations, needs, or understanding of the nature of the
parent-child relationship are deemed irrelevant.
A recent Iowa case reflects the customary presumption that equita-
ble adoption would not be applied in the context of stepchildren.  In In re
Estate of Thompson, a child’s natural father married the child’s step-
mother.179  The couple had no children of their own, and the stepmother
died intestate after the death of her husband.180  Her collateral relatives in
Germany inherited her estate over her stepdaughter, including property
that the stepmother inherited from her husband’s estate.181  The court
acknowledged the inequity of such a result, but nonetheless held that in
the absence of proof of an unexecuted contract to adopt, they could not
apply equitable adoption.182  This was a case in which a four-year-old
child was raised by a stepmother, the parties met all requirements of
holding each other out as mother and child, and there was no possibility
that the child would be intercepting an inheritance that should go to more
deserving relatives.183  The relatives in Germany had no contact with the
decedent for years and found themselves inheriting property, including
that which had belonged to the child’s own natural father.184
175 Id. at 1023.
176 Id. at 1018.
177 Reeves, supra note 168, at 131. R
178 Id. at 131–32.
179 No. 08-0120, 2008 WL 4877762, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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In re Estate of Seader is another case involving a stepparent who
failed to adopt a child, presumably because he did not think he needed to
since he had made a will treating his stepdaughter similarly to his two
biological sons.185  But the stepdaughter predeceased her stepfather by
just a few months, and her children claimed her devise through applica-
tion of the state’s antilapse statute.186  The court held that antilapse
would not apply because the stepdaughter was not of the required degree
of relationship as was required by the statute since she was neither the
natural nor adopted daughter of the decedent.187  The grandsons argued
that she should be considered an equitably adopted child for purposes of
the antilapse statute, but the court disagreed, stating that equitable adop-
tion was an intestacy doctrine and would not be used when the decedent
had made a will.188  The irony in this, of course, is that the decedent had
included his stepdaughter in his will precisely because he could not count
on intestacy to protect her rights.  Giving her a testamentary gift clearly
indicated an intent to provide her an inheritance.  But the narrowness of
the equitable adoption doctrine and intestacy statute prohibited her sons
from taking her bequest under an equally narrowly-defined antilapse
statute.189
Even a summary review of the facts of most equitable adoption
cases show that the presumptions—that putative parents did not adopt
because they intended that the child not inherit and that more deserving
relatives must be protected—are simply not true.190  In Seader and Han-
185 76 P.3d 1236, 1246 (Wyo. 2003).
186 Id. at 1238.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1238.
189 Id. at 1246–49.
190 In some cases the parent thought about adoption but resolved instead to write a will.
See Morgan v. Howard, 678 S.E.2d 882, 885 (Ga. 2009) (noting that a will was drawn up but
decedent died before execution); Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606–07 (N.C. 1997);
Seader, 76 P.3d at 1237–38.  Or, there were living parents who still participated in the child’s
life and their presence may have led the decedent to believe that adoption was not appropriate
even though the putative parent was acting as a functional parent for the child. See Hulsey v.
Carter, 588 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 2003); Walden v. Burke, 637 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); In
re Estate of Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016, 1019–20 (Utah 2013).  In others, there were legal barri-
ers to the adoption, often a prohibition against adult adoptions. See Samek v. Sanders, 788 So.
2d 872 (Ala. 2000); Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); In re Estate
of Thompson, 760 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008).  The most common, however, are the
stepparent adoptions where the court refuses to recognize equitable adoption. See Green v.
Boyd, 794 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Urick v. McFarland, 625 So. 2d 1253 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Franklin v. Gilchrist, 491 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. 1997); Davis v. Bennett, 438
S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1994); Smalley v. Parks, 108 S.W.3d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Bellinger v.
Boatmen’s Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 779 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Acevedo v.
Acevedo, No. 03-03-00309-CV, 2004 WL 635321 (Tex. App. Apr. 1, 2004).  And in cases
involving adoptions by relatives, there seem to be a number of conflicts of interest, especially
when the biological parents are still alive and intervene because the child’s claim will defeat
their own inheritance. See Lee v. Gurley, 389 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. 1990); Walden v. Burke, 637
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nifin, there was ample evidence, including a validly executed will and
POD designations, that the functional parent wanted the child to inherit.
Thus, it is only reasonable to assume that the putative parents did not
make an intentional decision to not adopt in order to foreclose an inheri-
tance.191  Secondly, Hannifin and Thompson illustrate the majority situa-
tion that functional children bringing claims of equitable adoption are not
displacing biological children or other close relatives who would likely
be the natural objects of the decedent’s bounty; rather, they are displac-
ing distant relatives and laughing heirs whose only connection to the de-
cedent seems to be intervening in the lawsuit to gain an undeserved
windfall.
Another common functional child scenario is the child taken in by
close relatives: grandparents, aunts and uncles, or cousins.  Because eve-
ryone is family, these cases may be particularly difficult for courts to
delineate when equitable adoption should be found and when it should
not.  One can imagine that a court would hesitate to find that a grandpar-
ent equitably adopted a grandchild if doing so means that the grandchild
would inherit a share of the grandparent’s estate along with the child’s
parent.192  But consider the case of Walden v. Burke, which involved a
purported agreement that a child’s natural parents entered into with the
father’s aunt that she would adopt their one-and-a-half-year-old daugh-
ter.193  The court found no contract between the decedent great-aunt and
the child’s natural parents, crediting testimony by the child’s father that
he never agreed to any adoption.  Since the decedent and her husband
had no children, the decedent’s heirs who would take the aunt’s estate
were her nieces and nephews, including the child’s father.  The court
refused to credit the conflict of interest in the father’s testimony despite
the fact that he stood to gain an inheritance if the functional child’s equi-
S.E.2d 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).  And in other cases, there are financial reasons for not adopt-
ing, like the possibility of losing a stipend. See Chambers v. Chambers, 398 S.E.2d 200 (Ga.
1990).  Or, the decedent died before the adoption was finalized. See Kisamore v. Coakley, 437
S.E.2d 585 (W. Va. 1993).  What is important is that none of these cases appear to provide
evidence that the decedent chose not to adopt because the decedent did not want the child to
inherit.
191 In both it seems there may have been mistaken assumptions about the necessity or
possibility of an adoption.  In Hannifin, the Indian Child Welfare Act most likely prohibited
the child’s adoption even though there was clear evidence that the elements of an equitable
adoption were met.  And in Seader, it appeared that the father consulted a lawyer about the
adoption but was most likely told not to waste the money but rather simply execute a will to
give his stepdaughter inheritance rights.
192 See In re Adoption of Holland, 965 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting
situation in which a grandfather legally adopted his adult grandson in order for him to receive
government veteran’s benefits).  It would be unlikely that a court would recognize an equitable
adoption in such a case where the child would step between the decedent and the child’s
natural parents to receive an inheritance. See Lee, 389 S.E.2d 333; Walden, 637 S.E.2d 859.
193 637 S.E.2d 859.
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table adoption claim were rejected.  The child, however, produced signif-
icant evidence that the decedent and her husband had agreed to adopt and
raise the child, that she lived with them from infancy, and that they sup-
ported her through college.  One can certainly understand a hesitation by
courts to credit claims by unadopted functional children to a share of an
estate when the decedent has children or a spouse who would be the
natural objects of his bounty.  But there is no reason to limit equitable
adoption in cases where the estate will pass to distant collateral relatives
or, perhaps worse, to the parents who surrendered the child in the first
place.  The court should ask what the great-aunt would think of her
nephew disputing his own daughter’s claim to inherit from the only
mother she ever knew after he had essentially abandoned her.
It does little good for the Uniform Probate Code or state statutes to
declare that they are not altering or rejecting the doctrine of equitable
estoppel as it has evolved in the common law of that state, if the doctrine
is never applied in practice.194  And in some states, as in Utah, the failure
to include a statutory provision was interpreted to mean that equitable
adoption was thereafter precluded altogether.195  With the difficulty of
proof and the judicial reluctance to open the door to what some believe
are unfounded and trumped-up claims, it is no wonder that there have
only been an average of one to two equitable adoption cases per year,
and only a small fraction of those have been decided in favor of the
child.  Courts have been so stingy in their application of the doctrine that
few lawyers would encourage their clients to bring such a claim.
One of the most cited reasons for applying equitable adoption rules
narrowly is the assumption that testators did not formally adopt because
they did not want the child to have inheritance rights.  But the facts of
these cases belie that assumption.  In the vast majority of cases, the equi-
tably adopted child does not displace some other person who would have
otherwise been considered the natural object of the decedent’s bounty.
Most often, the persons displaced by a finding of equitable adoption are
distant heirs, and that simple fact suggests that rejecting the child’s
claims was not what the decedent would have wanted or intended to have
happen.196
194 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-122 (amended 2010); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6455 (1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-122 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-122 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2-122 (West 2014).
195 See generally Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016.
196 In many cases, the legal beneficiaries were distant relatives. Samek, 788 So. 2d 872
(distant heirs at law who had no relationship with the decedent); In re Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d
747 (Cal. 2004) (decedent’s nephew and niece); In re Estate of Chambers, No. B223492, 2011
WL 711854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (decedent’s brother’s adopted child); In re Estate of Lucas,
No. ADM 1327-03, 2005 WL 674682 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2005) (decedent’s nephew); In
re Estate of Musil, 965 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (decedent’s niece); Miller, 591
So. 2d 321 (decedent’s collateral heirs); Walden, 637 S.E.2d 859 (decedent’s nephew); Hulsey,
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There is also a presumption that equitable adoption should not be
liberally applied in the context of stepparent arrangements, for the pur-
pose of not discouraging marriage and stepparenting.  For instance, in
Franklin v. Gilchrist, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a lower
court’s rejection of an equitable adoption claim by stepchildren, quoting
a common rule that “[w]hat might present a good case of equitable or
virtual adoption against a person standing as a stranger to the child might
not be so as against a person who, independently of the contract to adopt,
assumed, by virtue of his marriage to the mother of the child, the very
domestic relation which had been held in all other cases to give to the
child an equitable status in reference to the adoption agreement.”197
Thus, precisely because stepparents act as parents, courts have held that
such actions are insufficient to give rise to a claim of equitable adoption.
In this case, the court held that because the stepfather did not attempt to
get the permission of the natural father to an adoption before the natural
father died, there was no adoption agreement that could form the basis
for the equitable adoption claim.  But how many stepfathers would reach
out and have a discussion, sufficient to constitute an agreement to adopt,
with their wife’s previous husband?  The legal requirements ignore the
emotional upset of divorce and the fact that in many of these cases, the
natural parent has moved far away.
The reliance on a purported contract to adopt between the natural
parent and the adoptive parent leaves these children completely unpro-
tected even though they very likely performed all of the duties of chil-
dren, relied on their stepparent’s assertions about being their true parents,
and entered into relationships that were as close as most biological par-
ent-child relationships.  The requirement of a contract between the natu-
ral and adoptive parent subordinates the child’s interests and devalues the
588 S.E.2d 717 (decedent’s nieces and nephews); In re Estate of Thompson, 760 N.W.2d 208
(Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (distant relatives in Germany); In re Estate of Robbins, 738 P.2d 458
(Kan. 1987) (two cousins of decedent); Smalley, 108 S.W.3d 138 (decedent’s brother and two
sisters); Johnson v. Chandler, No. 14-03-00123-CV, 2004 WL 1946077 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 2,
2004) (decedent’s two sisters); Spiers v. Maples, 970 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (dece-
dent’s siblings and nieces and nephews); Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016 (collateral relatives of
priest).  Over the same time period, fewer cases involved children whose interests would have
been shared by the application of equitable adoption to a non-child claimant.  Williams v.
Estate of Pender, 738 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (decedent had a daughter); Wil-
liams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 575–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (decedent had a son);
Chambers, 398 S.E.2d 200 (decedent had two other children); Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647
(decedent had daughters); Acevedo, 2004 WL 635321 (decedent had four living descendants);
Welch v. Wilson, 516 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1999) (decedent had one natural child); Kisamore,
437 S.E.2d 585 (decedent had biological descendants).  During this same time, there were
many other cases in which it was not clear who would take in the absence of the equitably
adopted child, but at odds of around 2 to 1, it would seem that a super majority of cases
involve relatively distant heirs.
197 491 S.E.2d 361, 362 (Ga. 1997).
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child’s actions in reliance on the functional parent-child relationship in
order to protect a parent’s rights to be free of unfounded and trumped-up
claims.  When we consider that most of these putative parents in these
equitable adoption cases probably claimed a tax deduction for supporting
these children, received economic and emotional benefits from these
children, and provided care and financial support to the children during
their lives because they cared about the children, the strictness of the
equitable adoption doctrine more likely frustrates their intentions rather
than furthers them.  To now deny the putative parents any right to con-
tinue their support in the absence of an expensive and intensive adoption
or expensive estate planning truly jeopardizes their ability to care for the
true natural objects of their bounty.198
E. Reformed Intestacy Laws to Protect Against Disinheritance in the
Stepchild Situation
As discussed earlier, many stepsiblings become bitter enemies after
the death of one parent when that parent’s property passes to a stepparent
by intestacy and moves entirely out of the family’s control altogether
upon the death of the surviving stepparent.199  For hundreds of years, the
English common law did not treat a spouse as a legal heir; only relatives
by blood could inherit land or personal property.200  The surviving
spouse, usually the wife, was entitled to a life estate in one-third of the
decedent husband’s real estate (dower), and the surviving husband was
entitled to a life estate in all of a decedent wife’s real estate (curtesy).
The husband acquired outright ownership of all of a wife’s personal
property upon marriage, so at her death, there was no change in the legal
ownership of the personal property.  But if the husband died first, the
wife was entitled to a one-third or one-half share in the personal property
of the husband.201  Upon the death of the surviving spouse, however, the
remaining real and personal property passed to the lineal descendants.  In
a world in which men and women were differently situated, both socially
and legally, dower and curtesy made sense.  It recognized that a husband
who had managed his wife’s real property throughout their marriage
should continue to benefit from that land after her death.  The surviving
wife, however, who had not held or managed property during her mar-
riage, needed just enough for support, and thus the profits off one-third
198 See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Mandatory Nature of Inheritance, 53 AM. J. JURIS.
105, 106 (2008) (arguing that inheritance laws should be viewed as a way to build inter-
generational bonds so that testamentary freedom is a tool and not the end in itself).
199 See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 53; see also supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. R
200 See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 93, § 2.1. R
201 This of course included all of the personal property that the wife had owned outright
before the marriage and which became irrevocably vested in him upon the marriage under the
doctrine of coverture. See id.
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of the real estate was deemed sufficient to support her in her widowhood.
The key aspect of the common law of intestacy was that the property
ultimately descended to the children and grandchildren, and a remarriage
would not jeopardize the rights of the children to take their familial
inheritances.202
However, with the abolition of dower, curtesy, and primogeniture,
all but two states have adopted intestacy rules to make the spouse the
primary legal heir, entitled to an outright share of a decedent spouse’s
real and personal property, regardless of the existence of children from
the marriage.203  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
those laws generally gave the surviving spouse between one-third and
one-half of a decedent spouse’s estate and the remainder passed to chil-
dren, parents in the absence of children, or other collateral heirs.  This
early change merely shifted the spousal share from a life interest to an
outright share in fee simple, recognizing the disadvantages of legal life
interests and supplying the surviving spouse with enough property to
provide a sufficiently comfortable widowhood (or widowerhood).204  By
the mid-twentieth century, however, most states revised their intestacy
statutes once again to recognize and protect the partnership of the mar-
riage and the fact that in most marriages the couple worked together,
saved together, amassed assets together, and that most decedents wanted
the property to be used, first and foremost, to provide for the needs of the
surviving spouse.205  With increasing costs of end-of-life care, decreases
in children working in family businesses at home or on the family farm
(due to a mobile population), and desire by many for a more comfortable
retirement, it made sense to postpone the shares of the children until the
death of the surviving spouse.206  This second set of changes gave to the
surviving spouse a minimum of 50% and as much as 100% of the dece-
dent spouse’s estate outright, on the assumption that with the death of the
surviving spouse, the couple’s remaining property would pass to their
children.207
202 Id.
203 Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-204 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (2012).
204 Legal life estates are notoriously difficult to manage as the life tenant generally cannot
make substantial improvements to the property, cannot mortgage the life estate in order to
make improvements, and cannot sell a life estate except to the remaindermen. See MCGOVERN
& KURTZ, supra note 93, § 2.1. R
205 These were based on studies from the late 1970s. See Waggoner, supra note 55. R
206 Id.
207 The most common intestacy scheme gives the surviving spouse 100% of a decedent
spouse’s estate if there are no parents or children (forty-three states), and almost half of those
give 100% to the surviving spouse even if there are children so long as the children are the
children of both spouses and there are no children of either spouse by a different relationship
(nineteen states). See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 53, at tbl.7. R
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But with the rate of remarriages and the growing divorce rate, states
made a third set of revisions to their intestacy rules to recognize that the
existence of second marriages and stepparents contradicted the assump-
tion that the surviving spouse would leave all of the property to the
couple’s children.  These small changes provided that the surviving
spouse would only take a portion of a decedent spouse’s estate when the
decedent spouse has children by a prior relationship.208  The UPC § 2-
102(4) provides that a surviving spouse will take the first $150,000 of the
decedent’s estate, plus half of the remainder, “if one or more of the dece-
dent’s surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving
spouse.”209  Thus, it was assumed that if a stepparent was the surviving
spouse, up to one-half of the decedent spouse’s estate would pass to his
children upon his death and the other half would pass to the stepparent.
The stepparent would either execute a will to distribute the property
equally among the surviving spouse’s children and stepchildren or, more
likely, the surviving spouse would have consumed all of the decedent’s
property.  It was no big deal that the children would only take half of a
decedent spouse’s property and the surviving spouse would take the rest
because under the prior set of intestacy rules, the surviving spouse likely
received half of the decedent’s estate outright anyway.  Only Indiana cal-
culates the surviving spouse’s share on whether it is a first marriage or
subsequent marriage.210
The problem with the majority solution of slightly reducing the sur-
viving spouse’s share, however, lay in not recognizing the fundamental
difference between the inheritance rights of marital children and the lack
of inheritance rights of stepchildren.  When marriages lasted until death,
and remarriages were late in life and rarely included additional children,
it could be assumed that the children would receive a minimum of half of
their deceased parent’s estate.  But with the rate of serial marriage, the
tremendous number of children currently being born out of wedlock, and
the complete lack of protection for stepchildren’s inheritance rights, the
increased shares for surviving spouses come at the direct expense of chil-
dren, and often to the real benefit of stepsiblings.
Unfortunately, the intestacy laws have created a profound and bitter
rivalry between stepparents and stepchildren.  By privileging the spouse,
the children lose out.  By privileging the children, the spouse loses out.
Currently, the law privileges the spouse in most states so that upon the
death of the surviving spouse intestate, the first spouse’s children will
208 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (amended 2010); ALA. CODE § 43-8-41 (2014);
IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-102 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 561:1 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (West 2014).
209 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(4).
210 See IND. CODE § 20-1-2-1(c).
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inherit little or nothing.211  And if the surviving spouse remarries and
takes whatever property she inherited from the decedent with her, her
stepchildren are even less likely to see that property again.  Her children,
new spouse, or even collateral relatives will take to the exclusion of the
decedent’s children, even if most of her estate came from the decedent.
For a small estate, the surviving stepparent’s spouse takes the entire
estate, leaving nothing for the decedent’s children.212  In a modest estate,
the surviving spouse takes well over half of the decedent’s estate.  Only
in relatively large estates will the decedent’s children take a sizable
amount, yet it always will be less than half of a parent’s estate if that
parent has remarried without a prenuptial agreement.213  Moreover, large
estates are more likely to be distributed by testate plans or the couple is
more likely to have prenuptial agreements to protect the interests of the
decedent’s children, so the children of the wealthy are not the most likely
to suffer the inheritance penalty under typical intestacy statutes.  Thus, in
the estates where the odds are that the stepparent will inherit by intes-
tacy—usually the more modest estates—any amount passing to the dece-
dent’s children is likely to be small or even nonexistent.
This cumulative effect of disinheritance through intestacy is the re-
sult of numerous aspects of the intestacy statutes.  One is that we no
longer attempt to separate out the property the stepparent inherited from
her deceased spouse—which should perhaps go back to his children—
from the surviving spouse’s own property, which should rightfully pass
to her children and not her stepchildren.  This notion of ancestral prop-
erty, property that should remain in the family, was the rule for hundreds
of years, but has been jettisoned in the twentieth century in favor of pro-
tecting the marital unit over the family of origin.  A second cause is the
protection of the spouse as a priority over the children, regardless of the
length of the marriage, the spouse’s equitable claims on the decedent’s
property, and the spouse’s own property.  A third cause is the strict legal
distinction between stepchildren and natural children, which entirely pre-
cludes inheritance by stepchildren.
211 Arkansas and Kentucky are the exceptions, providing for children before a spouse.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-204 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (2012).
212 Under the UPC, the surviving spouse takes “the first $150,000, plus one-half of any
balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent’s surviving descendants are not
descendants of the surviving spouse.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(4).  In a $200,000 estate, the
decedent’s children would be entitled to share a total of $25,000, or a little over 10% of their
parent’s estate.
213 The surviving spouse will be entitled to at least half, and possibly some amount like
the UPC’s $150,000 plus half.  Notably, the Florida legislature had a provision giving the
surviving spouse the first $60,000 plus half when there were children of the surviving spouse
that were not the children of the decedent, but amended that rule to limit the surviving spouse
to half in all cases where there were children by either spouse from a previous relationship.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.102(2)–(3) (2014).
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California has tackled the problem of the disinherited stepchild.
The state allows a stepchild to inherit by intestacy from a stepparent if
the parent-child relationship began when the child was a minor and the
stepchild establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the stepparent
would have adopted but for a legal barrier.214  However, California
courts have been strict in their interpretation of a legal barrier, making it
difficult for stepchildren to establish the elements.  And of course, the
statute makes it impossible for a stepchild to inherit if she were an adult
at the time her biological parent and stepparent met.  The statute attempts
to protect the stepparent relationship when it functions like a parent-child
relationship with no concern for equity issues such as the title to ances-
tral property or the gradual development of a parent-child relationship.
Other states have begun to allow for stepchildren inheritance, but usually
only as a last resort to prevent an escheat.215  Thus, only after going
through all legally acceptable biological relationships, looking for third
cousins thrice removed for instance, do we turn to stepchildren.  These
statutes do not address the inequity between the rights of biological chil-
dren and stepchildren because the stepchildren take only in the absence
of biological children.
A number of commentators have argued that stepchildren should
not be treated as legal strangers for purposes of intestacy.216  Recogniz-
ing the inequity and randomness of receiving an inheritance dependent
on which parent died first in these blended families, Susan Gary and
Terin Cremer both suggest modifications to intestacy laws that would
allow certain stepchildren to take a share of the surviving spouse’s estate.
Cremer, for instance, argues that stepchildren should be considered legal
heirs if their parent and stepparent were married for a long time, the
stepparent functioned as a parent during the child’s minority, the charac-
ter of the stepparent-stepchild relationship was parental, the stepchild re-
ferred to the stepparent as “mom” or “dad,” and the stepchild and
stepparent continued to have a relationship after the child reached adult-
hood.217  Susan Gary argues for a discretion-based intestacy law that
would allow probate judges to reduce certain presumptive shares such as
the spousal share in marriages of short duration, and increase shares for
stepchildren who functioned as children, close family members who pro-
214 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (2012).
215 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-215(2) (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-439(a)(4) (2013);
IOWA CODE § 633.219(6) (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 474.010(3) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2106.06 (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-
103(6) (2013).
216 Terin Barbas Cremer, Reforming Intestate Inheritance for Stepchildren and Steppar-
ents, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 89, 90–92 (2011); Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of
Family: A Proposal for Guided Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787, 816–17
(2010) [hereinafter The Probate Definition of Family]; Gary, supra note 13, at 58–59. R
217 Cremer, supra note 216, at 97–98. R
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vided uncompensated care, and domestic partners who would not other-
wise be entitled to any share under intestacy codes that privilege only
legal marriage.
Both of these ideas are valuable and would alleviate the inheritance
penalty for those children who have formed close parent-child relation-
ships with a stepparent.  And these changes would provide some flexibil-
ity in the most inflexible part of the inheritance penalty: the intestacy
statute.  By protecting functional children under intestacy, it would be
much easier to protect them in matters involving antilapse, class gifts,
representation, executorships, standing, Social Security benefits, and the
plethora of derivative disabilities that are imposed on stepchildren.
I argue, however, that these solutions remedy only one aspect of the
multiple disabilities facing stepchildren.  Susan Gary’s discretion ap-
proach would allow judges to reduce presumptive shares for spouses in
marriages of short duration or, presumably, wealthier spouses who do not
need the decedent spouse’s estate.  However, it would not remedy the
ancestral property issue that I believe requires immediate attention.  The
rights of stepchildren should not depend on whether they formed a func-
tional parent-child relationship with their stepparent.  Rather, their rights
to inherit property from their natural parent should be protected, espe-
cially when the remarriage to the stepparent occurred late in life, the
children were grown, and they had little opportunity to form a strong
bond with their stepparent.  If they had formed a strong bond, it is more
likely that the surviving stepparent would execute a will or make inter
vivos gifts to the stepchildren.  It is precisely in the situation of the mar-
riage late in life where the children are grown and do not form a strong
bond with their new stepparent that some protections should exist.218
Consider the hypothetical case of Herman and Wilma who are mar-
ried for fifty years and have three adult children they raised together.
Wilma predeceases Herman, dying intestate, and Herman takes 100% of
Wilma’s property, including many family heirlooms that Wilma inher-
ited from her parents.219  This result is understandable because it is as-
sumed that upon Herman’s death the children will inherit everything that
Herman does not consume.  But Herman remarries Winifred in the last
few years of his life.  Winifred has two adult children from her marriage
with Howard, which ended in divorce many years ago.  Herman dies
intestate two years after marrying and Winifred inherits the first
218 MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 93, § 2.1, at 48 (noting the inexplicable disparity R
between the UPC’s elective share reducing the spousal share based on length of marriage, and
the complete lack of such adjustment under intestacy, which of course results in reducing the
amount of property the natural children will inherit).
219 Under the UPC § 2-102(1)(B), Herman would take 100% of Wilma’s estate because
the children are the children of both. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1)(B) (amended 2010).
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$150,000 plus half of Herman’s remaining estate, including property that
can be traced back to Wilma’s family.220  At Winifred’s death intestate,
her two children inherit her entire estate, and Herman’s three children
take nothing.  If Winifred had significant property from before her mar-
riage with Herman, she would not need any of Herman’s property.  If
Winifred dies shortly after Herman, she will not have had time to con-
sume much of his property.  In both events, her children receive every-
thing, including Wilma’s property.  If Winifred predeceased Herman
intestate, Herman’s children would take everything to the exclusion of
Winifred’s children.  Neither length of marriage, wealth of the surviving
spouse, origins of the property, nor surviving spouse’s needs are consid-
ered in these formalistic outcomes of which only one result is certain:
that Winifred’s and Herman’s children will resent one another.
One solution would be to impose a trust on any of the decedent’s
property that passes by intestacy to a stepparent, subject to a remainder
in the decedent’s children.  The trust would treat intestacy involving a
stepparent (or perhaps all spousal provisions) like dower and curtesy, a
mere life interest for the support of the survivor without any proprietary
claims on the decedent’s property.  Although few people would argue in
favor of the support theory in the case of a first marriage, especially
where the spouses worked together for a lifetime to accumulate assets
that are titled primarily in the deceased spouse’s name, it may make
more sense in the context of short marriages, later-in-life marriages, re-
marriages, or other circumstances in which there is a risk that family
property will pass to strangers.221  If a trust were imposed on all the
220 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(4).
221 Lawrence Waggoner, the reporter for the UPC, actually suggests that a trust would be
a more equitable way to distribute the property, but deems it offensive.  He states:
[The UPC’s current] approach is admittedly a crude solution to the survivor’s di-
vided-loyalties problem.  If the purpose is to strike a reasonable balance between the
objective of granting the surviving spouse an adequate share and the objective of
assuring that the surviving spouse does not later deprive the decedent’s children of
the unconsumed portion of the decedent’s property, a more responsive solution
might be to reinvoke the idea of common-law dower.  When stepchildren are in-
volved, the law might give the surviving spouse the use of the property for life, but
upon the death of the surviving spouse force a return of the unconsumed portion of
that property to the decedent’s own biological children.  Strictly speaking, no one
would suggest reinvoking true common-law dower, under which the surviving
spouse would be entitled to a life estate in one-third of the decedent’s land. Instead,
the device would create a statutory trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse in all
the decedent’s property, land, and personalty.  The trust could take a variety of
forms.  One approach would give the surviving spouse the right to all of the income
generated by the trust for life, coupled with a power in the spouse or the statutory
trustee to invade the corpus of the trust to the extent other sources of income prove
inadequate for the spouse’s support and maintenance in accordance with the
spouse’s accustomed standard of living.  However such a trust might be structured
during the surviving spouse’s lifetime, the trust would provide that upon the survi-
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property that Winifred inherited from Herman so that Winifred would
have a life estate, but Herman’s children would ultimately take the prop-
erty upon her death, then Herman’s and Winifred’s remarriage would not
jeopardize Herman’s property, and Wilma’s family heirlooms would stay
in the family to pass to her children.
Another possible solution is to mandate that stepchildren take equal
shares as lineal descendants of a stepparent if that stepparent inherits any
property from a deceased spouse.  This would mean that in the situation
described above, Herman’s three children and Winifred’s two children
would take one-fifth each of Winifred’s estate.  Treating stepchildren and
biological children equally when the stepparent survives the biological
parent and inherits property from the biological parent may be too for-
malistic, especially if the stepparent inherits just a small amount of prop-
erty from the biological parent and equal distribution risks giving the
stepchildren property that more appropriately should be distributed to the
stepparent’s biological children.  But it is no more formulaic than the
current rule and has the benefit of likely according with the intentions of
most testators, especially the intentions of the first spouse to die.  The
most likely testamentary intent is that all property be available to provide
support and care for a surviving spouse, even a second or third spouse,
but at that spouse’s death (or remarriage), most testators want at least
some part of their estate to pass to their own children and not entirely to
their stepchildren.  If their surviving spouse remarries a person with chil-
dren of his own and predeceases that new spouse, there is even a risk that
all of the property will pass to those strangers and not to the known
stepchildren.
vor’s death, any remaining income and corpus would go to the decedent’s own bio-
logical children and not stepchildren unless adopted by the decedent.
The statutory-trust approach responds to another troublesome feature of con-
ventional intestate-succession law.  As the statutes are currently constituted, the de-
cision as to how much to award the surviving spouse must be made on the basis of
the facts existing at the decedent’s death.  This does not take account of the possibil-
ity that a surviving spouse who had no children by a prior marriage at the decedent’s
death might subsequently remarry and have children.  Conventional intestate-succes-
sion schemes provide no mechanism for adjustment where a surviving spouse’s
moral conflict arises after the decedent’s death.  The statutory-trust approach, on the
other hand, if applied in all intestacy cases in which the decedent leaves a surviving
spouse and one or more children, and not just in cases in which the moral conflict is
known to exist at the decedent’s death, provides a solution to this problem.
The statutory-trust approach, therefore, is commendable, except for the fact that
its compulsion by a state would likely be considered offensive by many surviving
spouses and it makes little practical sense.  Putting aside the potential offensiveness,
the strength of which would be difficult to predict, it is simply not practical to com-
pel a statutory trust in every intestacy case with a surviving spouse and one or more
children, with respect to mainly small estates of, say, $15,000 to $25,000.
Waggoner, supra note 55, at 234–35. R
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Under inheritance laws in Sweden during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, married couples who inherited or acquired property from
their families of origin and did not have children together found their
estates subject to claims from kin groups and collateral relatives upon
their deaths.222  Courts in the United States have rejected the idea of
tracing property through the hands of spouses, but for hundreds of years
this disinheritance did not occur because spouses were not deemed legal
heirs.223  They had dower and curtesy claims on certain property for their
lifetimes, but the property of a decedent spouse passed ultimately to his
or her children and usually not to later spouses or stepchildren through
the hands of a surviving spouse.  If we do not wish to return to the days
of dower, we could achieve far more equitable results in this age of
blended families by treating children and stepchildren alike or imposing
a trust on the property inherited by a surviving spouse from a decedent
spouse, with a remainder interest in the decedent spouse’s children.
Since it was the marriage of the parents that cut off the stepchildren’s
inheritance rights, giving stepchildren an intestate share would only re-
turn their property rights to the status quo before the remarriage.
Another approach would be to prorate intestate shares for surviving
spouses along the lines of the prorated elective share.224  This could ac-
count for both the length of marriage and the surviving spouse’s own
wealth.  The UPC’s graduated elective share tables recognize the lesser
claims of surviving spouses who were married for a relatively short pe-
riod of time, thus lessening the claims of surviving spouses on property
that would more naturally pass to a decedent’s children.  But very few
states have adopted the graduated rules for elective shares, and none have
applied these rules to their intestacy scheme.  Even the UPC does not
apply its graduated percentage table to the intestate share.  It is ironic that
if Herman had made a will, and even if he left Winifred nothing in the
will, she would only be able to take an elective share amount of 1.5% of
Herman’s estate if they were married for less than a year, and only 3% if
they were married for less than two years.225  But if Herman dies intes-
222 See MARIA AGREN, DOMESTIC SECRETS: WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN SWEDEN,
1600–1857, at 27 (2009).
223 An argument for the recognition of ancestral property was rejected by a court. See In
re Estate of Brewington, 568 P.2d 133, 134–36 (Mont. 1977).
224 Indiana has a crude version of this, giving the surviving spouse only a life estate in
25% of the real property owned by the decedent spouse at death with an absolutely vested
remainder in the decedent’s descendants. See IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1(c) (2014).  However, the
surviving spouse receives the same share of personal property regardless of whether the mar-
riage is a first marriage or a subsequent marriage. Id.
225 UPC § 2-203 gives the surviving spouse 50% of the marital property portion of the
decedent spouse’s estate as an elective share, and the marital property portion is pro-rated by
length of marriage from 3% of the decedent’s estate if the marriage is less than one year, up to
100% of the decedent’s estate for marriages longer than fifteen years.  Admittedly, the elective
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tate, Winifred would take the first $150,000 plus half of the remainder of
his probate estate even if they had been married only for a few days.
Another possibility would be to simply correlate the intestacy shares
of a surviving spouse with elective shares, adopting more gradations and
refinements to account for length of marriage, remarriage, and the sur-
viving spouse’s own wealth.  Many states amended their elective share
statutes to ensure that a surviving spouse was not disinherited through
the use of will substitutes, leaving just a small fraction of the decedent’s
estate to pass through probate and by will.  The probate estate in these
cases was dramatically smaller than the augmented estate, which consists
of property that passes at death through the decedent’s will and that
passes at death through a will substitute such as a trust, POD designation,
or joint tenancy.  The elective share is often based on all of the property
that passes at death (the augmented estate) while intestacy governs the
distribution only of the probate estate.  But bringing these two estates
into better alignment and providing similar-sized shares for a surviving
spouse, regardless of whether the decedent died testate or intestate, is
understandable for many reasons, not just because intestacy creates an
inheritance penalty for children, which can be avoided only through ex-
pensive estate planning.
There are major factors that should guide states seeking to bring
inheritance equity to children in nontraditional families.  The first is to
make the surviving spousal elective share amounts consistent with intes-
tacy shares and to build flexibility into those shares to accommodate dif-
ferent types of marriages.  While it is true that a surviving spouse is only
entitled to intestacy shares on probate property (and not on property that
passes outside of probate, which, for many states, is included in elective
share calculations), most of the decedents who die intestate are unlikely
to have significant property passing outside of probate to their children
or other beneficiaries.  Thus, for the over 50% of decedents who die
without a will, the freedom to plan around the intestacy shares by making
inter vivos gifts or using will substitutes is unlikely to be widely exer-
cised.  This means that for the very group of people that are most likely
to default to intestacy as an estate plan, the ability to plan around the
default rules has little meaning.
Second, states should legislate alternative distributions for the step-
parent situation to provide a more appropriate distribution when stepchil-
dren are in the equation, either by reducing the surviving spouse’s share,
estate consists of property passing outside probate through non-probate transfers and may
often be a much larger estate than the probate estate from which the intestate share is taken.
Nonetheless, in the majority of cases of people who die intestate, their estates tend toward the
smaller side of the scale, which is consistent with fewer non-probate transfers. UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-203.
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imposing a trust to protect ancestral property, reinvigorating the support
theory of marriage in certain circumstances, or simply tracing family
property to prevent a first spouse’s property from passing to a second
spouse or her children.  Just as the UPC’s elective share sensibly takes
into account the wealth of a surviving spouse by denying a share to the
survivor if the survivor has more wealth than the deceased spouse, the
intestate shares also should be reduced when the marriage is short in
duration or if the survivor is wealthier than the decedent spouse.  One
could easily have the same rate tables and share amounts under intestacy
as currently exist in some states for the elective share.  And under such
statutory changes, there would be no need to argue that intestacy should
go back to the support theory of dower and curtesy.  Intestate shares
would be outright gifts in fee simple absolute, but the size of such shares
would be subject to more refined adjustments in order to recognize the
lesser claims of surviving spouses of short-term marriages who have
children and property from prior marriages.  There is no reason why stat-
utes cannot treat the surviving spouse of a long-term first marriage, with
children, differently from the short-term remarriage, with stepchildren.
Third, what seems to create the most conflict among stepchildren is
when they see particular items of property, like family heirlooms, the
house they grew up in, or a family portrait, pass entirely outside of their
family to their stepsiblings because of the inheritance penalty.  When a
handmade tablecloth or sterling silverware belonging to a child’s grand-
mother passes to a stepsibling who has no ties to the family, she is under-
standably bitter.  Although it may seem illiberal to resurrect the support
theory of marriage and to trace property back to different families of
origin, that was the model for hundreds of years precisely because it
respected the personal family meaning of certain property.  And although
the laws do not continue to recognize expectations about family property,
people very much continue to recognize them and value certain items of
personal property.226  Losing the 64” flat screen TV may not be particu-
larly upsetting to many stepsiblings, but losing their deceased mother’s
china, old photograph albums, or the house she inherited from her par-
ents because of the heavy-handed intestacy laws is a real problem.
226 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–60
(1982) (arguing that the law should recognize that certain items of property, like wedding rings
or the family home, have different values to certain people).  Although the wedding ring has a
mere market value to the jeweler who is selling it, it has much more meaning to the person
whose wedding it represents.  Radin suggests different ways in which the law can take account
of this differential meaning in property, just as I argue it can treat property differently in the
context of inheritance either when it has certain sentimental meaning or when its origins are
linked to certain persons.
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The case of In re Estate of Brewington illustrates this problem and
the lack of flexibility or concern that plagues current succession law.227
In Brewington, Raymond Brewington died intestate, leaving his wife,
Helen Brewington, as a survivor.  The couple had no children, but Ray-
mond had numerous brothers and sisters.  Helen, having never remarried,
had several cousins who inherited her estate when she died twenty-five
years later.  One of Raymond’s brothers petitioned for an intestate share
of Helen’s estate on the theory that he should be able to inherit under the
common law doctrine of ancestral succession for that portion of her es-
tate, which came to her from her husband.  Under the doctrine of “ances-
tral succession,” property reverts back to the family from which the
property descended or was devised, if the deceased leaves no lineal de-
scendants.  The Montana Supreme Court made short shrift of the
brother’s argument, explaining that the current state probate code abro-
gated the doctrine of ancestral succession, and that if Raymond did not
like the outcome, he could have made a will.228  Despite the brother’s
argument that less distant relatives by marriage should take priority over
more distant relatives by blood, the court ruled that Helen’s cousins were
entitled to her entire estate, including all the property she inherited from
Raymond.229  The court claimed that because the probate code was so
clear, its hands were tied and it could not muddy the rules through appli-
cation of equity principles.
The idea of tracing intestate property through a surviving spouse
and then back to the family of origin goes against both the partnership
theory of marriage and the administrative efficiency of intestate succes-
sion rules.  Nonetheless, with the advent of nifty computers and calcula-
tors, and the ubiquity of trusts and trust companies, there is no reason
why the law could not be more nuanced to better balance the claims of
surviving spouses with children or collateral kin.  It is unreasonable to
expect the millions of people who will die intestate to understand the
effects of remarriage, spousal claims, and the biological determinism of
modern intestacy laws when solutions are readily available.  Certainly,
graduated rates for surviving second spousal shares or tracing ancestral
property will not solve all of the problems that stepchildren face under
intestacy.  Nonetheless, if more nuance is already being provided with
elective shares, it can be done with intestacy as well.  And, both leave the
decedent and the surviving stepparent free to plan around the default
rules if they do not reflect his or her intentions.  These changes would
not undermine the social values of intestacy, including support for close
family members and dependents, avoiding complex property titles and
227 568 P.2d at 134–36.
228 See id. at 136.
229 See id. at 135–36.
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fractionation of property, encouraging the accumulation of wealth, or
providing for ease of administration,230 but these solutions would avoid
much of the bitterness that remains in stepfamilies after the dust has
cleared and the property has been distributed.
F. Decedent-Controlled Reforms: Expansive Testamentary Freedom
Besides the formal legislative and judicial changes noted above,
some scholars and reformers have suggested even more radical proposals
to recognize the rights of parents to dictate their heirs, regardless of de-
fault rules or the execution of a formal will.  Called “decedent-controlled
reforms,” these mechanisms “base[ ] inheritance rights on the decedent’s
own definition of her ‘family of choice.’”231  Even where no record of a
decedent’s preferences exist, courts could be given the flexibility to ad-
just intestate shares to reflect “the reasonable expectations or probable
desires of the decedent.”232  This proposal requires few statutory
changes, but opens the door to judicial discretion.  Judges can turn a
blind eye to a decedent’s clear intent in approximating his likely desires
if the judge disapproves of the decedent’s lifestyle choices.  Or a judge
may feel tempted to make decisions about property distributions based
on minimizing friction and maximizing equal treatment among the liv-
ing.  Even though its application may be intermittent, this approach is
more favorable than current intestacy rules whose lines in the sand pre-
clude testamentary freedom for many nontraditional decedents.
At least one scholar has advocated for a complete reconceptualiza-
tion of inheritance law, one that is divorced entirely from the family par-
adigm.233  Frances Foster rejects the less radical reforms just mentioned
because they continue to rely on “family” as their point of reference.234
A nonfamily approach would allow property to pass to any individuals
who have a relationship with the decedent—familial or otherwise.  Such
a proposal may sidestep the inheritance penalty because a child would
not need legal recognition to inherit from a parent.  While this approach
probably most accurately respects testamentary freedom, it may lead to a
litany of other problems for probate courts.235  Additionally, such a mon-
umental paradigm shift may not be conceivable in light of our current
230 Gary, supra note 13, at 9. R
231 Foster, supra note 80, at 232 (citing Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 R
U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 1017 (1999)).
232 Foster, supra note 80, at 233 (quoting John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern R
Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 559–60 (1977)).
233 Foster, supra note 80, at 204. R
234 Id. at 233.
235 For example, what would happen if the decedent did not leave adequate evidence of
intent, or if a will or other testamentary document is voided?  There are also significant poten-
tial administrative costs of such an individualized approach.
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highly formalistic rules.  At the same time, many nontraditional couples
may want recognition of their family relationships broadly defined and
not an absence of the concept all together.  This approach does not pro-
vide equal rights; it simply eliminates the need for those rights by taking
away the privileges for children of traditional parents.  We could call this
the “no inheritance rights” proposal.
Another change would be to strengthen the power of parents to
enter into contractually binding agreements to care for children and pro-
vide for their inheritances.236  These kinds of parentage agreements are
beginning to be used in situations involving assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (ART), where a nonbiological parent has agreed that a co-parent
undergoing ART will share parental rights and responsibilities with the
nonbiological co-parent.237  The contractual approach to determining
parentage would ensure “uniform and equitable results,” because it does
not distinguish between opposite sex or same-sex parents and it respects
the intentions of parents.238  Such an approach protects the privacy rights
of parents to create their family of choice,239 but it may not always serve
the best interests of children, especially if contracts can be used to defeat
a child’s rights to support, maintenance, or inheritance rights.  Although
most parents would only make contracts that benefit their children,
courts would need supervisory power to deny the enforcement of such a
contract if the child’s interests were harmed.
A contractual approach to family creation and definition could elim-
inate the inheritance penalty and honor testamentary freedom.  However,
families who cannot afford to hire an attorney to draft their contract, or
families who simply fail to create one, would still find themselves sub-
jected to strict intestacy rules unless the probate codes were radically
reformed to allow for functional child rights or contract norms.
G. Final Thoughts
It is certainly understandable that many state legislatures will hesi-
tate to enact these important revisions if they appear to be promoting
homosexuality or out-of-wedlock childbearing.240  Despite political bar-
riers, however, some of these reforms can be undertaken by state courts
exercising equity jurisdiction.  Second-parent adoptions can be judicially
interpreted as analogous to stepparent adoptions, and equitable adoption
236 See Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37, 89–92 (2009); see also Drake, supra note 169. R
237 See Abramowicz, supra note 236. R
238 O’Bryan, supra note 11, at 1118. R
239 Id.
240 Policies such as the legal status of same-sex marriage are in flux because the lower
federal courts are routinely striking down state constitutional or statutory bans on same-sex
marriage under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
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doctrines could be liberalized without legislative intervention.  The in-
heritance penalty for stepchildren may be hard to overcome by judicial
fiat, but policy preferences and a liberalization of equitable adoption to
include stepchildren could go a long way in preventing the disinheritance
of many children.  Recognizing ancestral property and imposing con-
structive trusts on second spouses could prevent the complete disinheri-
tance some children experience when their parents remarry, but these
adjustments may require legislative action.
Courts can also create or shift the presumptions in favor of func-
tional children, allowing for disinheritance only if a functional parent
expressly indicated a desire that the child take nothing.  The standard of
evidence in equitable adoption could be changed from “clear and con-
vincing” to a “preponderance of the evidence” to facilitate likely donor
intent without much difficulty at all.  And while courts are generally
bound to follow the intestacy rules strictly, they have far more room to
protect functional children in how they interpret lapse, class gifts, and
representation doctrines.  But courts are unlikely to make significant
changes unless the policy arguments support the change.  Thus, I now
return to the two important policy changes I think would help motivate
courts to be more attentive to the inheritance problems created by non-
traditional family structures and less enamored of the bright-line rules
that adoption and intestacy provide.  Revisiting the history of adoption
and our commitment to testamentary freedom provides compelling justi-
fications for changing our reliance on biology and adoption.
IV. PARADIGM SHIFT: RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION AND
FURTHER LIMITING THE DEAD HAND
One way to address part of the inheritance penalty problem is to
revisit and reprioritize the history of adoption law and to understand the
multi-faceted motivations that many adults have for caring for nonbio-
logical children.  By unlinking adoption from inheritance in its historical
context, we can unlink adoption from inheritance in the public imagina-
tion and in legal doctrine.  We also need to think critically about inheri-
tance and its function in society and in families.  For the past few
centuries the law has placed testamentary freedom at the center of suc-
cession law, denying most heirs and beneficiaries any legally enforceable
rights to an inheritance.  Only surviving spouses are recognized as hav-
ing legally binding claims on a spouse’s estate.241  But since everyone
will die, we should have a system of inheritance that explicitly furthers
the needs of the living.  The interests of the living should not be left to
241 The forced share for dependent children mandated under the Louisiana Civil Code is
the exception. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493–1495 (1996).
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the biases of judges searching for some hypothetical testator’s intent or
enforcement of traditional norms about the natural objects of one’s
bounty.  This is not to suggest that we should revive forced shares for
children.  Rather, we should return to the historical foundations of prop-
erty law, to the idea that property should serve the needs of the living,
not the ill-fated wishes of the dead.  If we look to functional relationships
rather than strict formal categories, we make the law more equitable and
create a legal order that assigns property rights in a way that can promote
socially beneficial behavior.242
A. Rethinking the Role of Adoption in History
The history of adoption law shows that formal legal adoption pro-
vided a legal solution to two complex social issues.  First, there were
many children throughout history whose parents died before they
reached an age where they could provide for themselves, whose parents
were unable to provide for them, or whose parents simply wanted to
transfer responsibility for raising and educating their children to someone
else.243  Societies have had to grapple with dependent children for centu-
ries, but most have used some form of extended family to perform this
function.  Other than the unusual case of Sparta, which removed children
into military camps, it was only with the rise of religious institutions in
the medieval period that dependent children might be moved out of in-
formal family-based living arrangements and into formal or state-spon-
sored institutional facilities.244  Orphanages, religious institutions,
apprenticeships, and even boarding schools provided options for more
children than the informal family networks, and they came into common
242 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy’s article, The Mandatory Nature of Inheritance, argues that we
should rethink inheritance as a duty to achieve intergenerational bonds that serve important
social and cultural purposes.  It is not socially productive when laughing heirs or even the state
through an escheat takes an inheritance.  Laughing heirs have not formed a bond with the
decedent, nor have they benefitted from a relationship with the deceased.  The decedent has
not benefitted from caretaking or emotional support from distant relatives who are preferred
over functional children or even stepchildren.  Allowing people to receive property that just
falls out of the sky in their laps serves no social purpose.  It is economically and emotionally
more efficient to establish a legal regime in which the people who receive the decedent’s
property are those who provide care, comfort, and support for the decent, or those whose
presence in the decedent’s life brought emotional or economic benefit. See Kreiczer-Levy,
supra note 198, at 106. R
243 See generally PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1963); Naomi Cahn, Per-
fect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1091 (2003); Amanda C. Pustilnik,
Note, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of
Adoption Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 268 (2002); see also Abramowicz, supra note
236. R
244 JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE 72, 100
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1983); Catherine J. Ross, Families Without Paradigms: Child Poverty
and Out-of-Home Placement in Historical Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1249, 1260–65
(1999).
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usage only in medieval Europe following the social and familial disrup-
tions of various plagues and wars.245  But even with the advent of or-
phanages, less formal options involving moving the children into the
homes of relatives or neighbors continued to operate alongside the insti-
tutional options.
Importantly, it was with the rise of formal institutions that children
were likely to be transferred into living arrangements where they had no
family ties and the prospect of a new family, or a surrogate family to
replace the natal family, became a matter of legal importance.246  Many
orphans, too, had property from their natal families, and there were
plenty of relatives and strangers willing to take those children in order to
get control over the property.  The Court of Orphans in late medieval
London placed children in families that agreed to raise the child and pro-
tect the child’s estate, but most families did so only if they had control
over the child’s property and could use it to maintain the child.247  For
propertyless children, courts did not generally get involved, and the chil-
dren were placed into homes as servants or taken in by religious institu-
tions until a suitable placement could be found.  If none appeared, the
child would generally remain in the religious institution and take vows or
simply work there until the child reached adulthood and could become
self-sufficient, either through learning a skill or through marriage.  Un-
fortunately, many of these propertyless children were neglected or over-
worked and died in childhood.
Officers in these institutions sought out new families to provide the
care and rearing of children who did not have a family network on which
to depend.  And in the nineteenth century, as these institutions branched
out from the traditional religious orders that often integrated these chil-
dren as adults into their order, moving children in and out to new fami-
lies became a social and institutional goal.248  Permanent legal adoption
245 Cahn, supra note 243, at 1107–10. R
246 Jack Goody talks about the Greco-Roman practice of adopting a child if a couple has
no male heir, but the adoptee was usually a relative, which was also true in early modern
France. GOODY, supra note 244, at 72; see also KRISTIN ELIZABETH GAGER, BLOOD TIES AND R
FICTIVE TIES: ADOPTION AND FAMILY LIFE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 38 (1996) (discussing
instances in which children were adopted into a family that replaces their biological family).
247 See generally CHARLES CARLTON, THE COURT OF ORPHANS (1974).
248 See Cahn, supra note 243, at 1090.  Naomi Cahn has explored how the different social R
trends within the children’s welfare movement of the nineteenth century shifted from a policy
of removing children from unacceptable family situations to attempting to fix the poor or
dysfunctional family so that children did not have to be removed from their biological parents
around the same time that states were passing general adoption statutes.  Even still, there were
fears by adoptive parents that adopted children would turn out like their biological parents:
drunk, feebleminded, or prone to illicit sexuality.  But as adoption became legally available
through legislative processes in the middle of the nineteenth century, popular culture reflected
the tension between a laudable desire to help unfortunate children and a fear that they carried
some indelible mark of failure or inadequacy, a fear that remains very much alive today. Id.
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became the express goal in order to free up institutional resources to
provide for the seemingly endless supply of needy children.  But adop-
tion often was not feasible, either because the child’s status and prospects
did not warrant adoption, or because the child already had property held
in a guardianship and was not seen as needing the formality of a legal
adoption and the new family and resources that would come with it.
There have always been needy children, and whether they are provided
for through informal family or village networks, institutions, foster care,
or other state-organized mechanisms, it is only in a subset of these situa-
tions that adoption was the purported or even an appropriate goal.
Adoption is the legal substitution of one family for another.249  But
for children sent to convents, apprenticed by their parents, living with
relatives, boarded out, or reared by others to acquire a certain skill, a
formal adoption was not expected or desirable.  For many child advo-
cates, simply getting children to adulthood was all that mattered.  If the
child was not adopted before reaching adulthood, there was no further
need to change the child’s legal status.  And while adoption of certain
parentless children became an important goal of these institutions, legal
adoption took backstage to the more important goal of providing for the
child’s basic needs.
In this context of child-saving institutions and the reality of child
dependency, the inheritance prospects of adoption simply were not a pri-
mary concern.  Inheritance rights may have been an added bonus to the
benefits of legal adoptions for orphaned children, but the immediate
needs of providing food and shelter for helpless children in the present,
and not hypothetical inheritances in the future, clearly dominated the de-
cisions of institutional actors.
However, inheritance became of greater significance between the
parent and the adoptive child once a child was placed and a relationship
developed; the immediate caregiving needs of the child gradually were
replaced by the child’s caregiving of the parent, and the institution was
no longer in the picture.  But as noted above, once the parent-child rela-
249 Pustilnik, supra note 243, at 268.  Amanda Pustilnik explored a lengthy history of R
adoptions and quasi-adoptions that took place throughout medieval France and England.  By
the early-modern period, English law may have discouraged formal adoption practices, but the
binding out of vagrant children was common.  Apprenticeships, which were lengthy contracts
in which parents agreed that their children would reside in the homes of other adults to be
trained in a marketable skill in exchange for the child’s labor, were legion in England,
America, and the continent.  But, as she notes, not all apprenticeship contracts were what we
would consider to be adoptions per se.  Many anticipated their termination when the child
reached a particular age and all legal and personal responsibilities for the parent to the child,
and vice versa, terminated.  But many apprenticeships evolved into something more, into life-
time relationships that may have resulted in the adults adopting the child, or at least bringing
that child into the adult’s home as more than just a servant, even if less than a family member.
Id.
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tionship reached that level, many parents did not feel it was necessary to
formalize the adoption, especially in light of the significant number of
states that prohibited adult adoptions.  The same inertia that has resulted
in such low will writing rates can also explain the same inertia in failing
to formalize functional parent-child relationships through formal legal
adoptions, especially when assuming that writing a will could eliminate
the need for an expensive and intrusive adoption.
Thus, the history of adoption and child protection services through-
out the past few hundred years shows that adoption played a very differ-
ent role than merely providing for an heir, despite the literary and social
myths surrounding adoption by the wealthy as depicted in the great Vic-
torian novels.  Adoption was not often part of the conversation about
taking in a child, nor was it expected by biological parents, dependent
children, potential adoptive parents, or institutional actors.  Since adop-
tion was a small part of taking care of needy children, and inheritance
was a small part of the adoption decision, it seems illogical that we have
made the linkages between adoption and inheritance so indelible in our
law.  This is especially true since those linkages do not reflect the bene-
fits parents receive of having children in their lives.
The second social issue concerns the needs of the substitute parent.
Religious orders needed new members, childless adults often needed
help on their farms or in their businesses,250 and many foster parents
today find satisfaction in helping dependent children, which the financial
support of the state allows them to do.  Before the institutionalization of
the elderly in nursing homes, there was the cultural expectation that at
least one child, usually a spinster daughter, would remain living at home
to care for parents as they aged, sacrificing her life and happiness to
support theirs.  If there were no spinster daughter, many aging adults
took in nieces or nephews or, in extreme cases, unrelated children to
provide this type of support.  Adults receive numerous benefits from hav-
ing members of a younger generation in their lives, from income tax
deductions to state financial support to the physical and emotional bene-
fits of caretaking as the adults age and become dependent themselves.
This reciprocal relationship, caretaking at one stage of life in exchange
for caretaking at another stage, underlies our cultural reliance on and
protection for family bonds.  And again, history shows that formal legal
adoption is appropriate in only a small subset of the situations in which
adults choose to care for children and receive the valuable benefits of
250 It is true, however, that one of the motives and effects of providing statutory mecha-
nisms for formalizing adoptions was to provide some state oversight into the adoption process
in order to provide for the interests of these children.  By leaving matters to contracts or
informal arrangements, the crass motives of those who simply wanted cheap child labor could
operate both in charitable and personal adoptions.
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doing so.  Inheritance rights, however, should take account of all of these
relationships, not just those for which formal adoption is a logical or
desired goal.
If we consider the multitude of reasons that adults take children into
their lives and form relationships with them, it makes little sense to limit
inheritance rights to only those adults who have the desire, wherewithal,
and opportunity to formally adopt.  In a large percentage of situations,
adults do not formalize the parent-child relationship through adoption
because they cannot afford to, the bond is not fully formed until the child
reaches adulthood and adoption is not then available, or living biological
parents may not consent and the adoptive parent does not want to go
through the process of terminating parental rights.251  Adults may care
for children in their professional or paid capacities (as foster parents or
religious professionals) and do not want to create expectations of adop-
tion in all the children they care for, even if they have developed special
relationships with one or a few of them.  Many adults do not want to
sever the ties children have with their biological families, and others sim-
ply do not want the state’s involvement in their private family arrange-
ments.  All of these are legitimate reasons for not legally adopting, and
yet none indicate a rejection of the child’s equitable claim for inheritance
considerations.  An adult may decide not to adopt a child but may plan to
execute a will giving the child her entire estate; but she may die before
doing so,252 or the will may be ruled invalid for a variety of reasons
unrelated to her intent to benefit that child through an inheritance.  There
must be a better way than formal legal adoption to determine which chil-
dren should have inheritance rights because, as we have seen in countless
cases, the parent often desires it, the child has performed as a child, and
the child has an equitable claim on the parent’s estate.  Perhaps more
importantly, social benefits flow from protecting the interests of depen-
dents and rewarding the intergenerational caregiving that families
undertake.
Rejecting the centrality of adoption and biology in defining inheri-
tance rights allows us to break down two particularly entrenched myths
about family and succession to property.  The first is that formal adop-
tion marks the bright line identifying true testamentary intent from gen-
eral benevolence toward dependency.  It is often assumed that the adult
who fails to adopt a child in his life does so precisely with the intent of
precluding inheritance rights by the child.  The adult is altruistic and
wants to help care for the child but does not want to raise expectations in
251 These are the reasons that are most identified in the equitable adoption cases as to why
a formal adoption was not consummated. See Weisbord, supra note 60, at 889; see also De- R
bunking the Myths, supra note 37. R
252 E.g., Kisamore v. Coakley, 437 S.E.2d 585, 585 (W. Va. 1993).
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the child or limit his own testamentary freedom.253  But life is rarely so
clear-cut, and evidence of intent is hard to glean from actions alone.  In
fact, the equitable adoption cases show a stunning number of situations
in which the adult did not formally adopt the child but clearly had dona-
tive intent that the child inherit. Seader and Hannifin were both cases in
which the adult did not adopt but made explicit efforts to have the child
inherit property, and the courts refused to validate the decedent’s dona-
tive intentions.  The decision not to adopt, or the failure to adopt, is more
often based on other factors than an explicit desire to preclude inheri-
tance rights, especially when children do not have statutory forced
shares.  A testator who wants to pass his property to a favorite charity,
friends, or even closer family members can easily execute a will to ac-
complish his testamentary wishes.  But the person who fails to adopt be-
cause of the cost, the invasion of privacy, or legal barriers is also likely
to be the person who fails to make a will, and inaction should not be
deemed proof of a desire to preclude inheritance.
Additionally, rejecting the centrality of adoption and biology in de-
fining inheritance rights allows us to break down the myth that the
unadopted child is undeserving, flawed, unnatural, or deceitfully trying
to step in between an aged decedent and his more deserving family.  As
we saw above in the many equitable adoption cases,254 the majority of
these children are being raised by adults who do not have children of
their own who could qualify as more deserving.  In most of these cases,
remote relatives challenged the rights of the child to inherit for what
certainly appeared to be motives of greed, and not a concern for the
memory or intentions of the decedent.  Where children or even more re-
mote relatives provided care to the aged decedent and maintained a
strong supportive relationship, those decedents usually left their property
to those caregivers and not random children in their lives.  But where
remote relatives are truly laughing heirs, living far away, the person the
adult would most likely want to have inherit his property is the child who
maintains close ties, cares for and visits the adult, and tends to the adult’s
physical or emotional needs.
Our modern laws place too much weight on the existence of a for-
mal legal adoption, in large part because we continue to rely on the cul-
tural myths suggesting that foster or stepchildren are undeserving or less
authentic, and that failure to adopt indicates an intent by the decedent
that the child in an adult’s life not have inheritance rights.  These two
253 This is the justification for the stepparent exception to equitable adoption – courts do
not want to discourage parental care-taking of minor dependents. See In re Estate of Seader,
76 P.3d 1236, 1246 (Wyo. 2003).
254 See In re Estate of Hannifin, 311 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2013); see also Debunking the
Myths, supra note 37; Weisbord, supra note 60, at 889. R
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myths, and our misplaced reliance on the bright-line rule that a legal
adoption indicates donative intent, not only frustrates a decedent’s intent
in many cases, but injures the very children that the adult took pains to
care for.  One of the important reasons adults take children into their
homes is that they care for them, love them, and value their relationships
with them.  Providing an inheritance is simply a continuation after death
of the care that they have shown during life.  Placing such a barrier be-
tween the donor and the donee after death, especially when the donor has
evidenced so much care prior to death, not only harms the donor by re-
jecting his intent, but also sours the memory and devalues the relation-
ship that the child had with his functional parent.
B. Rethinking the Role of Property and Inheritance
Just as recognizing that adoption law history reveals a much more
textured portrait of motives and intentions around adoption that is glazed
over by modern inheritance law, the narrow focus of the law on some
hypothetical intentions of the typical decedent ignores the very tangible
needs and expectations of functional and cut-off children.  Property
serves the needs of the living, or so the mantra goes.255  And of course,
the living will acquire the property of the deceased who cannot take it to
the grave with him.  So does it further or hinder donative freedom, public
policy, or the equitable claims of the living, to privilege the biological tie
at the expense of functional and cut-off children?  Should distant rela-
tives have priority over unrelated persons who have lived with the dece-
dent and formed emotional ties?
There is no question that inheritance law has shifted from very little
testamentary freedom prior to the Statute of Wills in 1540 to an almost
obsession with facilitating a testator’s gifting intentions regardless of so-
cial and personal impact.  Only the resilient elective (or forced) share for
a surviving spouse remains from the extensive limitations on dead hand
control that were prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Dower, curtesy, forced heirship, and primogeniture have gone the way of
the prison hulks to be replaced by nearly indestructible testamentary
trusts that can last almost in perpetuity, extending the dead hand poten-
tially for centuries.  By allowing testators to pick and choose their heirs
255 This phrase has occurred repeatedly in case law and in scholarship.  It refers to the
idea that property laws should be interpreted to protect the interests of the living and the
doctrine underlies the rule against perpetuities and rules against unreasonable restraints on
alienation. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRAC-
TICES 597, 629 (5th ed. 2010); see also LEWIS MALLALIEU SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1117, at 13 (2d ed. 1956) (“[O]ther things being equal, society is
better off, if property is controlled by its living members than if controlled by the dead.  Thus,
one policy back of the rule against perpetuities is to prevent too much dead hand control of
property.”).
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through testamentary devises, the law recognizes that statutory priorities
and mandated heirs may not represent every testator’s desires or satisfy
the needs of every situation.  By granting broad freedom to decedents to
dictate where their property would pass, the law assumes that people will
exercise their power to deviate from the default rules of kinship by con-
sanguinity and affinity whenever they do not wish that outcome.
But in our haste to promote testamentary freedom, we often lose
sight of the needs or claims of the living.  It’s not just the dependent
widow and minor children who will be left penniless if we do not protect
their claims to the decedent’s property; it also affects the claims of func-
tional and cut-off children whose emotional investment and labor in their
relationships with their parents will be soured and frustrated if we pass
family heirlooms or the house in which they were raised to more distant
relatives or stepfamilies.  Since the law of succession cannot rely on biol-
ogy to define modern family relationships anymore (and I’m not sure it
ever should have), it is a small step to recognize and prioritize the inter-
ests of the child rather than the parent at death.  The estate plans of most
decedents reflect a desire to protect and reward their loved ones, with
loved ones identified on the basis of personal interactions and not neces-
sarily biology.  But when the laws of intestacy and equitable adoption are
so rigid that the majority of decedents cannot protect and reward their
loved ones, the laws are no longer equitable.  Simply shifting the pre-
sumption from no inheritance in the absence of an estate plan or a formal
adoption, to a right to inherit unless the decedent provides otherwise,
would better reflect most decedent’s wishes.  There is no reason not to
shift the default rule and require decedents who want to deny inheritance
to their functional children or stepchildren to write down their intentions,
rather than require them to write down their intentions if they do wish
them to inherit.
The disinherited stepchild is a classic and relatively simple problem
that can only be partially planned around by astute testators and their
lawyers.  The average person is unlikely to even realize that such an “un-
natural” result is likely to occur in the basic case of the simple stepparent
scenario, and the living are very likely to be hurt, upset, and bitter at their
stepsiblings after the estates are administered.  There is no reason for the
law to work such inequities in cases that are happening by the thousands
every day.  Most estates aren’t valuable enough to justify lengthy and
expensive litigation over equitable adoption, pre-contract interference,
tortious interference with an expectancy, or some other relatively excep-
tional remedy.  Instead, some people will receive windfalls and others
will receive little or nothing.  The result for the living will be bitterness
and even more criticism and distrust of the legal system.
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In most blended families, the parties probably do not intend the dis-
inheritance of one set of children, and if they understood what would
happen, they probably would have taken steps to avoid the outcome.  The
bitterness among the survivors and the law’s lack of concern for true
donative intent justify our rethinking of the traditional assumption that
adults want children to inherit only when they have gone through the
formal legal channels of an adoption or are related by blood.  By focus-
ing on the inheritance penalty and how it frustrates expectations, inequi-
tably disadvantages a majority of children, and reveals the
ineffectiveness of the supposed opt-out mechanisms, we can begin to
chart a new path for succession law that bases inheritance on lived or
functional rather than biological or formal legal relationships.
Just as the “best interests of the child” standard has become the
norm in custodial decision-making, the best interests of the living should
become the norm in succession law, especially when the status of func-
tional children is at issue and the testator has not left clear instructions
otherwise.  We cannot say that it is inherently better for collateral heirs,
laughing heirs, or remote relatives to take an inheritance at the cost of
functional children’s welfare.  Nor can we say that it is inherently better
for biological children to take all of a parent’s property to the exclusion
of stepchildren, foster children, or adopted-out children.  The living will
always acquire the property of the dead, so at one level it matters not
who ultimately takes an inheritance.  However, protecting and rewarding
functional children who do provide the care, labor, and devotion of chil-
dren is a valid justification for changing the norms of inheritance law,
just as promoting equity within families to reflect actual and not biologi-
cal relationships is a valid legal goal.
Furthermore, protecting the likely intentions of most functional par-
ents, and certainly all biological parents of cut-off children, promotes
both the ideas of donative freedom embedded in succession law and pro-
tecting the living, thus better serving the multiple goals of succession and
property law.  The law’s obsession with, and jealous protection of, inher-
itance rights does not correspond to the intentions of most functional
parents.  As society has accepted the affective model of caretaking, and
as most adults agree that the best interests of children (and not inheri-
tance, child labor, or even reducing welfare rolls) should be at the heart
of the decision to parent, there is no reason for the law to remain the
jealous guardian of the property interests of deceased parents, whose ac-
tions during life speak louder than their silence at death.
V. A MODEL STATUTE
Recognizing that model statutes usually cannot be dropped un-
changed into each and every state’s probate code, this model statute pro-
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vides many of the pieces that could be adopted together, or separately, to
improve the inheritance protections for children of nontraditional
parents.
Preamble: All children are entitled to the care and support of at least two
parents during their minority, and they are entitled to a presumption of
inheritance rights from, through, and by those parents unless the parent
clearly and explicitly provides otherwise.
1A. Amendments to the Fresh Start Provisions
No child who is adopted shall lose inheritance rights from, through, or by
a genetic parent who continues to care for the child, houses the child, is
financially responsible for, or who maintains a parent-child relationship
with the child:
a) regardless of the marital relationship, or lack of a marital relationship
between the genetic parent and the adoptive parent, or
b) so long as the genetic parent’s parental rights have not been surren-
dered or terminated by a voluntary or judicial proceeding.
1B. Alternative Revisions to the Fresh Start Provision
Adoption of a child by the intimate partner of a genetic parent shall not
terminate that child’s rights to inherit from, through, or by any genetic
parent, or that genetic parent’s relatives, regardless of the marital status
of the child’s genetic parents and/or adoptive parents.
Commentary: Amendments to the fresh start provision are designed to
deal with the penalty faced by the cut-off child whose inheritance is jeop-
ardized if she is adopted by a co-parent.  This provision would normally
appear in the probate code that identifies the rights of adoptive children
in the context of inheritances.  But it is also important to make similar
changes to the family law or adoption codes to ensure that the fresh start
does not cut off the biological parent’s parental rights as well.  Alterna-
tive 1A provides language that is more inclusive, thus preventing the cut
off for children of both genetic parents if the child is adopted by a third
co-parent.  Most probate codes allow the child to inherit from her genetic
parent or her genetic parent’s spouse who adopts the child, but not the
genetic parent who was replaced by the stepparent.  The UPC, however,
allows the child to inherit from all three, that is both genetic parents and
a stepparent.  There is no reason, in states that permit inheritance by and
through all three adults, that the child could only inherit from the step-
parent but not the unmarried partner or co-parent.  This amendment
would therefore bring parity between married stepparents and their adop-
tive children, and unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex co-parents and
their adoptive children.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 78 23-DEC-15 16:42
78 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:1
2A. Intestate Succession: Spousal Shares
a) A surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the marital estate of a
decedent spouse.
b) The marital estate consists of the proportional value of the net probate
estate (or augmented estate)256 of a decedent spouse calculated by multi-
plying the decedent’s total net probate estate (or augmented estate) by
the following percentages:
If the decedent and the spouse were married to each The percentage is:
other:
Less than 1 year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3%
1 year but less than 2 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6%
2 years but less than 3 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12%
3 years but less than 4 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18%
4 years but less than 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24%
5 years but less than 6 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30%
6 years but less than 7 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36%
7 years but less than 8 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42%
8 years but less than 9 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48%
9 years but less than 10 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54%
10 years but less than 11 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60%
11 years but less than 12 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68%
12 years but less than 13 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76%
13 years but less than 14 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84%
14 years but less than 15 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92%
15 years or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100%
2B. Alternative Intestate Succession: Spousal Share
a) A surviving spouse is entitled to a life estate in one-half of a decedent
spouse’s net probate estate if the decedent had children with someone
other than the surviving spouse.257  The surviving spouse shall have the
power to consume the entirety of the property subject to the life estate in
order to provide for the health, education, maintenance, or support of the
256 This provision allows for the creation of parity between the intestacy and elective
share statutes by making the surviving spouse’s claim applicable to the same property.
257 This provision ensures that all of a decedent spouse’s property will pass to his or her
children, and not permanently to a surviving spouse or the surviving spouse’s later spouse or
children.  The life estate in one-half, however, ensures that the surviving spouse has adequate
property for support until death but will have no dispositive testamentary power over that
property.  If an estate is distributed under this provision, the decedent’s children will be enti-
tled to one-half of the decedent’s estate immediately upon the decedent’s death and a remain-
der in the other half that will become possessory at the death of the surviving spouse.
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surviving spouse and his or her dependents, including functional children
or stepchildren.258
b) A surviving spouse is entitled to a life estate in 100% of a decedent
spouse’s net probate estate if the decedent’s children are also the children
of the surviving spouse.
c) A surviving spouse is entitled to an absolute share of 50% of a dece-
dent spouse’s net probate estate if the decedent leaves no children or
lineal descendants, but leaves at least one surviving parent.
d) A surviving spouse is entitled to an absolute share of 100% of a dece-
dent spouse’s net probate estate if the decedent leaves no children, lineal
descendants, or parent.
Commentary: These intestacy provisions for the surviving spouse can be
made as complex or as simple as the state’s elective share provisions.
The key to these alternatives is to correlate the spousal intestacy share to
length of marriage, wealth of the surviving spouse, and whether the in-
testate share includes property from an earlier deceased spouse of the
decedent spouse.  The alternative provision uses a trust form or life estate
to protect the shares of the genetic children in cases involving steppar-
ents.  Since one of the primary goals of today’s estate plans is to give the
surviving spouse control if needed during life over the property, but have
final disposition pass according to the first spouse’s will or trust, the life
estate coupled with the power to consume effectively gives basic good
estate planning to all married couples without the need for expensive
estate plans.  Of course, the question of whether the surviving spouse’s
interest will be in trust or a legal life estate should be provided for, and if
the trust is used (which is the preferred mechanism), there should be a
statutory preference for the trustee—beginning with the surviving spouse
and then the children.
3. Functional Child Provision
Any child who functions as a child to any parent who functions as a
parent shall be deemed a child for all inheritance purposes unless the
parent explicitly provides otherwise, in writing, that the child is not to be
recognized as a child for purposes of inheritance.
a) Functioning as a child can be shown by evidence that the child lived in
the parent’s home for a majority of his or her first 20 years of life, identi-
fied the parent as a parent, looked to and treated the parent as a parent,
continued to have a relationship with the parent after the child reached
the age of majority, performed services for the parent such as caretaking
258 One might want to limit the use of the property for stepchildren to only those instances
when the surviving spouse’s intestate share includes property acquired from the estate of the
stepchildren’s genetic parent.
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or household labor, was given the parent’s last name, received economic
or emotional support from the parent, had a parent-child relationship that
was sufficiently long enough to form a parent-child bond, or any other
evidence that shows by a preponderance that a parent-child relationship
was formed.
b) Functioning as a parent can be shown by evidence that the parent
supported or housed the child during his or her minority, took applicable
tax deductions or obtained relevant tax credits as a result of supporting
the child, made relevant educational or medical decisions for the child,
received care and assistance in later years from the child, called the child
by the term “son” or “daughter” or otherwise held the child out to be a
child of the parent, gave the child his or her last name, received other
emotional or economic benefits from the child, named the child as a ben-
eficiary on non-probate instruments including (but not limited to) life
insurance, joint bank accounts, or employee benefit plans, or any other
evidence that shows by a preponderance that a parent-child relationship
was formed.259
c) Evidence of intent to deny inheritance rights to a functional child must
be in writing.
d) Any functional parent-child relationship recognized under this State’s
family law or adoption code, including any determination that it is in the
child’s best interests to be deemed a child for any purpose, is a determi-
nation that a functional parent-child relationship exists for all inheritance
and probate purposes.
e) Any child adopted by the legal spouse, legal domestic partner, or inti-
mate unmarried, co-resident partner of a genetic parent shall be treated as
a stepparent adoption for all purposes of the probate and family law
codes and the child’s inheritance rights from, through, and by the biolog-
ical co-parent will not be terminated.
Commentary: The functional child provision draws from the scholarship
on functional child relationships in family law and equitable adoption, as
well as recent scholarship on importing these considerations into the con-
text of inheritance.  It should be noted that in many instances, functional
parent-child relationships do not become fully formed until the child
reaches adulthood, so it is unwise to require that the bond be formed
during the child’s minority.  Even in cases where the child was already
an adult when he or she began a relationship with a functional parent,
259 UPC § 2-115(4) defines “functioned as a parent of the child” to mean “behaving to-
ward a child in a manner consistent with being the child’s parent and performing functions that
are customarily performed by a parent, including fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the
child, recognizing or holding out the child as the individual’s child, materially participating in
the child’s upbringing, and residing with the child in the same household as a regular member
of that household.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-115(4) (amended 2010).
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that relationship could meet the requirements of a functional parent-child
relationship for inheritance purposes if there is evidence that the parent
viewed the child in a way similar to the way parents view their adult
children.
4. Second-Parent Adoption Provision
In the adoption of any child in this State, a single person may adopt, a
married couple may adopt, two unmarried adults may adopt, and the
spouse or intimate partner of a genetic parent may adopt a child.  In all
adoptions in this State, the adoption shall not serve to terminate a child’s
rights to inherit from, through, or by a genetic or adoptive parent who
continues to have a parent-child relationship with the adopted child, re-
gardless of the marital status of the adoptive and genetic parents.
Commentary: This provision should be used to amend a State’s family
law or adoption code, and it would expressly link the definition of parent
and child in the family code to inheritance rights in the probate code.
One of the critiques of the 2008 amendments to the UPC is that the
probate code definitions of parent and child are independent of the fam-
ily code definitions.260  This dissonance permits the kind of penalties to
apply that dramatically affect children in nontraditional families.  And to
the extent that family codes are more open to functional parent-child re-
lationships and to undertaking “best interests of the child” analyses, the
family code definitions should prevail.
CONCLUSION
The vast majority of children today will face some form of an inher-
itance penalty in the next few decades when their parents die unless
courts and legislators do something now.  Every day children are essen-
tially disinherited not by their loved ones, the people who cared for them
and want them to have a better life, but by courts following strict legal
rules that leave little room for discretion or equity in determining and
honoring the decedent’s most likely intent.  The penalty will hit stepchil-
dren in blended families, children adopted by a co-parent, and millions of
children being raised by relatives, neighbors, friends, foster parents, or
siblings.  The reason these children will be unable to claim a share of
property left by a decedent functioning as a parent is that the law priori-
tizes the rights of the dead over the needs and claims of the living.  Pro-
tecting some abstract theory of donative freedom has become the excuse
for not protecting the rights of functional children to an inheritance, even
when not doing so clearly frustrates actual donative intentions of real
parents.  The argument that failure to formally adopt indicates an intent
260 See Tritt, supra note 14. R
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that a functional child should not inherit property is based on a discred-
ited myth that people make decisions about the children in their lives
primarily because of some far-removed concern about claims to property
in the future, and not about a desire to care for and protect children to-
day.  The shibboleth of equating adoption with inheritance demeans the
parent-child relationship that people form and dramatically hinders the
ability of functional parents to provide for their loved ones after they
have passed away.  When the law bases people’s claims to valuable
property rights on an abstract theory of intent that does not represent the
actual intent of a majority of the population, the law needs to change.
I have argued in this Article for a variety of legal changes, from
increased discretion for judges to use equitable considerations in evaluat-
ing the claims of functional children, to technical revisions to probate
codes to modernize the intestate shares of surviving spouses and chil-
dren.  The truly bizarre cut-off penalty facing many children who have
been adopted by a co-parent requires a simple revision to state probate
codes to add a co-parent exception to the fresh start provision.  Some of
the changes I advocate may be politically sensitive, particularly the ques-
tion of same-sex marriage.  But same-sex marriage is not a requisite.  My
underlying argument is that the marital status of the parents should not
determine inheritance rights, just as it no longer determines parental
rights.  More and more people are having children out of wedlock, and
those children deserve to be treated at least as well by the law as those
born in traditional married households.  The Supreme Court has held that
laws treating illegitimate children differently from legitimate children are
inherently suspect and should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.
I posit that administrative ease and bright-line rules, which have been
used to justify inheritance rights based solely on biology and legal adop-
tion, can no longer pass that higher level of scrutiny.  With a majority of
children being raised in nontraditional family situations, biology and le-
gal adoption simply do not rationally correlate to inheritance claims.
Protecting the inheritance claims of the living child over the dead not
only effectuates decedents’ intent, but goes a long way toward restoring
the human affections and values that underlie our law of inheritance.
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APPENDIX
A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE OF PROBATE AND
ADOPTION LAWS
SECOND PARENT OTHERSTATE RELEVANT PROBATE CODEADOPTION? NOTES
Not explicitly (though trial
courts have granted); any Exception for stepparent;
adult person may adopt,
otherwise, adopted child is child ofhusband and wife mayAlabama adopting parent and not the natural
adopt, and stepparent may parent for purposes of intestacy.
adopt spouse’s child. ALA. ALA. CODE § 43-8-48 (1991).CODE § 26-10A-5 (West
2014).
Not explicitly (though trial
courts have granted); Stepparent exception; otherwise,
husband and wife may child of adopting parents for
adopt, unmarried adult may intestacy; inheritance from orAlaska
adopt, and stepparent may through child by natural parents is
adopt. ALASKA STAT. precluded. ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.23.020 (LexisNexis § 13.12.114 (LexisNexis 2012).
2012).
Unclear; Any adult may
adopt; husband and wife Child of adopting parents;
may jointly adopt;
stepparent/spousal exception.Arizona preference for married ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2114
couples; no stepparent (West 2012).
section. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-103 (West 2014).
Unclear in light of 2012
“Descendants” defined to include
case.  Dep’t of Human
adopted children. ARK. CODEServs. v. Cole, 394 S.W.3d ANN. § 28-9-202 (LexisNexis318 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). 2012).  Adoption renders childArkansas Unmarried adults, husband
stranger to birth parents and child
and wife, and spouse/ descendant of adopting parent.
stepparent may adopt. ARK. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215CODE ANN. § 9-9-204 (LexisNexis 2009).(LexisNexis 2009).
Adoption creates legal relationship
of parent and child. CAL. FAM.Stepparents and domestic CODE § 8616 (West 2013).partners may adopt child of Adoption severs relationship with
spouse/partner.  CAL. FAM.
natural parent but there is aCODE § 9000 (West 2013).
spousal exception (although notAlso, in Sharon S. v.California clear if this contemplates domesticSuperior Court, the Supreme partners). CAL. PROB. CODECourt extended second- § 6451 (West 2009).  Can inheritparent adoptions to non-
through stepparents even withoutdomestic partners.  73 P.3d
adoption (although not clear if this554 (Cal. 2003).
applies to domestic partners). CAL.
PROB. CODE § 6454.
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No relationship between adoptee No
Any person may adopt. and genetic parents; parent-child relationship
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5- relationship exists between an with third
202 (2013).  Explicitly individual who is adopted by a party donor.
Colorado allows second-parent second parent and a genetic parent COLO. REV.
adoptions. COLO. REV. who consented or another genetic STAT. § 15-
STAT. § 19-5-203 parent who is not donor. COLO. 11-120
(LexisNexis 2013). REV. STAT. § 15-11-118–119 (LexisNexis
(LexisNexis 2013). 2013).
Relationship with biological
parents terminated and all rights toExplicitly allowed for.
adopting parents except forConnecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-
stepparents and second parent724(3) (2013).
adoptions. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 45a-731 (2013).
Yes. In re M.M.D., 662
A.2d 837 (1995).  Any Final decree of adoptionperson may petition for
establishes the relationship of
adoption but spouse must
natural parent and natural childjoin unless adoption is by a between the adopter and adoptee
stepparent. D.C. CODE for all purposes, including mutual§ 16-302 (West 2012).D.C. rights of inheritance andCourt may dispense with
succession as if adoptee were borninvestigation report when
to the adopter; inheritance betweenpetitioner is spouse or
adoptee and natural parents is cutdomestic partner of natural
off with spousal exception. D.C.parent of adoptee and CODE § 16-312 (West 2012).
natural parent consent. D.C.
CODE § 16-308.
Stepparent adoption does not alter
Unmarried person or relationship to natural parent. DEL.
husband and wife jointly CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 919
may adopt. DEL. CODE (LexisNexis 2009).  Nothing in
ANN. tit. 13, § 903 inheritance altered by stepparent
Delaware (LexisNexis 2009).  Second- adoption. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
parent adoption allowed by § 920; see also DEL. CODE ANN.
trial courts. In re Hart, 806 tit. 12, § 508 (indicating that
A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. adoption cuts off inheritance with
2001). natural parents except when
adopted by a stepparent).
Homosexuals cannot adopt
under FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.042(3) (West 2010),
but the Florida District Relationship with natural parentCourt of Appeal has held
severed except when spouse. FLA.Florida this unconstitutional. In re STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (WestAdoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 2010).3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010).  It is unclear whether
second-parent adoptions will
be allowed now.
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Any adult person but
husband and wife must file
jointly unless stepparent. Adoption terminates all legalGA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3
relationships (including(2010).  Natural parent must inheritance) of birth relatives. GA.
surrender rights. GA. CODEGeorgia CODE ANN. § 19-8-19 (2011).ANN. § 19-8-6.  No Inheritance rights for adoptive
appellate decision addressing parents and child. GA. CODE ANN.
same-sex adoptions, but § 53-1-8.permitted at trial court level.
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 642
S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2007).
Child considered natural child of
Any unmarried adult, adopting parent and natural parent
stepparent, or husband and is not considered a relative. HAW.
Hawaii wife jointly may adopt. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-16
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. (LexisNexis 2010).  But there is a
§ 578-1 (LexisNexis 2010). spousal exception. HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 560:2-114.
Child of adopting parents and not
natural parents, with spousal
exception. IDAHO CODE ANN.Idaho Unclear. § 15-2-109 (West 1996); see also
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 16-1508 to
-1509.
The Illinois Appellate Court,
First District, held that
unmarried same-sex
cohabitants have standing to Child is descendant of adoptedjointly petition for adoption. parent and not natural parent, withIllinois In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888
spousal exception.  755 ILL. COMP.(Ill. App. Ct. 1995). STAT. 5/2-4 (West 2007).Stepparent/civil union
adoption by statute.  750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/2
(West 2009).
Treated as natural child ofYes; appellate courts have
adopting parents and cease to be
allowed. In re Infant GirlIndiana treated as child of natural child.W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. IND. CODE § 29-1-2-8 (LexisNexisCt. App. 2006). 2011).
Lawful adoption extinguishes theSome counties allow
right of intestate succession of an
second-parent adoption;
adopted person from and throughIowa stepparent adoption is biological parents, with spousal
allowed. IOWA CODE
exception. IOWA CODE § 633.223§ 600.4 (West 2001). (West 1992).
Any adult may adopt or Adoption terminates right of birth
husband and wife jointly parent to inherit through and from
(one spouse needs consent adoptee (with spousal exception)
Kansas of other). KAN. STAT. ANN. but adoption does not terminate
§ 59-2113 (2005).  It is right of child to inherit from or
unclear whether second- through birth parent. KAN. STAT.
parent adoption is allowed. ANN. § 59-2118 (2005).
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Probably not.  S.J.L.S. v.
T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 Considered natural child of(Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (noting
adoptive parents and allin dicta that an unmarried
relationships with biological parentKentucky couple cannot use the
terminated except when spouse.
stepparent adoption KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520procedures in Kentucky to (West 2006).
establish legal parentage for
both partners).
Some counties have allowed
(Orleans Parish); state Upon adoption, adopting parent
attorney general said in a becomes parent of the child and
2007 advisory opinion said filiation between child and legal
that there is no provision parent is terminated; adopted child
Louisiana allowing for two unmarried and descendants retain right to
persons to adopt a child inherit from former legal parent,
jointly, and refusing to with stepparent exception. LA.
accept out of state adoption CIV. CODE ANN. art. 199 (West
does not violate the Full 2007).
Faith and Credit Clause.
In re Adoption of M.A., 930
A.2d 1088 (Me. 2007)
(holding that Maine’s Adopted person child of adopting
adoption statute does not bar parent except can inherit from
an unmarried same-sex natural parents if the adoption
couple from jointly decree provides; also adoption byMaine petitioning for adoption).  It spouse has no effect. ME. REV.
appears that domestic STAT. ANN. tit. 18A § 2-109 (West
partners are allowed to 2012); see also ME. REV. STAT.
jointly adopt as well. ANN. tit. 18A § 9-105.
Adoption of J.S.S., 2 A.3d
281 (Me. 2010).
Any adult may petition. Child includes adopted child,
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW though not stepchild. MD. CODE
§ 5-3A-29 (LexisNexis ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-205
2012).  Trial courts have (LexisNexis 2012).  SpousalMaryland
allowed. In re Petition of exception but otherwise not
D.L.G., No. 95179001/CAD considered child of natural parents.
(Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
City June 27, 1996). § 1-207 (LexisNexis 2012).
Adopted child is child of adopting
Yes. In re Adoption of parents and not natural parents,
Massachusetts Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 with spousal exception. MASS.
(Mass. 1993). GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-114
(LexisNexis 2011).
Adopted child considered heir of
adoptive parents and not heir at
law of a parent whose rights haveUnclear, though someMichigan been terminated. MICH. COMP.
counties allow. LAWS § 710.60 (West 2012).
Spousal exception. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.2114 (West 2003).
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Appellate court in 2010 did
not rule directly on whether
Minnesota law allows, but Adopted child is legal child of
said that it was not a adopting parents and shall not
Minnesota frivolous argument to inherit from birth parents, with
contend that Minnesota law spousal exception. MINN. STAT.
does not allow; some ANN. § 259.59 (2007).
counties allow (Aitkin and
Hennepin).
Child shall inherit from and
Adoption by couples of the through adopting parents and
same gender is prohibited. natural parents shall not inherit byMississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 or through child, with spousal
(West 2007). exception. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-
17-13 (West 2007).
Unclear but White v. White All legal relationships and all
suggests not because trial rights and duties between adopted
court dismissed non- child and natural parents (other
biological mother’s petition than natural parent who joins inMissouri for custody from ex-partner petition) cease. MO. REV. STAT.
and biological mother.  293 § 453.090 (2014).  Spousal
S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. exception. MO. REV. STAT.
2009). § 474.060.
Relationship of parent and child
between adopted child and
adoptive parents, and not with
former parents unless spouse.
Unclear, but the Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-202
Supreme Court in Kulstad v. (2013).  Adoption by spouse has
Maniaci affirmed trial no effect on intestate succession,
Montana court’s granting of parental and inheritance from or through
interest to former partner of child by natural parent is precluded
adoptive parent. 220 P.3d unless parent openly treated as
595 (Mont. 2009). child and has not refused to
support child. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-2-124; see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 42-4-311 (re-stepparent
adoption).
No. In re Luke, 640
N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002). Natural parents of adopted childCourt held that lesbian have no rights over adopted child’spartner could not adopt property by descent andpartner’s biological child distribution. NEB. REV. STAT.Nebraska because partner had not § 43-111 (2011).  Adopted person
relinquished parental rights. is child of adopting parent exceptThe dissent points out that for spouse. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
this is really about 2309 (2010).prohibiting second-parent
adoptions.
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Any adult person or two Child is legal child of adopting
married persons (mandatory parents; natural parents cannot
to join). NEV. REV. STAT. inherit from adopted child and
Nevada ANN. § 127.030 (LexisNexis adopted child shall not inherit from
2010).  Domestic partners natural parents with stepparent
are allowed. NEV. REV. exception. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN. § 127.045. § 127.160 (LexisNexis 2010).
Stepparent exception, but otherwiseAny husband and wife
upon adoption all reciprocal rights
together, unmarried adult, or
of inheritance with birth parentsNew Hampshire stepparent can adopt. N.H.
shall cease. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 § 170-B:25 (West 2014).  But no(West 2014).
alteration if agreement.
Adopted child treated as though
Second parent adoption. In born to adopting parent and
re Adoption of Two terminates rights and
Children, 666 A.2d 535 responsibilities of natural parent
New Jersey (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. except spouse; terminates
1995).  Stepparent/civil inheritance rights both ways.  N.J.
union adoption.  N.J. REV. REV. STAT. § 9:3-50 (West 2013);
STAT. § 9:3-50 (West 2013). see also N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:22-
3 (2010).
Parent barred from inheriting from
or through child if parent’s
parental rights were terminated.Trial courts have granted; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114
any individual or stepparent (LexisNexis 2012).  UponNew Mexico may adopt. N.M. STAT.
adoption, adoptee has all rightsANN. § 32A-5-11 including inheritance through(LexisNexis 2009).
adopting parent and vice versa.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-37
(LexisNexis 2009).
Second-parent
adoption. In
Yes. In re Jacob, 660 After adoption, birth parents have re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); no right to descent or succession N.E.2d 397
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 and adopted child cannot inherit (N.Y. 1995).New York (2010) (noting “two through birth parents, with Stepparent
unmarried adult intimate stepparent exception. N.Y. DOM. adoption.
partners”). REL. LAW § 117 (2002). N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW
§ 110 (2010).
Boseman v. Jarrell, 704
S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010)
(holding that a lesbian
partner’s second-parent Adoption severs relationship with
adoption was void because former parents but adoption by
the issuing court did not stepparent has no effect and
North Carolina terminate the parental rights adoptive parents are parents for
of the biological mother, her purposes of intestate succession.
partner, as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-106
statute).  Two unmarried (2013).
individuals cannot adopt
jointly. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48-2-301 (2013).
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Unclear.  Husband and wife Adoptee becomes stranger to
or unmarried adult or biological parents but treated as
North Dakota stepparent may adopt. N.D. legitimate blood descendant of
CENT. CODE § 14-15-03 adopting parents. N.D. CENT.
(2003). CODE § 14-15-14 (2003).
No. In re Adoption of Doe,
719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01
App. 1998) (denying the (2004).  The final adoption decree
petition of woman to adopt terminates all legal relationships
her partner’s biological between the adopted person and
child, stating that the the adopted person’s birth parents,
adoption by an adult who with spousal exception.  Adoption
Ohio was not the child’s decree creates the relationship of
stepparent would terminate parent and child between the
the parental rights of the petitioner and the adopted person,
biological parent by as if the adopted person were a
operation of law because the birth descendant of the petitioner,
unambiguous language and for all purposes including
meaning of the statute inheritance.
required strict construction).
10 OKL. ST. ANN. § 7503- Child entitled to inherit from and
1.1 (1998).  Husband and through adoptive parents (and vice
wife, married person if other versa) but biological parents haveOklahoma
spouse is parent or relative, no rights to descent or distribution,
or unmarried person may unless spouse.  10 OKL. ST. ANN.
adopt. § 7505-6.5 (1998).
“Any person” may adopt.
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.309
(2013).  Stepparent adoption.
Id.; In re Adoption of
M.M.S.A., No. D8503- Treated as child of adoptive61930 (Or. Cir. Ct., parents for intestate succession andMultnomah County Sept. 4,
ceases to be treated as child ofOregon 1985) (granting the joint
natural parents except forpetition of a lesbian couple
stepparent. OR. REV. STAT.for one woman to adopt the § 112.175 (1969).biological child of the
other).  Domestic partners
given same rights as married
individuals. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 106.340 (2008).
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Any individual may adopt.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2312
(2014); In re Adoption of
R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195
(2002) (allowing adoption to
take place without Adopted person considered issue
relinquishment of parental
of adopting parents; not considered
rights when cause is shown issue of natural parent except for
that such relinquishment is inheriting from natural kin (otherPennsylvania unnecessary under the
than parents) if maintained familyparticular circumstances of
relationship with adoptee; spousal
the case.)  The court in
exception.  21 PA. CONS. STAT.R.B.F. noted that it would ANN. § 2108 (2014).be absurd to allow same-sex
couples to adopt jointly—
which the statutes already
permit—but not allow one
of the partners to adopt the
child of the other.
A child lawfully adopted shall be
deemed the child of the adoptive
parent(s) for the purpose of
inheritance by and from the child.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16 (2014).Any person may adopt, The birth parents of the adopted
though married persons haveRhode Island child shall be deprived of all legal
to petition jointly. R.I. GEN.
rights respecting the child, and theLAWS § 15-7-4 (2014).
child shall be freed from all
obligations of maintenance and
obedience respecting his or her
birth parents; spousal exception.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-17.
After decree, parent and child
relationship between adoptee and
Any South Carolina resident adoptive parent and biological
may petition the court to parents relieved of all rights and
adopt a child.  S.C. CODE responsibilities; does not changeSouth Carolina ANN. § 63-9-60 (2013). rights of biological parent who is
Unclear whether this allows not expressly affected by final
second-parent adoptions. decree.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-
760 (2013).  Spousal exception.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109.
Adopted individual is child ofUnclear; any minor child
adoptive parents and not birth
may be adopted by anySouth Dakota parents, with spousal exception.
adult person. S.D. CODIFIED S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114LAWS § 25-6-2 (2014). (2014).
Adoption establishes legal
relationship of parent and child
Unclear; any person over 18 between adoptive parent and
may petition but spouse adoptee; adopted child shall notTennessee
must join. TENN. CODE inherit from biological parent if
ANN. § 36-1-115 (2014). relationship terminated by
adoption. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
1-121 (2014).
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In re M.K.S.-An “adult” may petition for V., 301
adoption but child can only S.W.3d 460be adopted if parental rights Adoption creates parent-child (Tex. Ct.
terminated, with spousal/ relationship between adoptive App. 2009)
stepparent exception; but if parent and child for all purposes, (noting that
relationship terminated with including inheritance. TEX. FAM. partner could
one parent, and person CODE ANN. § 162.017 (West
not adoptTexas seeking to adopt has had 2005).  Natural parents shall not
absent birth
actual care, control, and inherit from or through adoptee but
mother’spossession of child for a child shall inherit from and
consentperiod of one year, then through natural parents. TEX.
though she
child may be adopted. TEX. ESTATES CODE § 201.054 had standingFAM. CODE ANN. (LexisNexis 2014).
to sue for§ 162.001(b)(4) (West
conserva-2004).
torship).
No; child may not be Adopted child is child of adopting
adopted by a person parents and not natural parents,
cohabiting in a relationship
with spousal exception; inheritance
that is not a legally validUtah from or through a child by either
and binding marriage under
natural parent is precluded. UTAH
the laws of Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 (WestCODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) 2014).(West 2008).
When decree of adoption becomesYes; any person may adopt final, adoptive parent and adoptee
and if a family unit consists have legal relation of parent and See also
of a parent and the parent’s
child and have right of inheritance. Adoptions ofpartner, and adoption is in VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-104 B.L.V.B. &
the best interest of the child, (West 2014).  When adoption E.L.V.B., 628
the partner of a parent mayVermont decree becomes final, all parental A.2d 1271
adopt a child of the parent.
rights and duties of each former (1993)Termination of the parent’s parent terminate, including (recognizingparental rights is inheritance both ways. VT. STAT. second-parent
unnecessary. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-105.  Stepparent adoptions).ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102
exception. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.(West 2014). 15A, § 1-102.
Unclear; however, under
settlement of case, no
absolute barriers to adoption Adopted person is child of an
for LGBT individuals. adopting parent and not of the
Virginia Prashad v. Copeland, 685 biological parents, with spousal
S.E.2d 199 (Va. Ct. App. exception. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
2009); Miller-Jenkins v. 102 (2014).
Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d
330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
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There is a presumption of
legal parentage for any child
born during a registered
domestic partnership or for
adults acting as parents A lawfully adopted child shall not
during the first two years of be considered an “heir” of his or
a child’s life. WASH. REV. her natural parents. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §26.26.051, CODE ANN. § 11.04.085
Washington .101, .106 (LexisNexis (LexisNexis 2014).  Adopted
2014).  Additionally, some individual is lineal descendant of
counties inWashington have each of his or her adoptive parents.
granted second-parent WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
adoptions; also, any person §11.02.005(8).
who is legally competent
and 18 may adopt. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.140.
Upon order of adoption, any
person previously entitled toSome trial courts have parental rights is divested of allgranted; any person not legal rights, with spousal
married, any person with
exception.  For descent and
spousal consent, or anyWest Virginia distribution, after order ofhusband and wife jointly
adoption, legally adopted child
may petition for adoption.
shall inherit from and through theW. VA. CODE § 48-22-201
adopting parent or parents, with(2001).
spousal exception. W. VA. CODE
§ 48-22-703 (2001).
No.  In re Angel Lace M., A legally adopted person is treated
516 N.W.2d 678 (1994) as a birth child of person’s
(denying single petition of adoptive parents and adoptive
woman to adopt her parents are treated as birth parents
partner’s adopted child and of adopted person for purposes of
petition of mother to allow transfers at death, to, through, and
her partner to adopt the from the adopted person; this only
child upon termination of applies if at least one of the
her ex-husband’s parental following applies:
rights).  The court held that (1) The deceased person is the
while the petitioner met adoptive parent or adopted child.
eligibility requirements to (2) The adopted person was a
Wisconsin adopt, the child was not minor at the time of adoption.
eligible to be adopted (3) The adoptive parent raised the
because one parent still adopted person in a parent-like
retained parental rights, and relationship beginning on or before
further that the parent’s the child’s 15th birthday and
rights would be lasting for a substantial period or
automatically terminated if until adulthood.
the petitioner were allowed WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2014). A
to adopt the child.  The legally adopted person ceases to be
court also found no treated as child of person’s birth
constitutional violation to parents except when relationship to
the child’s or petitioner’s one birth parent is not replaced.
rights. Id.
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An adopted person is child of an
adopting parent for inheritance
purposes; adoption by spouse of
natural parent has no effect.  An
adopted person shall inherit from
all other relatives of an adoptive
Wyoming Unclear parent as though he or she were a
child who was born to the
adoptive parent, and the relatives
shall inherit from the adoptive
person’s estate as if they were his
or her relatives. WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 2-4-107 (2015).
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